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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO RESPONSE 
TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
AMEND PETITION BY ADDING TWO 
ADDITIONAL CAUSES OF ACTION 
PLAINTIFF'S REPL Y TO RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
PETITION 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, through his attorney of record and files this, his 
Reply to Response to Motion for Leave to Amend Petition and in support thereof states 
as follows; 
1. Defendant Camas County in it Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend cites four 
Idaho cases to support its argument that this court should not exercise its discretion to 
allow amendment. In fact each case supports the proposition that the court should in the 
interest of justice exercise its discretion to allow amendment. 
2. Defendant cites Sinclair Mktg., Inc. v. Slepert, 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d 385 
(1985), in support of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition. In 
Sinclair, the Idaho Supreme Court held that " ... it was an abuse of the trial court's 
discretion to deny the motion to amend the complaint. On remand the district court 
should liberally allow for the amendment to the pleadings under I.R.C.P. 15(a)." id at 
1006. The facts and underlying rationale were that Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to 
Amend concurrently with a motion to amend partial summary judgment where the major 
claim of liability for a debt remained pending. Similarly, in the case before the bench, 
Plaintiffs underlying claim for declaratory relief springing from a series transactions or 
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading, and 
preliminary injunctions entered herein, sought to be supplemented and which involve 
common questions of law and fact. 
3. Defendant cites Baxter v. Carney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000) in support 
of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition. In Baxter plaintiff 
sought to add a third party after the date for trial had been set. The Supreme Court 
upheld the District Court's ruling that "it would be unfairly prejudicial at this point to 
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allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action 
as it no\v stands." Id at 169. The Court reasoned that Defendants would be prejudiced by 
the amendment. that the third party sought to be added was not a necessary party, and the 
issues sought to be resolved were not directly related to the action against the Defendants. 
In the instant case no prejudice will be caused to Defendant in allowing the amendment. 
In fact resolution of the dispute will be expedited by allowing the amendment. It is true 
that the issues raised by the proposed amendment could be litigated in a separate lmvsuit, 
but why delay justice? Why force these issues, arising from the same series of 
transactions, into another court? Defendant could forever avoid justice by continuing to 
illegally adopt the same flawed ordinances. All of this, at the wasted expense of Camas 
County taxpayers. 
4. Defendant cites Black Canyon Raquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 
119 Idaho 171, 804 P .2d 900 (1991) for the proposition that is not an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to deny a motion to file an amended complaint. This is an accurate, but 
incomplete, statement of law. In Black Canyon, the Court, recognized that, "In 
determining whether an amended complaint should be allowed, where leave of court is 
required under Rule 15( a), the court may consider whether the new claims proposed to be 
inserted into the action by the amended complaint state a valid claim." Id at 175. The 
tort claims raised by Plaintiff in Black Canyon, unlike those raised here. were 
unsupported by law or fact, and were time barred. No such allegation is made in the case 
before this honorable court. 
5. Finally, Defendant cites Hinkle v. Winey, 126 Idaho 993,895 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 
1995) in support of its argument to deny leave to file a second amended Petition. In 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 3 
PETITION 
Hinkle the District Court's denial of a motion for leave to amend \vas affirmed on appeal. 
The Court decision was based mainly on the concern for delay in resolving the main issue 
between the parties, right to possession of real property. Id at 997. The Court also noted 
that the evidence relating to the proposed new claims was "entirely different from that 
necessary for the original causes of action." 
In the case at bar the evidence regarding the proposed new declaratory relief 
claims is in most instances exactly the same genre of evidence used to prove the original 
claims, because the Defendant has simply repeated the same abusive process. Finally, the 
Hinkle Court determined that Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by litigating the proposed 
new claims in separate litigation. Here, Plaintiff would be massively prejudiced if he is 
forced to chase Defendants from one Court to another seeking justice for the very same 
wrong. Defendant will incur additional damages in the form of continued uncertainty in 
Camas County Zoning, continued subdivision approvals, continuing discriminatory 
zoning and attorney fees. Furthermore, Camas County tax payers would also suffer 
further, additional and ongoing delay in final resolution of these issues and increased 
attorney fees and costs. 
SUMMARY 
It is clear throughout the case law that although leave to amend is to be freely 
given, I.R.c.P. 15(a), the decision to grant or refuse permission to amend is left to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. It does not appear that the Courts have issued a clear 
statement as to the criteria, elements or factors to be considered by the trial court in 
exercise of its discretion. Criteria that have been considered are delay and prejudice to 
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either party. In this case those factors favor Plaintiff and favor granting the Motion for 
Leave to File Second Amended Petition. 
Defendants, spending the public fisc, should favor a speedy and economically 
expeditious resolution of this claim, not delay and further litigation. Defendants will not 
be caused prejudice, in the form of a delay in resolution of the underlying issue, in 
granting the Motion. Plaintiff, on the other hand, will suffer justice delayed and possibly 
forever denied if Defendants are permitted to simply adopt replacement ordinances and 
put off until another day final determination of the legality of their actions. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff seeks to introduce wholly new factual allegations 
under entirely new theories of law. This argument overlooks the basic fact that Plaintiff 
seeks, in part, only to provide a remedy under this Court's Preliminary Injunction 
preventing the Defendant from operating under the enjoined zoning ordinance. The 
Defendants' actions in adopting yet another amended zoning ordinance could legally and 
logically only be based upon provisions of the enjoined ordinance. Despite the 
conclusion of trial on the original declaratory relief issues, the underlying issue, the 
legality of Camas County's amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance 
remains due to the actions of Defendant intentionally side stepping the order of this court. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court grant leave to file a Second 
Amended Petition, as herein described. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this /Q day of 4d 2008, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's Reply to Response to Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, via facsimile to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney 
for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 
83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5800, and Paul Fitzer, Attorneys for Camas 
County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number 
208331 1202. 
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PETITION 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg., Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, 10 83340 
Tel: 208 622 7878 
Fax: 208622 7129 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL 
MEMORANDUM 
PLAINTIFF"S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER, through his attorney of record and tiles this, his 
POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM in support of the relief requested in PlaintitTs 
Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment and in support thereof states as follows: 
1. This Court has been extensively briefed regarding the issues presented by the 
pleadings and evidence herein. Plaintiff refers this Honorable Court, in addition to all of 
the documentary evidence and testimony, to Plaintiffs Petition and Defendant Camas 
County's Anslver thereto, Amended Petition and Amended Answer thereto; Defendant 
Camas County and the Individual Members of the Camas County Board of County 
Commissioners' Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction and Plaint[ff's Response to Camas County Defendants 
Objections to Application for TRO and Preliminary Restraining Order and Request for 
Rule 1 I Sanctions; Plaintiff's Briefin Support of Applicationfor Preliminary Injunction 
Second Evidentiary Hearing, County Defendants Post-Hearing Memorandum (2d 
Evidentiary Hearing), Plaintiff's Reply thereto, all relating to Defendant Camas 
County's failure to maintain a reviewable record and Decision on Requirements of 
"Transcribable Verbatim Record" and other Records for Purposes of a PreliminG1Y 
Injunction: Defendant's Post-Hearing Alemorandum Objecting to Plainttff's Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction (Conjlict-of-Interest Allegation), Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant Camas County's Post-Hearing A1emorandum Relating to Conflict (~r Interest 
Allegation and Decision on Conflict of Interest Issue, for Purposes (~r Preliminary 
Injunction: Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence; and finally 
Plaintiff's Trial Brief 
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2. The facts are no longer in dispute. After more than a full year of litigation, after 
denials and evasive discovery responses and partial trial, Defendants entered into a 
Stipulation of Facts. Plaintiff does not intend to repeat any statement of fact, recitation of 
law or arguments previously advocated or rebutted in any of the referenced documents. 
Plaintiff does ask the Court to consider the basic statement of law, that no 
Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance can be amended other than through the 
LLUPA process. Therefore, any amendment to a Comprehensive Plan or Zoning 
Ordinance that is null and void must logically also be null and void. Given the 
overwhelming evidence regarding the lack of reviewable record, conflict of interest, 
failure to provide lawful Notice of Hearings and failure to consider the "substantive 
dictates" of LLUPA, the real issue before the Court is the proper remedy. 
3. Plaintiff requests that the Court give consideration to all of the arguments, and all 
of the evidence in support thereof, or lack thereof as the case may be, and to render 
specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to each issue presented. For 
example, in the Court's Decision on Requirements of "Transcribable Verbatim Record" 
and other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction care was given to specify the 
documents and records that might satisfy the reviewable records requirements of LLUP A. 
The Court ruled. for purposes of Preliminary Injunction, on the more limited issue of 
failure to maintain a transcribable verbatim record, but indicated that unless Camas 
County produced additional records an adverse Declaratory Judgment would issue. No 
additional records were produced at trial. 
Plaintiff also requests the Court consider the Camas County Defendants conduct 
and positions taken throughout the proceedings. The Camas County Defendants have 
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repeatedly attempted to mislead the Court by misstatements of fact and law. Early in the 
proceedings, on or about May 14, 2007, Defendants filed O~jection to Plaint(/J's 
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction asserting the 
Plaintiff had no rezone application pending, when in fact such an application was 
pending. (See pg 7 Objection to Plaint(fJ's Applicationfor Temporary Restraining Order 
and Preliminary Injunction) 
In this same pleading the Camas County Defendants' request Rule 11 Sanctions. 
In this regard the Defendants' make a host of unfounded allegations. The most 
groundless of these accusations was stated by Defense counsel as follows, 
The allegation that the County failed to keep a trancribable 
verbatim record of the proceedings at issue is laughable. Plaintiffs and 
their counsel would have learned this if the ever had the bright idea to 
check with the County to see whether the tapes exist before alleging they 
don't exist. But they did not. The County did, in fact, keep a 
transcribable record of every single public meeting and public hearing 
on the amendment to the zoning ordnance and comprehensive plan. 
This Court has made a finding of fact that all relevant proceedings were not recorded. 
Thus verifying that Plaintiff's Attorney made the required inquiry, accurately determined 
the facts, and law, and proceeding according to his ethical duties. Whereas the Camas 
County Defendants and their attorneys, showing a complete lack of good faith and 
candor, attempted to mislead the court and intimidate an opponent, demonstrating 
disrespect for the legal system and a Rule 11 violation. 
Idaho Code Section 12-117 provides for an attorneys fees award to the prevailing 
party, and costs against a county, if a party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or 
law. In Bogner v. State Dep't of Rev. and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859; 693 P.2d 1056, 
1061 (1984) The Supreme Court described the purpose of the statute, as follows: 
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We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as' a 
deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action: and (2) to provide a 
remedy for persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial 
burdens of defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct 
mistakes agencies should never have made, " 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the statute is one which states that attorney fees 
"shall" be granted if the action of the agency was groundless or arbitrary, Rincover v. 
State Dep't of Finance, 129 Idaho 4442, 444; 926 P .2d 626, 628 (1996). In this case not 
only were the Commissioners various actions violating LLUPA groundless, arbitrary and 
self serving, their defense continued to assert and controvert issues without a reasonable 
basis in law or fact throughout these proceedings. Plaintiff respectfully requests this 
Honorable Court to make a finding of fact and law that the Camas County 
Commissioners "acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law," Plaintiff further 
requests this court set an evidentiary hearing to determine the proper amount for an order 
awarding Plaintiff attorney fees and costs. 
REMEDY 
Due to the unusual procedural posture of this case the question of a proper remedy 
remains, The applicable statutes allow the Court to fashion a remedy providing for a 
declaration either aftlrmative or negative in form and effect regarding the parties' rights, 
status and other legal relations. I.e. Section 10-1201. The Declaratory Judgment Act is 
" ... remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity 
with respect to rights, status and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed and 
administered." I.e. 10-1212. Plaintiff invites this Honorable Court to enter an order that 
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\vill both terminate the present controversy and remove uncertainty in past and future 
land use proceedings in Camas County. 
Searching more broadly for statutory authority in fashioning a remedy, Title 30. 
Corporations, provides some guidance. Reasoning that a County is a body corporate. the 
Court, in addition to traditional equitable remedies and mandamus, may consider 
appointment of a Special Master. In that all but one member of the Planning and Zoning 
Commission, and all but one member of the Board of Commissioners is ineligible for 
deliberation on amendments to the Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, given the Camas 
County Defendants history of LLUPA process abuse, given that these Defendants have 
ignored or avoided this Court's Preliminary Injunctions, a Special Master could insure a 
lawful process in addressing an overhaul of the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
or a major rezone application. if that is to occur in Camas County. 
In summary, Plaintiff requests this Court enter an Order that includes the 
following: 
1. Declaration that the Amendments to the Camas County Comprehensive Plan 
adopted May 25, 2006, as Resolution 96, and as amended on March 29, 2007, and 
amended again on May 12. 2008 as Resolutions 114 and 115, are all and each of them, 
null and void. 
2. Declaration that the Amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance, 
adopted April 18, 2007 as Ordinance # 153, and later amended on May 12, 2008. as 
Ordinance # 157 and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29, 2007. as Ordinance 
#150, and later amended on May 12, 2008 as Ordinance # 159 are all and each of them, 
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null and void. Furthennore. any and all subdivision application approvals. and building 
pennit approvals. based upon said Ordinances must also be declared null and void. 
3. Enjoining Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of County 
Commissioners from processing land use applications, including rezone applications, 
subdivision applications, and/or building penn it applications, conditional use Pennit 
applications, and or variance applications regarding any lands whose zoning or land use 
designations were altered as a result of any of the above referenced voided Resolutions 
and/or Ordinances, except to process applications that were pending prior to adoption of 
those said Ordinances and/or Resolutions under the land use designation and zoning 
designation in place prior to May 25, 2006. 
4. Appointment of a special master to oversee the undertaking of any large scale 
amendments to the Camas County Comprehensive Plan and/or Zoning Ordinance and 
Zoning Designation Map. 
PLAINTIFF'S POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY PLAINTIFF 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this /G.... day of .:;; ~r'r 2008, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Reply to Response to Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, via facsimile to Phillip J. Collaer, Attorney 
for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 
83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5510, and Paul Fitzer, Attorneys for Camas 
County Defendants 950 W. Bannock St., Ste 520, Boise, Idaho 83702, facsimile number 
208331 1202. 
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-t-Paul J. Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock SL Suite 520 
Boise, 10 83702 
Tel: 208/331/1800 
Fax: 208/331/1202 
Attorneys /iJr Defendants Camas County, the Individual Commissioners. and Ed Smith in his 
capacity as a member (~rthe Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
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Case No. CV-07-24 
DEFENDANTS CAMAS COUNTY, 
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF 
THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS' POST 
TRIAL BRIEF 
Come now. Camas County. Idaho (the County). by and through its duly elected Board of 
County Commissioners (the Board). Ken Backstrom. Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the 
Individual Commissioners). by and through the County Defendants' legal counsel, Moore Smith 
Buxton & Turcke. Chtd .. and submits its Post-Trial Brief. 
\G\NA 
DEFENDANTS TRIAL BRIEF -- 1 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
In September 2005, the Camas County Board of County Commissioners (the "Board"') 
directed the County Planning and Zoning Commission (the "Commission") to conduct a 
comprehensive planning process in order to send the Board recommended changes to the County 
zoning ordinance, zoning map. and comprehensive plan including its land use map. Over the 
course of two years, the Commission and the Board conducted multiple \vorkshops, 
informational sessions, public meetings, and public hearings. In adopting the Comprehensive 
Plan including the Land Use Map ("Plan"), the Commission conducted public hearings on March 
28. 2006. April 4t\ 11 tho and 17th • 2006. Legal notices of the time and place of the hearings were 
published in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the Plan and map were available for 
review prior to the hearing. All public hearings were recorded. I Plaintiff attended and testified 
at length at each and every hearing. The Commission recommended its approval to the Board on 
April 17,2006.2 
The Board conducted a public hearing for the Plan including the land use map on May 
17.2006 and thereafter deliberated on May 22 and 25, 2006 adopting the Plan on or about May 
25.2006. See Resolution 96 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder. p. 344).3 To include 
I See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 225). Additionally, the 
actual tapes themselves are admitted into evidence as Defendant Camas County Evidence Exhibit T. 
2 Planning and Zoning Commission: Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map: 
Public Hearing - March 28, 2006; 
Legal Notice - March 8, 2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 3) 
Minutes - George Mal1in was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. (6) 
Public Hearings April 4. 2006. April 11.2006, and April 17.2006; 
Legal Notices - March 15. 22, and 29th , 2006 providing legal notice for public hearings on April 4, II tho and 17th . 
(Detendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 4. 6. and 7) 
Minutes - George Mm1in was in attendance and testitied (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 99. 106. 
109); 
Commissioner's versions of the comprehensive plan land llse map provided to Board (Defendant Camas County 
rvidence Binder p. 116) 
Board of County Commissinners- Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map 
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all land within the county, the Board conducted an additional public hearing on the Plan on 
March 14, 200i which included the largely uninhabited northern portion of the county adopting 
Resolution 103 on or about March 29, 2007. See Resolution 103 (Defendant Camas County 
Evidence Binder p. 421). Plaintiff attended and testified at all public hearings. All meetings 
\vere recorded. 
The Commission conducted public hearings with regard to the Zoning Ordinance and 
Map on October 10 and 17, 2006, and the Commission thereafter deliberated and ultimately 
provided its recommendation to the Board on October 24, 2006. Legal notices of the time and 
place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the zoning 
ordinance and map were available for review prior to the hearing. All public hearings were 
recorded. Plaintiff attended and testified at each and every hearing. 5 
The Board conducted a public hearing on March 14 and thereafter deliberated on March 
19,26, 27, 29 and April 18, 2007 ultimately adopting the zoning ordinance (Ordinance 153) and 
zoning map (Ordinance 150). Legal notices of the time and place of the hearings were published 
in the Camas County Courier and the copies of the zoning ordinance and map were available for 
Public Hearing - May 17.2006; 
Legal Notice - April 26.2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 229) 
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 30 I) 
Tabled to May 22 and 25 meeting for Deliberation; 
Resoultion 96 Adopted on May 25. 2006 
Transcribable Record (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 333; Actual Audio Tapes admitted into 
record as Defendant's Exhibit T. 
-t Legal Notice February 21.2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 231) 
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 327) tabled 
until 3;(9. thereafter tabled unitI3/26. 3/27. and 3/29 for deliberation and adoption. 
5 Planning and Zoning Commission - Zoning Ordinance and included Map 
Public Hearing - October 10.2006: Tabled to Oct 17th . 24th for continued public hearing and deliberation 
Legal Notice - September 28.2006 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 17-18) 
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 204-211. 
214) 
Recommendation of Commissioner provided to Board (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 212) 
Transcribable Record - (See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 
225): Additionally. the actual tapes themselves are admitted into evidence as Defendant Camas County Evidence 
Exhibit T [sic]: 
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review prior to the hearing. All public hearings were recorded. Plaintiff was present and 
testified at all public hearings.6 Plaintiff brings this action seeking to enjoin the County"s Plan 
and Zoning Ordinance/Map by virtue of his status as a property owner in the County. Among his 
contentions is that his property has been downzoned. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. County-wide Comprehensive Plans, Zoning Ordinances, and Map are Legislative, 
as opposed to Quasi-judicial, in nature and are thus not subject to LLUPA Judicial Review. 
The Plaintiff in this cause of action appears to bring both a petition for judicial review 
and a declaratory judgment action to enjoin the County's county-wide 1) Comprehensive Plan 
and Land Use Map; 2) Zoning Ordinance; and 3) Zoning Map. The Supreme Court has recently 
specifically precluded a plaintiff from clothing an action as a petition for judicial review but 
seeking civil remedies via a declarative action, and vice-versa. See Euclid v. City o.fBoise, No, 
6 Board of County Commissioners Zoning Ordinance and Map 
Public Hearing - March 14.2007: adjourned to 3/19. 3126. 3/27. 3/29 for deliberation 
Legal Notice - February 21. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 231.233 Maps provided) 
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 3327-331) 
Tabled to May 22 and 25 meeting for Deliberation: 
Sign in Sheets - (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 336-343) 
Ordinance 150 Adopted on March 29. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 499) See p. 237 Legal 
Notice 
Transcribable Record (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 333: Actual Audio Tapes admitted into 
record as Defendant's Exhibit T. 
Public Hearing - April 18.2006: Zoning Ordinance 
Legal Notice - March 28. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 236) 
Minutes - George Martin was in attendance and testified (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 332) 
Ordinance 153 Adopted on April 18. 2007 (Defendant Camas County Evidence Binder p. 50 I) See p. 238 Legal 
Notice 
Transcribable Record ~. (Defendant Camas Coullty Evidence Binder p. 333: Actual Audio Tapes admitted into 
record as Defendant's Exhibit T. 
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33974, September 23, 2008 7 The two actions cannot be combined. The Local Land Use 
Planning Act Idaho Codes §67-6501 et seq. ("LLUPA") provides a limited remedy for certain 
land use decisions in the form of judicial review. 8 Some land decisions are reviewable under 
LLUPA: some are not. In order to understand which means of review are available, it is 
necessary to understand the distinction drawn by the courts between legislative and quasi-judicial 
actions. Such a distinction is crucial to determine the plaintiffs ability to challenge the 
governmental activity in question, the due process rights afforded, and a court's standard of 
review. If the governmental action is quasi-judicial, then it is subject to review under LLUPA. 
However, if the activity is legislative, then such activity falls outside LLUPA's judicial review 
protections and a court's review of such legislation is subject to very limited oversight. "While 
legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, 
they cannot be attacked by petition for judicial review." Cowan v. Board (~lCom 'rs olFremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501,512,148 P.3d 1247, 1258 (2006). 
1. Quasi-Judicial vs. Legislative Activity 
The Courts tirst delved into this legal distinction in City of Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 
Idaho 90, 117 P .2d 461 (1941) which held that zoning ordinances are subject to very limited 
judicial review, due to their legislative nature. "Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of 
the exercise of that discretion, unless arbitrary action is clearly disclosed." Grimmett, 63 Idaho at 
92. 117 Idaho at 463; see also Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 511, 
By alleging violations of LLUPA's judicial review provisions including 67-6521. 67-6535. 67-6536. Plaintiff is 
seemingly seeking statutory injunctive relief pursuant to LLUPA clothed as a declarative action. The courts have 
clearly prohibited plaintiffs from doing an end-around the judicial review provisions in favor of civi I actions. Bone 
v. City ojLeH'iston. ] 07 Idaho 844. 693 P.2d ] 046 ( ]984). In this proceeding. in seeking LLUPA's judicial review 
protections. Plaintiff has improperly submitted additional evidence and failed to follow Rule 84. IRep. Judicial 
review actions must be confined to the agency record. Plaintiff has emphatically declared that the Plaintiff has 
violated LLUPA's provisions. but failed to allege harm, substantial rights that have been prejudiced. or other 
damages. See. Euclid, at 5. Thus. Plaintiff is precluded from seeking the judicial review provisions of LLUPA and 
Defendant should be awarded attornev fees. 
g LLUPA. in tllrn. incorporates lAPA:sjudicial review provisions. thereby bringing into play the familiar 
"substantive evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" tests. 
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567 P.1d 1257. 1262 (1977) ("'Zoning is essentially a politicaL rather than a judicial matter, over 
\vhich the legislative authorities have generally speaking. complete discretion".) Thereafter. the 
Supreme Court clarified the distinction in Cooper v. Ada County Comm 'rs. 101 Idaho 407. 614 
P .2d 947 (1980) which articulated: 
It is beyond dispute that the promulgation or enactment of general zoning plans 
and ordinances is legislative action. Dawson, 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d at 1257; 
Harrell v. City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243. 506 P.2d 470 (1973); Cole-Collister 
Fire Protection District v. City 0.1' Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); 
Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P.2d 461 (1941). However, appellants 
urge that a crucial distinction be drawn between a zoning entity's action in 
enacting general zoning legislation and its action in applying existing legislation 
and policy to specific, individual interests as in a proceeding on an application for 
rezone of particular property . 
. . , Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of 
property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited 
review, and may only attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse 
of authority. On the other hand. a determination whether the permissible use of a 
specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial 
authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test. 
Basically. this test involves the determination of whether action produces a 
general mle or policy that is applicable to an open class of individuals, interests, 
or situations, or whether it entails the application of a general mle or policy to 
specific individuals, interests, or situations. If the former determination is 
satisfied, there is legislative action; if the latter determination is satisfied. the 
action is judicial. 
Cooper. 101 Idaho at 409-410. 614 P.2d at 949-950. See also Cmnln. 143 Idaho at 512. 148 
P.3d 1258 quoting Burt, 105 Idaho at 67, 665 P.2d at 1075 ("Legislative activity by a county ... 
is differentiated from quasi-judicial activity by the result: legislative activity produces a rule or 
policy which has application to an open class of citizens whereas quasi-judicial activity impacts 
specific individuals, interests, or situations.") 
Action is legislative when it affects a large area consisting of many parcels of 
property in disparate ownership .... Conversely, action is considered quasi-judicial 
when it applies a general rule to a specific interest such as a zonmg change 
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atTecting a single piece of property, a variance, or a conditional use permit. ... It 
is analogous to a general rezone which affects a large number of people-in this 
case, mUltiple owners of multiple tracts of land approximating over eight hundred 
individuals, each with varying affected interests and impacts, and which is highly 
visible to the public. . .. The amendment of the plan and zoning of the annexed 
property affects the interests of all persons in the city in some manner. Such 
widely felt impact and high visibility is consistent with action deemed legislative. 
Burt. 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1077: see also Dawson. 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. In 
Cooper, the Court articulated that legislative actions are to be evaluated with a restricted 
standard of review; as a form of judicial deference to legislative actions. See also Gay v. County 
Commissioners of Bonneville County. 103 Idaho 626, 627, 651 P .2d 560, 561 (Idaho App. 1982). 
"This restrained standard of review is appropriate to such legislative determinations as the 
adoption of comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances:' Jd. The basic 
idea is that when a county or city takes action that affects a broad number of people, the action is 
like that of a legislative body. The remedy is political, not judicial. "Legislative action is 
shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory 
that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls." BlIrt v. City olJdaho Falls. 105 Idaho 65, 
68,665 P.2d 1075, 1078 (1983) quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410,614 P.2d at 950. While 
legislative actions by counties are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments, 
they cannot be attacked by a petition for judicial review. Id: See also Scott v. Gooding County, 
137 Idaho 206, 208, 46 P.3d 23, 25 (2002). 
2. The County's Actions are wholly legislative in nature 
In the present action, the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are county-
wide legislation affecting the entire county. As general legislation pertaining to "many parcels 
of property in disparate ownership", they are wholly legislative in character. Burl, 105 Idaho at 
67,665 P.2d at 1075. This Court intimated that the zoning map is quasi-judicial in nature citing 
the Cooper court's finding that the action of the Board of Commissioners in acting upon 
re:::oning request was quasi-judicial in nature. By virtue of the word "rezone" this Court 
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determined that the proceeding was quasi-judicial in nature. Cooper is wholly different from the 
present situation. In Cooper, the Appellants themselves had submitted an application to rezone 
specific property. The Court held that the "application for rezone oL\pecffic property required a 
decision in the nature of an administrative, quasi-judicial determination of individual rights:' 
Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409.614 P.2d at 949 (Emphasis added). In contrast to Cooper, the County 
zoning map does not affect a single piece of property pursuant to a specific application by a 
specific applicant, but to the county as a whole. As expressed in Burt, such actions are 
legislative in nature and are not afforded judicial review under LLUP A. 
B. Statutory Remedies are Unavailable to Plaintiff: LLUPA does not provide Plaintiff 
judicial appellate review in legislative, as opposed to quasi-judicial activity. 
The legislative vs. quasi-judicial distinction is a product of over half of a century of case 
law producing a fairly straightforward rule: If the action is quasi-judicial, then it is subject to 
judicial review. If the action is legislative, then it falls outside the purview ofLLUPA'sjudicial 
review provisions. Strangely, the legislature does not address the distinction in the text. and with 
the most recent 2008 Supreme Court decisions. Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County. 145 Idaho 
630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008) and Highland's Development Corp. v. City of Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 
188 P.3d 900 (2008) even the Court seems to have ignored fifty years of jurisprudence in favor 
of a basic statutory interpretation: LLUPA authorizes judicial review of five, and only five, 
types of permits: variances. special use permits, subdivisions. PUD's, and building permits. 
Comprehensiye Plans, Land Use Maps. Zoning Ordinances, and Zoning Maps rezoning property 
are not among the enumerated accepted bases for reyiew and are not subject to the statutory 
judicial reyiew pWYisions of LLUP A. 
"LLUPA grants the right of judicial review to persons who haye applied for a permit 
required or authorized under LLUPA and were denied the permit or aggrieved by the decision on 
the application for the permit." High/and's, 145 Idaho at 962. 188 P.3d 904. The PlaintitTs 
action does not pertain to a specific application or permit filed by Plaintiff nor an adjoining 
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landowner. Plaintiff is not appealing the issuance or denial of a special use permit. building 
permit. variance permit, PUD permit, subdivision permit, nor any other type of permit. Plaintiff 
is not appealing the issuance or denial of an application for rezone, annexation nor any other 
application. Thus, the Plaintiff does not have the standing nor the statutory authority to 
commence an action against the County seeking to enforce the due process protections and 
substantive dictates under LL UP A's judicial review provisions including, but not limited to, 
failure to maintain a transcribable record, failure to produce written findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, conflicts of interest, due process considerations, and other "substantive dictates" alluded 
to by the Plaintiff. Awarding attorney fees to the City of Boise in Highland the Supreme Court 
on June 18, 2008 held "[b ]ecause there is no statute authorizing judicial review of the City's 
actions in this case, we dismiss the appeal." 
1. Idaho Code §67-6521: Plaintiff cannot maintain an action as an "affected person" 
LLUPA limits a litigant's ability to seek judicial review allowing only an "affected 
person" to seek judicial review as provided for in the Idaho Administrative Procedural Act 
(lDAPA). See Idaho Code § 67-6521(1); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74,73 P.3d 84, 
87 (2003). An "affected person" is "one having an interest in real property which may be 
adversely ({fleeted by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." §67-
6521(l)(a) (Emphasis Added). Plaintiffs challenges under LLUPA must be denied as a matter 
of law as: 1) the Plaintiff is not challenging the issuance or denial of a permit; 2) County-wide 
legislation does not authorize development; and 3) the Plaintiff does not have an interest in 
property \vhich may be adversely affected. 
In Giltner, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs 
petition for judicial revie\v holding that the IAPA and its judicial review standards apply only to 
agency actions. and a county is a local governing body and not an agency for purposes of the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("'IAPA''). The plaintiff in seeking to overturn Jerome 
County's comprehensive plan land use map. argued that it had statutory authority to appeal this 
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legislative action pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6521 as an "afTected person". The Court disagreed. 
The Supreme Court unequivocally held that an 
ordinance amending the comprehensive plan map does not authorize any 
development. A comprehensive plan is not a legally controlling zoning law, it 
serves as a guide to local government agencies charged with making zoning 
decisions. . .. Because the amendment to the comprehensive plan map does not 
authorize development, [the plaintiff] is not an affected person under that statute. 
Therefore, Idaho Code § 67-6521 does not provide any right to provide judicial 
review in this case. 
Giltner. 145 Idaho at 633,181 P.3d at 1241 (2008) at 3-4. 
In Highland. the Supreme Court curtailed the appellate reVIew provISIons of LLUP A 
even further in applying general zoning principles. i.e. the zoning code and map, to a specific 
pIece of property. In Highland. the applicant submitted an application entitled 
"annexation/rezone" seeking annexation to the City of Boise with a zoning classification of R-3, 
or three units per acre. The property's vested existing zoning in the county would have allowed 
densities of up to six units per acre. The city council approved the annexation of the property, 
but instead of approving the requested R-3 zoning or even the existing R-6, the property was 
zoned "A" (Open) permitting only one dwelling unit per acre. The applicant sought judicial 
review under LLUPA for this "downzoning" of the property. The Supreme Court held that an 
application did not involve the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development. Because 
there was no statute authorizing judicial review of Boise City's actions. the case was dismissed 
and the Court awarded attorney fees to the City. 
Rejecting the dissent's concern that such a ruling \vill prevent property o\vners from 
obtaining judicial review of decisions rezoning their property, the Court succinctly stated that "it 
will noC as affected land O\vners can seek relief through a declaratory judgment action as 
demonstrated in JfcCuskey v. Canyon County. 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953 (1993). 
In the present action, unlike in Highland. there isn't even an application for a rezone of 
specific property. The challenged legislative activity is the enactment of countywide 
comprehensive planning and zoning. Such legislatiw activity is not afforded the due process 
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protections of LLUPA as evidenced by the plain text of the statute which limits such judicial 
review to the "issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development". ') Thus. Plaintiff is 
precluded from invoking LL UP A's appellate provisions. 10 
2. Transcribable Verbatim Record 
Similarly, Plaintiffs challenge to the County's alleged failure to maintain a 
transcribable record must fail. Idaho Code §67-6536 which provides in pertinent part: 
In every case in this chapter where an appeal is provided for, a transcribable 
verbatim record of the proceeding shall be made... . The proceeding envisioned 
by this statute for which a transcribable verbatim record must be maintained shall 
include all public hearings at which testimony or evidence is received or at which 
an applicant or qtfected person addresses the commission or governing board 
regarding a pending application or during which the commission or governmg 
board deliberates toward a decision after compilation of the record. 
(emphasis added), As discussed, there is no appellate review of the County's legislative activity 
as it does not pertain to a permit. Additionally, Idaho Code §67-6536 mandates a transcribable 
record only for a public hearing pertaining to a pending application at which an applicant or 
ciffected person addresses the Board, evidence is received, or the Board deliberates. Per Giltner 
and Highlands. there is no pending application in county-wide comprehensive planning and 
zonll1g. 
Lastly, the County has in fact maintained a record of all public hearings pertaining to 
the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance. and map. Pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6509, a 
'i The objective of statutory construction is to derive the intent of the legislature. which begins \vith the literal 
language of the statute. Where the language is unambiguous. the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body 
must be given effect. there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory construction. and the courts shall 
apply the plain meaning. Cowan v. Board o/Com 'rs o/Fremont County. 143 Idaho at 512. 148 P.3d 1258. 
10 The District Coul1 in its preliminary injunctive order suggests that Idaho Code §31-IS06 seems to make any order 
of the Board subject tojudicial review. Actually. the statute provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided by law". an 
aggrieved person may seek judicial review of a board's actions pursuant to IAPA. The Supreme Court in the 2008 
decisions. Giltner and Highlal1d~, clearly provide that the judicial review provisions of LLUPA are strictly and 
statutorily limited to five. and only five. applications for a permit. Thus. the specific. on point. LLUPA statute 
trumps the general Title 31 provision granting review .. [ u jnless otherwise provided by law". 
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"record of the hearings, tindings made, and actions taken" shall be maintained by the County. 
Audio recordings were maintained and submitted into evidence representing each and every 
public hearing for all the challenged legislation. See Planning and Zoning Tape Catalog and 
Board of County Commissioner Tape Catalog, Defendant Camas County's Evidence Binder, p. 
225-226,333 as well Defense Exhibit T, the audio tapes themselves. 
3. Written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
Idaho Code §67 -6535 provides that the approval or denial of any application provided for 
in LLUPA be based upon standards as set forth in the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. 
and to be in writing. Plaintiff asserts that this statute requires the County to issue written 
findings of fact. conclusions of law for legislative actions such as comprehensive planning and 
zoning. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that all decisions relating to a comprehensive plan and zoning 
ordinances must be based upon standards set forth in ... itself: the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinance. As the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and Highlands, 
there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review provisions of LLUPA. 
Here, there is none. Lastly, the zoning ordinance, map, and comprehensive plan are all written 
documents which in and of themselves are public documents or records promulgated in a public 
meeting and contained in the record. See Evans v. Teton County. 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 
(2003). Res Ipsa Loquitur: the thing speaks for itself. 
c. Declaratory Judgment Action Challenges to Legislative Activitv 
Idaho Code § 1 0-1202 provides that: 
"[a]ny person ... whose rights ... are affected by a .. , municipal ordinance .. may 
have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... 
ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights .... 
Because the Plaintiff is not challenging the issuance or denial of a permit enumerated in 
LLUPA. judicial review per the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act and LLUPA is precluded. 
Thus. the Plaintiff is limited to challenge. in the form of a declaratory judgment action. the 
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legislative activity of the County itself which is subject to a much stricter burden of proof and 
limited standard of review. To prevail, the Plaintiff carries the burden to provide a clear showing 
that 1) there is a justiciable case or controversy; 2) that he has standing to bring a declarative 
action: 3) that the ordinance in question was confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and 
CaprIClOUS; 4) that the Plaintitf has suffered actual harm or a substantial right has been 
prejudiced; and 5) the nexus that this actual harm was caused by the County's actions. 
1. Preliminary Threshold Requirements: An Actual or Justiciable Controversy 
As a matter of constitutional and state law, a declaratory judgment may only be rendered 
vvhere an actual or justiciable controversy exists lodged by one who has suffered particularized 
or personal harm that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public. Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513, 516, 681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). Miles v. Idaho Power Co .. 116 
Idaho 635, 639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989); Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc., Inc. v. State ex reI. Batt, 
128 Idaho 831, 834, 919 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1996). 
"Although the Declaratory ludgment Act, Idaho Code Title 10, chapter 12, bestows the 
authority to declare rights, status, or other legal relations, that authority is circumscribed by the 
rule that 'a declaratory judgment can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable 
controversy exists'." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, 133 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006) 
quoting Harris, 106 Idaho at 516, 681 P.2d at 991. Generally, justiciability questions are 
divisible into several sub-categories including, but not limited to standing and mootness. Id. See 
also Miles. 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. Thus, a preliminary consideration prior to 
addressing potential challenges as to the validity of the ordinances is \vhether there is a 
justiciable controversy: 1) Has the matter been rendered moot? 2) Does the Plaintiff have 
standing to bring this cause of action; and. 3) Is the Plaintiff s requested relief a legally viable 
and cognizable interest? 
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a. flfootlless 
On or about May 12, 2008, the County adopted the 2008 Comprehensive Plan, 
Comprehensive Plan Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map which by operation of law 
repealed all predecessor ordinances and resolutions in conflict there\vith. As such, the remedy, 
an injunction of the 2007 plans and ordinances, is merely academic as the present controversy 
itself is thereby rendered moot in all respects. "A case becomes moot when the issues presented 
are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome." Goodson v. 
Nez Perce County Board of County Commissioners, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 P.2d 614,616 
(2000). "A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will 
have no practical effect upon the outcome." lei. See also Cowan, 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 
1255. In Goodson, the plaintiffs alleged that procedural violations were committed in the 
promulgation of a 1996 personnel policy manual. During the pendency of the cause of action, 
the Board of County Commissioners adopted a 1997 version of the personnel policy manual. 
The Supreme Court determined the cause of action was rendered moot. The adoption of the 
1997 manual withdrew the application of the 1979 and 1996 versions of the manual and it was 
therefore unnecessary for the court to determine whether the commission breached the 
employees' contract by adopting the 1996 manual. 
In C0>1Ian, the plaintiff argued that the board committed due process errors in granting an 
application for a preliminary plat. The Supreme Court held that the Board's subsequent approval 
of a second application for preliminary plat rendered the litigation concerning alleged procedural 
and substantive violations committed in processing the first application moot. "Therefore, there 
is no live controversy. and the plaintitr s arguments relating to the first application are moot:' 
Id. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 1255. "The appellants have received all the relief to 
\vhich they might have been found to be entitled. Only hypothetical questions remain. It being 
impossible for this court to grant appellants other or additional relief: we \vill not proceed to 
formal judgment on the hypothetical issues but will dismiss the appeal." In Re Doe I. 179 P.3d 
300.301 (2008) quoting Dorman v. YOUI1f;, 80 Idaho 435, 437.332 P.2d 480, 481 (1958). 
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In the present action, the Plaintiff has sought injunctive relief pertaining to the adoption 
of the 2007 Zoning Ordinance and Map and Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. Ordinance 
No. 157 enacts a ne\v zoning ordinance repealing all prior zoning ordinances. Ordinance No. 
158 enacts a new zoning map repealing all prior zoning maps. Resolution No. 15 enacts a new 
comprehensive plan and land use map repealing all prior comprehensive plans. Thus, the 
Plaintiffs action to enjoin prior ordinances and resolutions shall be rendered moot as the remedy 
for alleged errors committed in the 2007 ordinances have become hypothetical. As such, there is 
no justiciable case or controversy and the case should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
h. Standing 
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for a court to render declaratory 
judgments. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63. 69. 822 P.2d 960, 966 (1991). However, the 
Declaratory Judgment Act does not relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the 
action in the first instance. Selkirk-Priest, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 P.2d at 1035. Standing, 
meaning a party's right to seek judicial enforcement of a right, is a "fundamental prerequisite" to 
invoking the jurisdiction of the courts. Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 800. 53 P.3d 1217. 
1219 (2002). "It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to 
invoke a court's jurisdiction must have standing." Van Valkenhurgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 
135 Idaho 121, 125, 15 P .3d 1129. 1132 (2000). Standing is a component of the constitutionally-
based case-or-controversy rule and the threshold necessary to obtain standing cannot be 
legislated to require less than the constitutional test. ,Voh. 137 Idaho at 801. 53 P.3d at 1220. In 
other words. the declaratory judgment act is not a forum for those \vith general complaints about 
the conduct of one' s local governing board. When considering whether a party has standing. the 
focus is on the party, not the issues the party raises. Jliles. 116 Idaho at 641. 778 P.2d at 763. 
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to invoke the 
court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure the concrete adversariness which sharpens the 
presentation upon which the court so depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions." As rdined by subsequent reformation. this requirement 
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of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a "distinct 
palpable injury" to the plaintifl but also a "fairly traceable" causal connection 
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. 
ld. To satisfy the standing requirement, the Plaintiff must "allege or demonstrate an injury in 
fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the 
claimed injury:' ld. Or, put differently, the Plaintiff must possess a "personal stake" in the 
controversy. See Rural Kootenai Org.. Inc. v. Board of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 84 L 993 P.2d 
596, 604 (1999). Indeed, the Plaintiff must show a "peculiar or personal injury that is different 
than that suffered by any other member of the public." Selkirk-Priest, 128 Idaho at 834, 919 
P.2dat 1035. 
Where the courts have upheld the standing of a plaintiff in a land use matter. a central 
factor in establishing standing was plaintiffs proximity to the affected areas coupled with a 
particularized harm. In Cowan, an applicant wished to subdivide high density home sites on a 
parcel immediately adjacent to Cowan's property; a predominantly rural low density area. Thus, 
as the application concerned a specific parcel of property, the case was properly brought as a 
petition for judicial review invoking increased scrutiny and protections. The Court determined 
that Cowan had standing to bring the action as his property, immediately adjacent to the 
proposed subdivision would be adversely impacted by a high density subdivision. In AlcCuskey, 
the appellant challenged the Canyon County Zoning Ordinance because it downzoned his 
property from heavy industrial to a rural residential. The court found that he had standing by 
virtue of the actual downzone of his property. 
In 5·;chncidcr, an adjacent land owncr to a proposed subdivision sought to enforce a road 
easement through the subdivision. The adjacent landowner was held to have standing by virtue 
of his literal connection to the proposed subdivision and the harm sutTered should he lose such 
access to his property. In Butlers v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 501. 960 P.2d 18 L 184 (1998) the 
plaintiff challenged a Latah County approval of an applicant's conditional usc permit to erect a 
radio transmission tcmer. While an important factor, the Court reasoned that even the proximity 
is not enough to achieve standing; that individualized harm was the paramount requirement: 
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[A] grievance relating to status as an owner of land within a designated area does 
not relieve a complainant of the necessity of demonstrating a "distinct palpable 
injury" traceable to the challenged governmental conduct. It is the quality or 
magnitude of the injury suffered which must differentiate a plaintiff from the 
citizenry at large in order to confer standing. The situs of owned property in 
relationship to an area touched by an ordinance is relevant to a standing inquiry 
only insofar as the property's location exposes the landowner to peculiarized 
harm. 
ld. The court in Butters determined that the plaintiff had standing by virtue that she O\\<l1ed land 
in close proximity to the tower; the tower loomed over her land; and its physical invasiveness 
affected her enjoyment of her property. 
Although the location of her property alone does not confer standing, the location 
does expose her to peculiarized harm. In particular, Butters contends that she had 
to spend $1,500 for a new telephone system to eliminate the tower's radio signal 
from her telephone and that the tower's radio signal still broadcasts through her 
daughter's compact disc system. 
ld. In Bopp v. City a/Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488. 716 P .2d 1260 (1986), the plaintitT challenged a 
city ordinance vacating a public right-of-way in a bridge and the city's subsequent lease of the 
underlying property for development of a shopping center. The Supreme Court held that because 
Bopp, who owned no property adjacent to the vacated right-of-way. asserted no injury peculiar to 
himself, but only such injury as was sustained by the general pUblic, he could not maintain the 
declaratory judgment action. 
In Young v. City of Ketchum. 137 Idaho 102.44 P.3d 1157 (2002), the Supreme Court 
held that the plaintifTs lacked standing to challenge a services contract between the city and the 
local chamber of commerce under which the chamber agreed to distribute tourist information and 
promote the area. The city paid for those services from revenues raised by a local option tax. The 
plaintiffs alleged that they vvere indirectly injured because: (a) the chamber's activities under the 
contract would attract visitors and second homeo\vners. vvhich would drive up the plaintitTs' land 
values. thereby increasing their real estate taxes: (b) the plaintiffs vvould ultimately pay the tax 
because the businesses that ,vere taxed ,vould pass the cost on to their customers: and (cl the 
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money that the city paid to the chamber under the contract would reduce the city's funds 
available for essential services, causing the city to increase levies against the plaintiffs' 
properties. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they "do not point to any 
irtiury that is not shared alike by all citizens and taxpayers in the City nor have they alleged that 
the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury:' 137 Idaho at 106, 44 P.3d at 
1161. 
The Plaintiff has wholly failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the Comprehensive 
Plan and Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map has caused him to suffer any 
actual, threatened, or particularized harm. Plaintiff owns the following parcels of property in 
Camas County: 
1) Property: forty acre parcel at 770 E. 240 N. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A); 
b. After the amendments, the property was zoned Agricultural (A). 
c. Result: No change. 
2) Property: twenty-nine acre parcel west of Soldier road. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments, the property was Agricultural (A) allowing one 
unit per twenty acres; 
b. After the amendments. the property was zoned Residential, allowing one unit per 
acre. 
c. Result: the property was upzoned. 
3) Property: two one acre lots, Lots 3 and 4 Blk 5, within the existing, approved, and 
platted Homestead Subdivision entitling one acre lots. 
a. Prior to the 2007 amendments. the properties are zoned Agricultural Transitional 
(AT): 
b. After the amendments. the property was zoned Agricultural (AS) although such 
zoning designations are some\vhat irrelevant in a legally vested, existing 
subdivision. 
c. Result: no change. 
Other than his status as a county land owner. the Plaintiff has presented no additional 
evidence tending to demonstrate how his property was actually or potentially harmed. Plaintiff 
has failed to shc)\', that his property might be in a related proximity or is otherwise affected by 
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the zoning change of an adjacent or related property. Plaintiff claims that his property was 
purchased ""vith the intention" of subdivision and development. Plaintiff testified that the only 
harm suffered was his opinion that he now had increased competition in the development market. 
He did not provide a basis to demonstrate that he has a cognizable substantial right or interest in 
limited competition. 
As Giltner and Highland suggest. a comprehensive plan. zoning ordinance, and zoning 
map do not by their very legislative nature confer a right to develop. but are merely legislation 
applicable to property county-wide. The state legislature granted local governing boards the 
authority to exercise legislative judgment in determining the appropriate zoning designation 
throughout its jurisdiction - an individual has no right to a particular zone. An applicant's 
rights are determined by the zoning and other ordinances in effect at the time of application. See 
South Fork Coalition v. Board (~l Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857. 861, 792 P.2d 
882, 886 (1990). The Plaintiff does not bring this declarative judgment action to appeal a 
denied penn it or application. Instead, he challenges the ordinances themselves. Without an 
application, there is no right to a particular zone; w"ithout a right to a particular zone, there can be 
no injury. Had he demonstrated that his property suffered an injury, he might have a cause of 
action via a declaratory judgment. However, he is merely attacking the validity of the County's 
legislation by virtue of his status as a landowner in the County. Plaintiffs harm is purely 
speculative based upon a non-existent right and he does not have standing to bring this cause of 
action. 
2. Restrained Standard of Review in Challenges to Legislative Actions 
"Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity including 
the board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances:' Spencer v. Kootenai 
County. 145 Idaho 448.180.184. P.3d 487. 491 (2008). 
In making the determination [whether the zoning ordinance can be upheld], 
hO\vever, we note that our review of decisions of zoning authorities is limited. 
Zoning is essentially a politicaL rather than a judicial matter, over which the 
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legislative authorities have, generally speaking. complete discretion ... , It is not 
the function of this Court or of the trial courts to sit as super zoning commissions. 
Dawson Enterprises. Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 511, 567 P .2d 1257, 1262 (1977). 
Legislative actions are to be evaluated with a restricted standard of review; as a fom1 of judicial 
deference to legislative actions. Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410, 614 P.2d at 950: Gay v. County 
Commissioners of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 627 651 P.2d 560, 561 (Idaho App. 1982). 
Judicial review of legislative actions of a local zoning board is limited to a review of whether the 
action is arbitrary and capricious. Cooper, 101 Idaho at 409,614 P.2d at 949. Courts are not 
justified in preventing the enforcement of a legislative enactment by declaring it invalid unless it 
is a clear violation of some provision of the Constitution. It is not for the Court to endorse or 
criticize the value of specific legislative enactments, because the political process is better suited 
to contend with the complex questions of public policy and competing social interest. 
"Legislative action is shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt 
impact, on the theory that the appropriate remedy can be had at the polls:' Burt, 105 Idaho at 68, 
665 P.2d at 1078 quoting Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410,614 P.2d at 950. In the absence of some 
procedural, statutory, or constitutional flaw in the ordinance, the party challenging a zoning 
ordinance must demonstrate that it bears no "substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare." Dmt'son, 98 Idaho at 511, 567 P.2d at 1262. "This restrained 
standard of review is appropriate to such legislative detenninations as the adoption of 
comprehensive plans or the enactment of general zoning ordinances," Burt, 105 Idaho at 68, 665 
P.2d at 1078. 
"The burden of proving that thc ordinance is invalid rests upon the litigant who attacked 
the validity of the ordinance." Dawson. 98 Idaho at 511. P.2d at 1262. 
A strong presumption exists in favor of the validity of local zoning ordinances. 
The burden of proving that the ordinance is invalid rests upon the party 
challenging its validity and the presumption in favor of validity can be overcome 
only by a clear showing that the ordinance as applied is confiscatory, arbitrary, 
unreasonable. and capricious. Where there is a basis for a reasonable difference 
of opinion. or if the validity of legislative classification for zoning purposes is 
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debatable. a court may not substitute its jUdgment for that of the local zonIng 
authority. 
Sprenger, Grubb, & Associates v, City (~lHailey, 127 Idaho 576. 581 903 P.2d 741. 745 (1995); 
see also Burt. 105 Idaho 66. 665 P,2d 1076; Cowan. 143 Idaho at 509, 148 P.3d at 1255. ("In 
such instances, the decision will not be disturbed absent a clear showing that it is confiscatory, 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious." ) 
3. Actual Harm 
Thus, the Plaintiff bears the burden to present clear evidence that the Comprehensive 
Plan and Zoning Ordinance are confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious in violation 
of constitutional or statutory principles. Additionally. however, the Plaintiff bears the burden to 
demonstrate a nexus; that such error caused the plaintiff actual harm or prejudiced a substantial 
right of the Plaintiff. 
While real or potential harm is sufficient to have standing to bring a declarative action, 
Plaintiff cannot meet his burden unless he can clearly demonstrate that he has suffered actual 
harm. Even in quasi-judicial proceedings protected by LLUPA requires such actual harm. 
"Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental 
rights. not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy ... ," See Idaho Code §67-
6535(c). Further, even if the Plaintiff can demonstrate that the County committed error, such as 
a defective notice, the error alone cannot serve to enjoin the County's zoning ordinances and 
comprehensive plan. Plaintiff must show error and demonstrate the proper nexus that the error 
actually caused his alleged harm or prejudiced his substantial rights. COl ran. 143 Idaho at 513, 
148 P.3d at 1259. He must demonstrate that any errors committed in enacting the 
comprehensive plan or zoning ordinances. as applied to his property. was confiscatory, arbitrary, 
unreasonable. and void. 5j)renger, 127 Idaho at 751, 903 P.2d at 586, 
Plaintin"s prope11y remains unchanged. He has provided no evidence tending to shoyv 
harm of any kind. Increased competition does not provide a basis of actual harm. He has 
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provided no evidence tending to show that adjacent properties \vere upzoned to his detriment. 
He has provided no evidence to show that his property has been downzoned. In short, Plaintiff 
appears to be seeking injunctive relief pursuant to a petition for judicial review as opposed to a 
civil declaratory action in vvhich damages are alleged and proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
D. Plaintiff's Declarative Action Challenges to the Validitv of the Ordinance must fail 
as a matter of law 
1. Procedural Due Process - Notice and an Opportunity to be heard 
Quasi-judicial actions are subject to strict due process constraints requmng that an 
affected person is afforded some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived 
of his rights in violation of state or federal constitutions. In a quasi-judicial zoning decision, in 
order to meet constitutional due process requirements, an individual must be provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. This is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Plaintiff is not an 
affected party pursuant to LLUP A. Thus, Plaintiff is not afforded stricter constitutional due 
process protections. Nonetheless, the adoption of comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and 
maps do have statutory notice and hearing provisions such that the failure to adhere to such 
statutory requirements could deny an affected party notice and opportunity to be heard. 
For example in AfcCuskey, Canyon County issued a stop work order to the plaintiff who 
was building a gas station on land recently do\vnzoned from industrial to residential. The 
plaintitI sought a declarative judgment declaring the ordinance downzoning his property void 
because he had not received notice of the hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed on 
procedural grounds holding that the Plaintiff was challenging the enactment of the ordinance as 
opposed to an argument that the authorities made the wrong decision. Further, as the zoning 
ordinance affected the plaintiffs land, i.e. the downzoning was a particularized harm, McCuskey 
was entitled to mailed notice of the hearing pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6511 (b). Of import to 
note, the court did 110t substitute its judgment as to whether the property should have been 
dowl1zoned. Further. the court did not simply find that the county failed to follo\v procedural 
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statutory guidelines. Rather. the court limited its reVIew as to \vhether the plaintiff I) had 
suffered harm; 2) was entitled to notice; and 3) had received notice. If all three elements were 
met, then and only then, did the court have the power to void the county's legislation due to its 
statutory procedural error. 
Q. Plaintiff's Claim that he was denied due process for the Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Ordinance and Map Public Hearings 
Idaho Code §67-6509 provides the notice and hearing requirements necessary to adopt 
or amend a comprehensive plan II and, by reference from Idaho 67 -6511, a zoning ordinance. 12 
The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission conducted at least one public 
hearing in adopting the Comprehensive Plan including the land use map in which interested 
persons had the opportunity to be heard. In fact, the planning commission conducted multiple 
hearings on the comprehensive plan on March 28, 2006, April 4th, II t,\ and 1 ih, 2006. Legal 
notices of the time and place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and 
the copies of the plan and map were available for review prior to the hearing. All public 
II Idaho Code §67-6509 provides for the following requirements: 
I) The planning and zoning commission shall conduct at least one public hearing in which interested 
persons shall have an opportunity to be heard: 
2) Notice of the time and place and a summary of the plan shall be published in the official newspaper at 
least tlfteen (15) days prior to the hearing; 
3) Notice of intent to ... amend the plan shall be sent to all political subdivisions providing services within 
the planning jurisdiction, including school districts, at least fifteen (15) days prior to the public hearing. 
4) If the commission recommends a material change to the proposed amendment considered at the hearing, 
it shall give notice of its proposed recommendation and conduct another public hearing unless the 
governing board conducts a subsequent public hearing. I f so. notice of the planning and zoning 
commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing provided by the governing 
board. 
S) The County shall keep a record of the hearings. findings made. and actions taken by the commission. 
6) The board may also conduct at least one (I) public hearing using the same notice and hearing procedures 
as the commission. 
7) The governing board shall only hold said public hearing after receiving the commissions' 
recommendation. 
8) I f the governing board makes a material change in the recommendation or. further notice and hearing shall be 
provided before the governing board. 
12 Idaho Code ~67-6511 provides that the board may amend its zoning ordinance by adhering to the notice and 
hearing requirements of 67 -6509 as well as other posting requirements with regard to Loning district changes. 
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hearings were recorded. Plaintiff attended and testified at length at each and every hearing. The 
planning commission recommended its approval to the board on April 17.2006. 
The Board of County Commissioners conducted a public hearing for the comprehensive 
plan and land use map on May 17, 2006 and thereafter deliberated on May 22 and 25, 2006 
adopting the comprehensive plan on or about May 25, 2006. Resolution 96 (Defendant's Trial 
Exhibits. p. 416). To include all land within the county, the board conducted an additional public 
hearing on the comprehensive plan to include the largely uninhabited northern portion of the 
county and adopted Resolution 103 on or about March 29, 2007 which is mostly uninhabited 
public land. Plaintiff attended and testified at all public hearings. All meetings were recorded. 
The Planning and Zoning Commission conducted at least one public hearing in adopting 
the zoning ordinance and map in which interested persons had the opportunity to be heard. 
Public hearings were held on October 10, 2006, October 17. and the commission thereafter 
deliberated ultimately providing its recommendation to the Board on October 24, 2006. Legal 
notices of the time and place of the hearings were published in the Camas County Courier and 
the copies of the zoning ordinance and map were available for review prior to the hearing. All 
public hearings were recorded. Plaintiff attended and testified at length at each and every 
hearing. 
Plaintiff was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and presented considerable 
evidence over the course of several years worth of public workshops. meetings, and ultimately at 
every public hearing. He did not ever miss a public hearing. Plaintiff alleges numerous 
procedural errors pertaining to the enactment of comprehensive plan and land use map and 
petitions this court to void the County's legislation. If any alleged procedural errors were 
committed. Plaintiff \\holly fails to demonstrate any violation of his right to procedural due 
process. He points to nothing in the record which indicates that his substantial rights were 
prejudiced by virtue of a procedural error: Sj)encer, 145 Idaho at 453. 180 P.3d at 492. He fails 
to show that he was not afforded a meaningful and adequate opportunity to be heard. !d. In 
('011'(/11. the court noted: 
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[TJhe Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has 
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either 
defective notice. First, Cowan's counsel attended the ... hearing and submitted a 
brief objecting to notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that 
hearing. Therefore, even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to 
demonstrate how this defect prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had 
notice of the meeting. 
Co·wan. 143 Idaho at 513,148 P.3d at 1259. PlaintifTattended and testified at all public hearings 
before both the planning and zoning commission hearings and at the board hearings and thus had 
actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs actual notice and attendance 
act as a waiver to the County's alleged defective notice. The nexus connecting any alleged 
procedural error and substantive right of the PlaintifT is simply not present. 13 
b. Conflict of Interest - Denial of Due Process? 
In order to overturn the County's legislative activity, Plaintiff bears the burden to 
demonstrate that a substantial right was prej udiced or he suffered actual harm due to a County 
board or commission member's conflict of interest. Idaho Code §67-6506 provides that areas or 
interests of the County shall be broadly represented on the commission. It further provides that 
members of the planning and zoning commission and the county board shall not participate in 
any proceeding or action when he has an economic interest in the procedure or action. As with 
other due process challenges discussed, the Plaintiff bears the burden to not only demonstrate 
that a conflict of interest exists but also that a substantial right of the Plaintiff has been 
prejudiced; that he has suffered actual. particularized harm as a result of this contlict of interest; 
i.e. a nexus between the alleged contlict of interest and the prejUdice or particularized harm 
sutTered by Plaintiff. 
1:\ Plaintiff additionally alleges that the County did not send notice to all political subdivisions providing services in 
the planning area. Again. should sllch a procedural error exist Plaintiff must carry its burden to show how this 
defect prejudiced his substantial clue process rights. Again. the nexus of the defect precipitating or causally relating 
to his particularized injury is absent 
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In Jfanookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697 (1987), the applicant sought a conditional 
use permit to construct an electrical transmission lines. Three potential routes "vere identified to 
locate the lines: 1) the "Idaho Power route" which ran through property owned by two of the 
planning and zoning commissioners; 2) the "desert route" which runs away from the planning 
commissioners' property; and 3) the route ultimately approved by the planning and zoning 
commissioners, the "toe of the hills route", which crossed the property owned by the plaintiffs. 
The court reasoned that utility transmission lines, either the Idaho Power or Desert route 
impacted the Commissioners' land both physically and visually and thus constituted an economic 
interest. Similarly, the chosen route impacted the plaintiffs property. 
The present action is distinguishable from Afanoonkian. In l\Ianoonkian, the properties 
owned by the planning members were the subject of a specific application. The members 
specifically diverted attention from their own properties which would have suiler particularized 
harm. Instead, the plaintiff s property was burdened. Thus, there was a causal and spatial 
connection, a nexus, between the respective properties as possible locations for the power lines. 
In contrast. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered actual, particularized harm. 
His properties remain unaffected, even benefited, by the zoning map. There has been no 
evidence presented that suggests a nexus, a spatial proximity, or some interest between the 
Plaintiff s property and the Board and Commission members. 
Seemingly, the County members are deemed to have a conflict of interest causing harm 
to Plaintiff merely because they are property owners within the County. County members are 
required to reside in the County to even be eligible to serve as a public servant. This author's 
review of the case law fails to identify a case that holds that. in the adoption of county-wide 
zoning legislation which affects all properties within the county of disparate O\vnership among 
an entire class of citizens, a contlict of interest is nonetheless deemed to exist by virtue of the 
commission members' mere ownership of property within the jurisdiction. The evidence 
demonstrates that the governing board member properties were zoned as pm1 of a county-wide 
zoning plan based upon independent. historical. sound planning principles. There is no evidence 
suggesting that a change in zoning designations "vere motivated by an eC01101l11C interest 
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resulting in an economic benefit to the board members or harm to the plaintiff The Plaintiff's 
property is not adjacent to, in the vicinity of, nor does it bear any relationship to the 
governmental members' property other than being located within the same county and identified 
on the same county-\vide zoning map. Plaintiff must show a nexus, a causal connection 
demonstrating that he suffered actual harm by virtue (~l the board members' ownership of 
property elsewhere in the County. Spencer, 145 Idaho 453,180 P.3d 492; Cowan, 143 Idaho at 
513, 148 P.3d 1259. Neither of these elements have been met. Idaho Code §67 -6506 has never 
been applied to a legislative action. Such an application undermines the value of having 
interested land owners within the community serve as public servants; a requirement for county 
boards and even for the judiciary. 
2. Substantive Statutory Challenges Pursuant to LLUPA: Res Ipsa Loquitur 
Plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to be heard in the adoption of the county 
legislation. In fact, he has testified at length at the myriad of informational meetings, workshops, 
public meetings, and ultimately public hearings during the course of several years' worth of 
comprehensive planning undertaken in the adoption of the comprehensive plan, zoning 
ordinance, and zomng map. He has attended every public hearing and more informational 
meetings and workshops than anyone else in the County including the governmental members 
themselves. The simple truth is that the Plaintiff a local developer, fundamentally disagrees 
\vith the direction that the elected officials have undertaken in the zoning process. He does not 
feel that the elected officials have the proper professional credentials to undertake a legislative 
comprehensive planning process. The courts have addressed these issues before. In Spencer, the 
court provided: "[C]ontrary to Spencer's assertion, due process does not require any particular 
technical or educational background on the part of the decision-maker." Spencer. 145 Idaho at 
455, 180 P.3d 487 494. The Board members are elected ofticials engaged in their legislative 
function. Failing at the election polls. Plaintiff now turns to the Court to invoke his political and 
legislative aspirations. As Burt and subsequent cases have staunchly held. "legislative action is 
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shielded from direct judicial review by its high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory 
that appropriate remedy can be had at the polls:' Burt, 105 Idaho at 66, 665 P.2d at 1076. 
a. Idalto Code 67-6508: The Comprehensive Plan 
Turning to the courts, the Plaintiff nonetheless alleges that he has sufficient standing and 
suffered such harm that he may lodge statutory challenges to county legislation. The vast 
majority of Plaintiffs elicited testimony and argument rests upon his allegation that the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and the Board failed to properly enact its Comprehensive Plan pursuant 
to the "substantive dictates" of Idaho Code §67-650S. Said Section provides that the 
comprehensive plan itself shall be based on planning components including property rights, 
population, school facilities and transportation, economic development, land use, natural 
resources, hazardous areas, public services and facilities, recreation, special areas, housing, 
community design, and implementation. The text of Idaho Code 67-650S is plain and clear: the 
plan shall include these elements. Yet, PlaintifT s argument seems to center upon the particular 
education levels of the planning members and what they specifically discussed at the open 
meetings. The testimony revealed that the planning and zoning members and the board members 
did in fact consider the efficacy of the comprehensive plan, page for page, and simply did not 
feel that the text itself needed significant revision from the original 1997 enactment. 14 The main 
focus of the plan revision was the land use map itself. The fact that the Plaintiff, who testified at 
length over the course of several years, disagreed is simply not relevant. The comprehensive 
plan is in compliance with Idaho Code §67-650S. As the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur so 
provides, the thing speaks for itself as it the required planning components. S'ee Delendant 
('wnw; County's Eridence Binder. p. 3./5-,/20. 
b. The Comprehensive Planning Process 
11 In 1997. the County enacted its Comprehensive Plan utilizing exper1s and other professionals to enact said plan. 
The testimony revealed that the county did not feel that the plan needed to be scrapped: that the findings in the 1997 
plan were still viable and timely. Thus. the vast majority of the workshops, informational meetings. and testimony 
at the public meetings and hearings centered on the land use map as opposed to the text. 
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Idaho Code ~67-6508 also provides that the commission shall conduct a comprehensive 
planning process to prepare, implement, and update its comprehensive plan. Similarly, Idaho 
Code §67-6507 identifies the powers of the planning and zoning commission in relation to the 
planning process. It provides that the commission shall provide for citizen meetings, hearings, 
surveys, or other methods to obtain advice on the planning process and implementation of the 
plan. Thereafter, the section provides that the commission may, or in other words, has the 
discretion to, consult with public officials or other professional organizations, conduct 
informational meetings, etc. 
Over the course of two years, the commission conducted a comprehensive planning 
process updating the comprehensive plan. The commission and the board conducted multiple 
infonnational workshops, public meetings, and numerous public hearings in considering an 
amendment to the comprehensive plan. Even a brief perusal of the minutes or, or if the court 
should wish to listen to the hundreds of hours of testimony and deliberation, the planning 
commission and the Board received countless testimony and advice from citizens, governmental 
agency's providing services, and experts including planners, developers, legal consultants, etc. as 
to the proper course the County should undertake in the adoption of the comprehensive plan, 
land use map, zoning ordinance, and map. 
Even in quasi-judicial proceedings, the Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment 
for the governmental entity and shall defer to the factual determinations of the governing body 
unless they are clearly erroneous, even where there is conflicting evidence before the governing 
body so long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Spencer, 145 Idaho 
at 452, 180 P.3d at 491. In legislative actions, the governing board's decision shall not be 
"disturbed absent a clear shovving that it is confiscatory, arbitrary. unreasonable or capricious:' 
Burt. 66. 1076. Further. in order to overturn the Board's action. this Court would have to find 
that the Board erred and then that a substantial right of the Plaintiff has been prejudiced by the 
County's alleged error. Spencer. 145 Idaho at 457. 180 P.3d at 497. The Plaintiff has not 
provided evidence and cannot bear its burden to demonstrate the County did not sufficiently 
conduct a comprehensive planning process or how a comprehensive plan with a t:1Ulty planning 
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component prejudices his substantial rights. A comprehensive plan confers no property right. It 
applies county-\vide to mUltiple properties. 
Even if this \vere a quasi-judicial proceeding, the County's determinations are binding on 
this Court provided there is substantial and competent evidence. Spencer. 145 Idaho at 456, 180 
P.3d at 495. Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance. but more than a scintilla. Id 
Such a burden is met if reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder. Id. 
In legislative actions, the court has even less or "limited" review. Affording the legislative 
branch nearly complete discretion. a plaintiff must make a clear showing that the comprehensive 
plan is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious. Dawson. 98 Idaho at 506, 567 P.2d 
at 1257. Additionally, a party seeking to attack a comprehensive plan must demonstrate that 
this error has caused him actual harm. 
The County conducted a comprehensive planning process. A reView of the record 
demonstrates many years of input, testimony, and consideration of the Comprehensive Plan and 
its included land use map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map. The Plaintiff brings this action, 
not to repair an actual particularized harm suffered, but to have this Court substitute its own 
judgment for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff was provided a meaningful opportunity to present testimony 
at all levels. His remedy is more appropriately to be felt at the polls. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that Plaintiffs cause of action 
be dismissed: that the Court submit its Judgment upon said claim against the County pursuant to 
IRCP 54(b), and that Defendant be awarded attorney fees. 
Dated this 
--,i 
v ~ day of September. 2008. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKL CHTD. 
Attorney for the County Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . f. 
TY f sr~ 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoinl~n VS this __ _ 
day of September. 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Vh/ United Stales mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COllRT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 81 . INE COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN. 
Plaintiff, 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES. LLC, 
vs. 
ED SMITH. 
Defendant 
and 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
Their official and individual capacities, 
KEN BAXTROM. 
BILL DAVIS, and 
RON CHAPMAN 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
GtT0\,+s 
C® 
) Case No.: CV -2007-24 
) 
) 
) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history and present posture of this case is particularly 
important with regard to this motion. In his original complaint, Nlartin 
brought causes of action against Camas County seeking judgment declaring 
that certain zoning ordinances passed by Camas County in 200612007 \vere 
Order on Plain(ifr~ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- I 
invalid and violated existing law. Combined with the original declaratory 
judgment are claims by which Martin seeks civil damages against Ed Smith 
individually, and the Camas County commissioners in their official 
capacities. 
The court has heard the declaratory judgment action over the 
200612007 amendments in toto. In the process of getting to trial on this first 
declaratory judgment action, the court has issued 2 injunctions, one 
determining that the Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to 
keep a trancribable verbatim record, and the other determining that conflicts 
of interest existed. Evidence obtained during hearings over these preliminary 
injunction issues were combined with trial evidence pursuant to IRCP 
65( a)(2). 
Trial was held on this first declaratory judgment issue in Camas 
County on August 20, 2008. Post trial briefs are currently being submitted, 
and the court will take the matter under advisement immediately. By 
agreement of counsel, all claims for money damages against all defendants 
have been reserved for a subsequent trial at a later time, and those issues 
have not yet been set/or trial. 
On August 8, 2008, shortly before trial, Martin filed a lvlotion/or 
Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes a/Action. This 
motion was submitted on briefing submitted post-trial. This motion seeks to 
add new claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as a part of the existing 
case, as to new ordinances passed by Camas County in 2008. It also seeks 
to add new civil damages claims against Camas County, and the Board 0/ 
Cornrnissioners in their individual capacities, for violations of Section 1983 
Order 011 Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 2 
of the Civil Rights Act, alleging both due process and equal protection 
violations. As noted, the existing pending civil damage claims against these 
same defendants have been split off from the declaratory judgment claims by 
agreement of counsel, and have not yet been set for trial. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
One of the pending issues is whether the court should allow plaintifT 
to amend his complaint, post-trial, on the declaratory judgment issues, to 
incorporate new matters that have occurred since the original filing. 
Although not specifically addressed by the parties, (because both parties 
have taken an "all or nothing approach" to the proposed pleading 
amendment) a separate issue is whether the court should allow a partial 
amendment to the complaint as to the civil damage issues that are still 
pending for trial. Another issue, addressed but unclear, is whether the court 
can bifurcate the declaratory judgment issues, that have already been tried, 
from the pending civil damages issues for purposes of an appeal, so that the 
parties can get a resolution of the declaratory judgment issues at the 
Supreme COUli, without having to wait for trial on civil damage issues that 
have little in common factually or legally with the declaratory judgment to 
be rendered. 
The starting point for this analysis is IRCP 15. The court recognizes 
under Rule I5(a) that in the ordinary case, if a trial is not pending, or there is 
no prejudice, leave to amend should be freely given. The court also 
recognizes this is a discretionary decision. Jones v. Watson 98 Idaho 606, 
570 P.2d 284 (1977), Hines v. Hines 129 Idaho 847,934 P.2d 20 (1997). 
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Plaintiff l\;lartin argues under Rule 15( d) that the amendment here 
should be allowed as his new pleading involves occurrences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be amended. That 
much is true. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the evidence 
necessary to address these new claims is entirely different from the original 
cause of action, that the trial on the original cause of action has already been 
held (at least as to the declaratory judgment issues), and thus any 
amendment will open up new avenues of discovery and delay, citing Black 
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc, v. Idaho First National Bank 119 Idaho 171, 
804 P.2d 900 (1991), and Hinkle v. Winey 126 Idaho 993, 895 P.2d 594 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
The court finds that the new allegations, at least as to the declaratory 
judgment causes of action, are based on events that have happened since the 
filing of the original complaint, but they will involve new evidence, new 
discovery, and application of new legal theory or principles. To elaborate, 
plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint, as to the relief seeking 
declaratOlY judgment, that Camas County failed to properly enact 
ordinances, and conduct administrative hearings involving zoning 
amendments passed in 2008. Although it is true that plaintiff's original 
complaint alleged some of the same general sort oflegal defects as to 
ordinances and hearings conducted in 2006 and 2007, the defects alleged in 
the proposed amended complaint are not founded on the same facts as the 
prior complaint- indeed, they are founded on allegations as to what Camas 
County did or did not do in passing the 2008 amendments. The court can 
tell, simply from the attachments submitted with the Verified Application for 
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Temporary Restraining Order, and the allegations of the new complaint, that 
Camas County utilized a ditTerent, more thorough process in 2008 than it did 
with the 2006, 2007 amendments. Whether this process (in 2008) was 
adequate will not involve an examination of the same questions raised in the 
attack on the 2006, 2007 ordinance amendments. It may involve some of the 
same or similar questions, but it is apparent that it will involve, at a 
minimum, new discovery based on new facts and events, and the application 
of some different legal principles. This is not as straightforward as Camas 
County simply putting a new coat of paint over old defects. Moreover, the 
declaratory judgment issues raised by the initial complaint have already been 
tried, and briefed, and those matters are due to be taken under advisement 
forthwith by the court. Finally, akin to the situation in Hinkle v. Winey, 
supra, there is no showing of any prejudice to Martin if he is required to 
resolve these new declaratory judgment claims in a separate action. This is 
where they would be best resolved. As will be more fully addressed below, 
there is simply no good reason to tie these new declaratory judgment claims 
in with the old ones. I 
The motion for leave to file an amended complaint with regard to new 
claims for declaratory judgment is DENIED. 
The next issue is whether the new civil claims set forth by Martin in 
his proposed amended complaint (violation of due process and equal 
I Although in his proposed amended complaint Martin makes an alternative claim for a Petition for Judicial 
Review. his pleading does not seem to address the judicial review factors. Whether it does or does not is of 
no moment. however. as the Idaho Supreme Court recently determined an action for Judicial Review 
could not be combined with a civil action. Euclid Arcf1uc Trust v. Cit)' o./Boisc Supreme Court Opinion No. 
107. Docket No. 33974. filed Sept 23. 2008. Accordingly. this COllrt need not address where that 
particular allegation falls under this motion. 
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protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983) should be treated differently 
than his claims for declaratory relief. As noted, these claims are directed at 
the members of the Camas County Board of Commissioners personal!.v and 
individually. Also as noted, tv1artin has existing civil damage claims against 
Ed Smith and Camas County seeking money damages, which claims are not 
currently set for trial and remain pending. These civil rights claims allege 
violations of Martin 's rights from both the 2006/2007 amendments to the 
county zoning, and the 2008 amendments as well. As such, if the cOUli did 
not allow the amended complaint as to the alleged violations occurring in 
2006/2007, Martin would probably lose the right to bring them. That is, 
insofar as alleged violations are alleged to have occurred in 200612007, they 
either needed to be brought along with the original claims made in this case, 
or they would likely be barred. See Duthie v.Lewiston Gun Club 104 Idaho 
751,663 P.2d 287, (1983) (Res judicata principles operate to prohibit 
subsequent claims as to not only that which was litigated, but also to every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.) 
A second reason to treat these allegations differently from the new 
declaratory judgment claims is these involve questions of money damages, 
are triable to a jury Uury trial is requested in the proposed amended 
complaint), and there is no reason to require or allow two separate suits for 
money damages between the same parties on the same facts. 
The third reason to treat these claims differently is that there is no 
viable claim of prejudice that can be made by the defendants. No trial date 
has been set on the civil damage claims. Rule 15 (a) requires leave to amend 
be freely given vvhen justice so requires, and the court determines, for the 
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reasons set forth above, at least with regard to the civil damage5,' claims. that 
justice requires leave be granted to amend the pleadings to allow the civil 
rights claims to be pled and proved along with the other civil damage claims 
now pending. See Sinclair A1ktg., Inc. v. Slepert 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.:2d 
385. The motion to amend with regard to the new civil damage claims is 
GRANTED. 
Finally, Camas County has raised in its brieting the necessity or 
advisability of having the court issue a Rule 54(b) certificate as to the 
declaratory judgment issues resolved or to be resolved by the trial held in 
August 2008. Camas County has already tried to appeal those issues once, 
and the court has addressed this issue previously on the record with the 
parties. As this issue implicates the procedure and posture of this case (the 
court is in the process of rendering judgment on the declaratory judgment 
claims, there may be a new declaratory judgment action filed, and a civil 
trial for damages is still pending) this issue needs attention from both the 
court and the parties. The court will make no rulings on this issue at this 
point, but wants the parties to carefully consider their positions here. 
From the court's perspective, it makes perfect sense to celiify the 
issues resolved by the declaratory judgment trial for appeal pursuant to Rule 
54(b). They are unconnected legally from the civil damage claims, as they 
involve entirely different questions of law. The declaratory judgment trial, 
(and preliminary injunctions) revolved primarily around the failure to keep a 
transcribable verbatim record, whether county officials are exempt from 
contlict of interest statutes if their activity is "legislative" as opposed to 
"quasi-judicial", and such things as whether a written recommendation was 
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sent or received from the P&Z Commission to the Board before zoning was 
changed. The civil damage claims will involve a jury trial, at least in part, 
and will not occur for some period of time. Of equal significance, any 
decision rendered by an appellate court in Idaho as to \vhether some of the 
conduct of county ot1icials (e.g.- the effect of alleged conflicts of interest) is 
exempt from some provisions of law because it falls under the umbrella of 
"legislative activity", or whether certain civil claims are viable under the 
circumstances alleged can only help here. If guidance on the declaratory 
action already tried comes before the civil trial on damages, it can only help-
not only the parties involved in this litigation but throughout Idaho. The 
legal issues raised by the declaratory judgment are important questions that 
need resolution-the sooner the better. If guidance is not forthcoming before 
the civil trial, the parties are no worse off. If this court certifies those 
declaratory judgment issues for appeal, and they are not appealed, they 
become the law of the case, and the only issues that could be appealed later 
would be those raised by the civil trial. In short, there are many good reasons 
to certify a forthcoming judgment on the declaratory judgment issues, and 
scant few to wait for the results of a relatively unconnected civil trial. 
Finally, any issues as to claims or entitlement as to attorney fees should 
probably be reviewed, resolved, and determined at this juncture rather than 
after a civil trial, and a separate analysis conducted on the civil issues when 
they are resolved. Any claims for attorney's fees against the county at this 
point, and attorney's fees under civil damage claims that might be made 
later, will likely involve completely different analyses under completely 
ditferent statutes and standards, and the same is true under the appeal 
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process. Combining those issues will only make them more complex and 
harder to resolve in the future. 
Having made those observations, the court is concerned about the 
application of Rule 54(b )(2) to this case. As the court has indicated, the court 
would be reluctant to stay the civil trial until after an appeal of the 
declaratory judgment issues, which would seem to be the result mandated 
by Rule 54 (b)(2) . . The court believes the best course of action is if the 
parties stipulate that the declaratory judgment issues already tried will be 
certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), that any discovery conducted in 
the declaratory judgment action need not be repeated for purposes of the 
pending civil action, that the issues on the civil damage claims involve a 
"separate action" under the meaning or Rule 54(b )(2), the civil action for 
damages will not be stayed pending appeal of the declaratory judgment 
issues, that the court may determine prevailing parties, attorney's fees, and 
costs upon the declaratory judgment action upon entry of a judgment in this 
case, and that there will be a separate and independent review of the 
attorney's fee issue in the civil action once it is resolved. How you wish to 
treat attorney's fees incurred to date that may relate solely to the civil action 
is up to you. The court is not ordering any of this at this time; it is only 
making suggestions as to what the most expedient and et1icient method of 
handling the case may be. 
Although the head note under Rule 54(b )(2) says the exact opposite, 
the procedure allowing an appeal with a Rule 54 (b) certificate, with a 
bifurcated separate iSSlle- a separate third par(Y' claim, was allowed in 
Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 541, 691 P.2d 787 
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(App.1984). What is unclear is whether this particular provision of 54(b )(2) 
was in effect at that time, or came after the decision. If the parties fail to 
stipulate, the cOUli does not know yet what action would be appropriate, but 
a stipulation of some SOli would eliminate uncertainty and avoid expensi\'e 
legal maneuvering on these procedural issues. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED THIS __ day of October, 2008. 
District Judge 
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Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES,LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS CAMAS 
COUNTY, THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS 
OF THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED 
SMITH IN HIS CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE CAMAS COUNTY 
PLANNING AND ZONING 
COMMISSION 
In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served on the 
County Defendants on October 8, 2008, this Court denied in part and granted in part the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Petition. Plaintiff included as an attachment to said 
motion, his proposed amended pleading. To date, the Plaintiff has not served County Defendants 
vvith the amended pleading reflecting the Court's Order. Erring on the side of caution, County 
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Defendants hereby submit its response to Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Petition for 
Breach of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for 
Violation of Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of the Law. In 
so doing, Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through its duly elected 
board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record, 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby submit this Second Amended Answer in 
conformance with the Court's Order. 
I. 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
Facts Common to all Counts & Jurisdictional Statement 
1. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Plaintiffs 
Paragraph 1, 2, and 4, and therefore deny. 
2. County Defendants admit paragraph 3. 
3. With regard to Paragraph 5, County Defendants admits insofar as the legislative 
actions of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of 
County Commissioners in enacting the County's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and 
map occurred in Camas County but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
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4. County Defendants deny Paragraphs 6 and 7. 
COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5. As Count 1 does not pertain to nor is it relevant to the County Defendants, County 
Defendants are not required to answer. However, to the extent that any such claim can be 
asserted against County Defendants, Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied in 
their entirety. 
COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
6. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Paragraph 16, 17, 
18, 20, and 21 and therefore deny same. 
7. County Defendants deny paragraph 19,20,22, and 23. 
COUNT III - Petition for Declarative Judgment 
8. Count III has already proceeded to trial before the Court and is awaiting the 
Court's final order and IRCP 54(b) certification of final judgment. Therefore, Defendant is not 
required to submit an additional amended answer as to Count III. To the extent that any such 
allegations remain, (due to the pending nature of the Court's Order and 54(b) certification), 
County Defendants deny each and every allegation alleged by Plaintiff unless specifically 
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admitted herein including but not limited to. all allegations pertaining to Count III (Paragraphs 
24-47) . 
COUNT IV - Declarative Relief May 12, 2008 Comprehensive Plan & Zoning Ordinance 
Amendments 
9. In its Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served 
upon County Defendants on October 8, 2008, the Court specifically denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition as it pertains to this Count. Therefore, the matter is stricken from the 
amended pleading and County Defendants are not required to answer this Count. To the extent 
that any such allegation pertains to a triable issues, County Defendants deny each and every 
allegation not specifically admitted herein including any and all allegations alleged in Count IV 
(Paragraphs 48-66). 
COUNT V - Violation of Procedural and Substantive Due Rights [sic] 
10. With regard to Paragraph 67, Defendant admits that Plaintiff does own property 
within the County, but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
11. With regard to Paragraph 68, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was a part of the 
comprehensive planning process utilized in the amendment of the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinance and map as Plaintiff attended and/or testified at every public hearing, meeting, 
informational session. and workshop, but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
12. County Defendants deny paragraphs 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78. 
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13. With regard to Paragraph 71, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual allegation, 
but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the extent a 
response is required, deny. 
14. With regard to Paragraph 72, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual 
allegation, but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the 
extent a response is required, deny. 
COUNT VI - Equal Protection of Law 
15. County Defendants deny paragraph 79, 80, 81, and 82. 
16. [Prayer] Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition is 
wholly devoid of any merit whatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117 because this action has been brought without a reasonable 
basis in fact and law. 
II. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and 
against the County Defendants. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
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Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions 
or omissions. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or 
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of Title 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims 
against Government Entities. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6-
904B(3). 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I.C. § 6-918. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual ham1 or a violation of a fundamental right as 
required by I.C. § 67-6535. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
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The Plaintiffs' alleged claims are properly before the District Court of the United States 
as said claims have original jurisdiction over such federal questions of law and therefore such 
civil action should be removed to the United States District Court. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by 
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded 
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.e. §§ 12-117, 12-120,12-121. and 6-918A; and 
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of October, 2008. 
MOORE SMITH B XTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Paul . itzer 
Att neys for County Defendants 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Camas ) 
Ken Backstrom, being duly sworn, states as follows: 
That he is the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioner for the County of Camas, 
representing the County Defendants in the above-entitled matter; that, as such, he has read the 
foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be tnte and correct to 
the best of his knowledge; 
KenBackstrom, Chairman 
Camas County Board of County Commissioners 
~r ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this -'--"-"-- day of October, 2008. 
~-:~~,~--£c< ., . ". ~L=:::' (~/ -~.: _LA-. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing 
My Commission Expires: 5:""<..0 -,:;LCd I () 
..- ~ ... .... .-
TRACY 0, GILL 
Notary Public ~ Stote of Idaho 
• 
- -
~ -
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*** 
CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this ___ ~-I- day 
of October, 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Via United States mail 
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PAUL 1. FITZER, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHARTERED 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 331-1202 
Attorneys for Defendant Camas County 
c;. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 
GEORGE MARTIN and ) 
) 
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, L.L.C., ) 
) 
Plaintiffs ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
ED SMITH and ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by and through the ) 
duly elected Board of Commissioners in their ) 
official capacity, KEN BACKSTROM, ) 
BILL DAVIS, and RON CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
·1 
Case No. CV 
-'---'--'-
NOTICE OF REMOVAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Defendants Camas County, Ed Smith in his capacity as 
a member of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and 
Ron Chapman (the Individual Commissioners), by and through their attorney of record, Paul 1. 
Fitzer, removes the above-captioned action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1446(b). The 
basis for removal is that this Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c. § 1331 of this civil 
action brought in state court. The Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, 
Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural & 
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Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law asserts a civil action arising under the 
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. On October 8, 2008, the District Court for the 
Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho In and For Camas County in its Order on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint ordered that Plaintiff was entitled to assert a civil 
action against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
As directed by the United States Courts District of Idaho Clerks Office, Petitioner files 
herewith copies of the amended pleadings filed in the state court, the Fifth Judicial District's 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, a supplemental civil cover 
sheet, a copy of the Fifth Judicial District Court for Camas County Docket Sheet (ROA Report) 
for CV -2007 -0000024, and the appropriate filing fee, all in accordance with Local Rule 5 .1 (d) 
and other applicable rules. 
A copy of the Notice of Removal has been provided to all adverse parties and filed with the 
Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County 
of Camas. It is acknowledged that this Notice of Removal is signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this s-' day of November, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
REMOVAL was forwarded to the following parties by the method stated below on November, 
2008. 
Christopher P. Simms 
Attorney at Law 
U.S. Bank Bldg., Suite 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Phillip J. Collaer 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
PO Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
District Court Clerk 
Fifth Judicial District 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
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~.S.Mail 
__ via Hand Delivery 
__ via Overnight Delivery 
~"~ail 
__ via Hand Delivery 
__ via Overnight Delivery 
~S.Mail 
__ via Hand Delivery 
__ via Overnight Delivery 
10/2112(\08 01:0i FAX 208i6423 
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Date: 10/20/2008 
Time: 01:09 PM 
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Fifth Judicia' District Court - Camas County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, etaL VS. Ed Smith, etal. 
I4J 002 
User: KORRI 
George Martin, Martin Cu:;tom Homes, L.I. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
Date Code User Judge 
5/412.007 NeOt:: KORRI New Case Filed - Other Claims Robert J Elgee 
KORRI Filing: A 1 ~ Civil Complaint. More Than $1000 No Robert J Eigee 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Martin, George 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0000435 Dated: 
5/4/2007 Amount $88.00 (Check) 
APEn KORRI Plaintiff: Martin, George Appearance Christopher Robert J Eigee 
P_ Simms 
SMIS KORRI Summons Issued X2 Robert J Elgee 
5/10/2007 APEH KORRI Defendant Camas County Board of Robert J Eigee 
Commissioners Appearance Stephanie J. Bonney 
5/15/2007 OBJG BOBBIE Objection To Plaintiffs' Application For a Robert J Elgee 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injuction 
5/23/2007 KORRI Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Robert J Eigee 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Anderson, 
Julian & Hull Receipt number. 0000499 Dateet 
5/23/2007 Amount $58.00 (Check) For: [NONE1 
APE I=< KORRI Defendant Smith. Ed Appearance Phillip J Robert J Eigee 
Collaer 
6(1/2007 AN'!;.iW KORRI Answer to complaint and demand for Jury Trial Robert J Eigee 
6/5/2007 HRVC KORRI Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on Robert J Elgee 
0710312.00702:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
6/6/2007 OSC KORRI Order To Show Causetemporary restraing order, Robert J Eigee 
preliminary injunction 
HR:;iC KORRI Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause Robert J Eigee 
07/03/200702:00 PM) 
6/11/2007 NOTC KORRI Notice of service Robert J Eigee 
6/13/2007 RE:;iP KORRI Plaintiffs response to def CCounty's objection to 
Plantiff application forTRO & Pre Injunction & 
Robert J Eigee 
request for Rule 11 Sanctions 
MI~;C KORRI Correction of inadvertant typogrphicaVclerical Robert J Elgee 
error in petition 
HRSC KORRI Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause Robert J Elgee 
06127/200701:00 PM) In Camas County 
6/14/2007 MOTN KORRI Motion for a more definite statement Robert J Eigee 
6/18/2007 RESP KORRI Response to CCounty defendants mtn for more Robert J Eigee 
definete statement & demand for default 
judgment 
612012007 ANSW BOBBIE Answer Of Defendants Camas County. The Robert J Eigee 
Individual Members Of The Camas County Board 
Of County Commissioners. Ed Smith In His 
Capacity As A Member Of The Camas County 
Planning And Zoning Commission 
6121/2007 SMIS BOSBIE Summons IssuedX2 Robert J Elgee 
612212007 SMRT KORRI Summons Returnedx2 Robert J Elgee 
AFSV KORRI Affidavit Of Service x2 Li ((Obert J Eigee 
" ~r- f 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007 -0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Elgee 
George Martin, etal. VS. Ed Smith, eta\. 
George Martin, Martll1 Cu'stom Homes, L.l. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
Date Code User 
6/26/2001 MOThl BOBBIE 
SUSI BOBBIE 
6127/2007 CMIN KORRI 
SUBt~ BOBBIE 
AFSfi: BOBBIE 
HRHD KORRI 
7/6/2007 MEMO KORRI 
7/13/2007 NO~,V BOBBIE 
APFL BOBBIE 
7/16/2007 NO-;-C KORRI 
MOTN KORRI 
RE~)P KORRI 
M01iN KORRI 
7/19/2007 OB,JC BOBBIE 
AFFD BOBBIE 
1120/2007 Cf\'IIN KORRI 
7/24/2007 HF:SC BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
7/27/2007 OnDR BOBBIE 
Rf:SP BOBBIE 
Judge 
Motion To Quash Subpoena Robert J Eigee 
Subpoena Issued X Robert J Elgee 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Order to Show Robert J Eigee 
Cause Hearing date: 6/27/2007 Time: 1:00 pm 
Audio tape number: 301 
Subpoena Returned Robert J Elgee 
Affidavit Of Servicel Robert Rodman Robert J Elgee 
Hearing result for Order to Show Cause held on Robert J Eigee 
061271200701:00 PM: Hearing Held In Camas 
County 
Memorandum Robert J Eigee 
Notice Of Service Robert J Elgee 
Verified Application For Temporary Restraining Robert J Eigee 
Order and Preliminary Injunction relating To 
Destruction Of Public Records 
Notice of non opposition to plaint.motion for Robert J Eigee 
enlargment of time to respond to def smith 1 set of 
interrogatories, ect 
Plaintiffs motion for enlargment of time to respond Robert J Eigee 
to defendant smiths 1st set of interogatories 
Plaintiffs response to post hearing memo Robert J Eigee 
supporting county defendants' objection to 
plaintiffs app. for TRO & Preliminary injunction 
Motion to strike & objection to Plaintiffs' Verified Robert J Elgee 
application for aTRO & Pre-Injunction relating to 
destruction of public records 
Objection To Plaintiffs' Verified Application For A Robert J Eigee 
Temporary Restraining Order And Preliminary 
Injunction Relating To Destruction Of Public 
Records 
Affidavit Of Dwight Butlin In Support Of 
Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs' Verified 
Robert J Eigee 
Application For A Temporary Restraining Order 
And Preliminary Injuction Relating To DestruCtion 
Of Public Records 
Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Robert J Eigee 
09/25/200701 :00 PM) EVidentuary Hearing In 
Camas Cou nty. 
Notice Of Hearing Robert J Elgee 
OrderDenying Plaintiffs' July 13, 2007 Verified Robert J Elgee 
Application For Temporary Restaining Order And 
Preliminary Injunction Relating To Destruction Of 
Public Records 
Plaintiff's First Set Of Requests For ProdUction Of Robert J Eigee 
Documents ProdUction Of Documents 
Propounded To Camas County Defendantvj 
10/2112098 01 :.07 FAX 2087642349 
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fifth District Court - Camas County User: KORRI 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, etal. vs. Ed Smith, eta\. 
George Martin, Marljn Ccstom Homes, L.L C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
late 
1113/2007 
3/22/2007 
B124/2007 
9/10/2007 
9/11/2007 
9/1212007 
9/14/2007 
9/18/2007 
912112007 
101512007 
10/9/2007 
10/1612007 
Code 
DEOP 
STIF 
NSRII 
NO~:\I 
NOSV 
OBJC 
ORDR 
NO-'C 
sunl 
NOTC 
NOTC 
MOTC 
NOHG 
NCHG 
HRVC 
HF:SC 
M[~MO 
CI)NT 
MI::MO 
Ar:FD 
User 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
BOSBIE 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
KORRI 
KORRI 
KORRI 
KORRI 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
B0881E 
BOBBIE 
BOBBIE 
KORRI 
KORRI 
KORR! 
Judge 
Decision On Status Of Camas County Planning Robert J Eigee 
And Zoning Commission For Purposes of a 
preliminary Injunction 
Stipulation To Enlarge Time For County Robert J Eigee 
Defendants To Respond To Plaintiff's First Set Of 
Requests For Production Of Documents 
Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs Response To Robert J Eigee 
Interrogstorries And Requests For Production Of 
Doucuments Propounded By Defendant Smith 
Notice Of Service Of Plaintiffs First Set Of Robert J Elgee 
Interrogatories and Requests For Production Of 
Documents Propounded To Defendant Smith 
Notice Of Service Robert J Elgee 
Objection To Notice Of Hearing Scheduled For Robert J Eigee 
September 25, 2007 
Order Vacating hearing Robert J Eigee 
Notice of service of supplemental response to Robert J Elgee 
interrogatories propounded by def Camas County 
Subpoenalssuedx5 
butJin,rodman,gregory,Clint krahn, f.r8ennett 
Notice of service 
Notice of service 
Robert J Eigee 
Robert J Elgee 
Robert J Eigee 
Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Camas County Robert J Eigea 
Defendants To Fully Respond To Requests To 
Produce Documents & Issue Sanctions For 
Failure To Respond 
Notice Of Hearing-Paintiffs Application For Robert J Eigee 
Preliminary Injunction and on the Merits Of 
Request For Injunctive Relief Related To Conflict 
Of Intrest Claims 
Notice Of Hearing-Plaintiffs motion To Compel Robert J Eigee 
Camas County Defendants To Fully Respond To 
Request To Produce Documents 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Elgee 
09125/2007 01 :00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Evidentuary Hearing In Camas County. 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Robert J Eigee 
11/13/2007 01 :00 PM) Amended Notice of 
Hearing. 
Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting The Robert J Eigee 
County Defendants Objection To Plaintiffs' 
Application For A Temporary Restraining Order 
And Preliminary Injunction 
Continued (Hearing Scheduled 11f13/2007 Robert J Eigee 
03:00 PM) Amended Notice of Hearing. 
Plaintiffs reply to cc def post hearing memo 
plaintiffs affidavit in support 
Robert J Eigee 
Robe~ E!9. ee r~j Lt L:J 
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District Court - Camas County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, eta\. vs. Ed Smith, etal. 
I4J 005 
User: KORRI 
George Martin, Martll' Custom Homes, L.I. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
Date Code User Judge 
10/16/2007 NOTG KORRI Notice of hearing Robert J Eigee 
HRSC KORRI Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Robert J Eigee 
10/23/200710:00 AM) By phone 
10/2212007 MOT~J BOBBIE Motion To Strike Affidavit Of George Martin In Robert J Eigee 
Support Of Plaintiffs Post-Hearing Memorandum 
(Second Evidentiary Hearing) 
MEMO BOBBIE Memorandum Supporting Motion To Strike Robert J Elgee 
Affidavit Of George Martin In Suppoert Of 
Plaintiff's Post Hearing Memorandum (Second 
Evidentiary Hearing) 
10/24/2007 MOrN BOBBIE Plaintiff's Motion For Enlargement Of Time Robert J Eigee 
To Respond To Defendant Camas County's 
Supplementallnterogatories And First Request 
For Production Of Documents 
10125/2007 NOTC KORRI Notice of service Robert J Eigee 
10/31/2007 NOSV BOBBIE Notice Of Service X2 Robert J Eigee 
11/612007 SUE:P BOBBIE Subpoena issued X5 Robert J Eigee 
11/8/2007 MOTN BOBBIE Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend Petition Robert J Elgee 
11/9/2007 COt,IT KORRI Continued (Hearing Scheduled 11/13/2007 
01:00 PM) Amended Notice of Hearing. 
Robert J Eigee 
SUBI BOBBIE Subpoena Issued X2 Robert J Eigee 
11/1312007 CM:'N KORRI Court Minutes Hearing type: Hearing Scheduled 
Hearing date: 11/13/2007 Time: 1:00 pm Audio 
Robert J Eigee 
tape number: 2007-11-13 
HR"tO KORRI Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Eigee 
11/13/200701:00 PM: Hearing Held Amended 
Notice of Hearing. 
11/16/2007 HRSC BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/11/200701 :00 Robert J Eigee 
PM) Motion For Leave To Amend Petition & 
Cont On Application For Preliminary Injunction 
1211012007 MOTN KORRI Motion to continue Hearing Robert J Elgee 
OFDR KORRI Order granting Camas Countys motion to Robert J Eigee 
continue hearing 
12111/2007 HP'r\D BOBBIE Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Robert J Eigea 
10/23/200710:00 AM: Hearing Held By phone 
HF:HD BOBBIE Hearing result for Motion held on 12/11/2007 Robert J Elgee 
01:00 PM: Hearing Held Motion For Leave To 
Amend Petition & 
Cont. On Application For Preliminary Injunction 
CHilN BOBBIE Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
Or1:DR BOBBIE Order Granting Leave To Amend Petition For 
Declatory Judgement 
Robert J Eigee 
12/13/2007 Ai'IICO BOB81~ Amended Petition for Breach of Contract Robert J Eigee 
ylt-f 
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'age 5 of 8 Case: CV-2007 -0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, eta\. vs. Ed Smith, eta\. 
George Martin, Martin Custom Homes, L.t. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
)ate Code User Judge 
12/20/2007 HRSl:: BOBBIE amended Notice Of Continued Hearing Robert J Elgee 
Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 02126/2008 
01 :00 PM) Conl Hearing on Application For 
Preliminary Injunction 
MOTC BOBBIE Plaintiffs Motion To Compel Robert J Elgea 
NOHG BOBBIE Notice Of Hearing-Motion To Compel Robert J Eigee 
HRS:; BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Robert J Elgee 
02126/2008 01 :00 PM) In Camas County 
12128/2007 DEOP BOBBIE DeciSion On Requirements of a "Transcribable Robert J Eigee 
Verbatim Record" and Other Records For 
Purposes Of A Preliminary Injunction 
1/14/200S MOTN BOBBIE Motion For Permission To Appeallnteriocutory Robert J Eigee 
Order 
HR~;G BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/29/200803:30 Robert J Eigee 
PM) In Blaine County Counsel For Def. will 
initiate the call. 
1/1712008 NOTC KORRI Notice of Service of plaintiffs 1 st set of requests Robert J Eigee 
for admission propounded to Camas County def. 
1/2212008 AFFD KORRI Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs motion to hold Robert J Eigee 
C.County Defendants in contempt of court for 
violation of Preliminary Injunction 
MorN KORRI Plaintiffs motion to hold Camas county Robert J Eigee 
defendants in contempt of court for violation of 
Preliminary Injunction 
NOTC KORRI Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs motion to hold Robert J Eigee 
Camas County Defendants in contempt of court 
for violation of Prelim. Injunction 
1/2312008 MEMO BOBBIE Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion Robert J Elgee 
To Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt 
Of Court For Violation Of Preliminary Injunction 
AFF'D BOBBIE Affidavit Of Stephanie J. Bonney In Support Of 
Defendants' Objection To Plantiffs' Motion For 
Ro bert J Elgee 
Contempt For Alleged Violation Of Preliminary 
Injunction 
1/31/2008 C~'IIN BOBBIE Court Minutes Robert J Elgea 
HF:HD BOBBIE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Eigee 
02126/2008 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held Cont. 
Hearing on Application For Preliminary Injunction 
HFlHD BOBBIE Hearing result for Motion held on 01/29f2008 Robert J Eigee 
03:30 PM: Hearing Held In Blaine County 
Counsel For Def. will initiate the ca/!. 
HHSC BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 03/07/2008 Robert J Eigee 
09:00 AM) In Camas County 
BOBBIE Notice Of Trial Robert J Eigea 
BOBBIE Notice Of Hearing Robert J Elgee 
211/2008 NOHG BOSBIE Notice Of Hearing Robert J Eigee 
L\ 5 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, etal. VS. Ed Smith, eta!. 
~VVI 
User. KORRI 
George Martin. Martm Cw;tom Homes, U. C. I/S. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
late Code User Judge 
!l1/2008 MEMO BOBBIE Plaintiffs Memorandum In Opposition To Robert J Eigee 
Defendant's Motion For PermisSion To Appeal 
Interlocutory Order 
216/2008 OROFt BOBBIE Order Denying Motion For Permission To Appeal Robert J Elgee 
Interlocutory Order 
212212008 MOT~J KORRI Motion for acceptance of appeal by permission Robert J Eigee 
MEMO KORRI Memorandum in support of motion Robert J Eigee 
SUBFJ BOBBIE Subpoena issued Robert J Eigee 
MOrC BOBBIE Motion To Compel Robert J Elgea 
M01N BOBBIE Motion To Shorten Time Robert J Eigee 
2125/2008 NOFG BOBBIE Notice Of Hearing-3-7-06 9:00 am Motion To Robert J Elgee 
Compel 
2126/2008 HRH'D BOBBIE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Elgee 
02/26/200801:00 PM: Hearing Held Continued 
Evidentuary Hearing In Camas County 
ORDG BOBBIE Order Granting Camas County's Motion To Robert J Eigee 
Shorten Time 
2/27/2008 CMIN BOBBIE Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
SUBP BOBBIE Subpoena issued Robert J Eigee 
2128/2008 SUBR BOBBIE Subpoena RetumedJButlin Robert J Eigee 
AHiR BOBBIE Affidavit Of Service/Sutlin Robert J Eigee 
212912008 AF~;R KORRI Affidavit Of Service Robert J Eigee 
SMRT KORRI Summons Returned Robert J Elgee 
3nl2008 CMfN KORRI Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing 
date: 3f71200a Time: 9:00 am Court reporter. 
Robert J Eigee 
Susan Isreal Audio tape number: 200807 
CTST KORRI Hearing result for Court Trial held on 03/07/2008 Robert J Eigee 
09:00AM: Court Trial Started In Camas County 
3/1112008 OF,lJR BOBBIE Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order 
Expanding Preliminary Injunction 
Robert J Eigee 
3/1212008 ME:MO BOBBIE Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting To 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Preliminary Injunction 
Robert J Eigee 
(Conflict-Of-Intrest Allegation) 
3/13/2008 CMIN BOBSIE Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
HHSC BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference Robert J Eigee 
05/05/2008 02:00 PM) 1/2 Hr. In Blaine County 
HnSC BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 05/20/2008 Robert J Eigee 
09:00 AM) Set for 4 days in Camas County 
BOBBIE Notice Of Hearing Robert J Eigee 
3/1812008 Mc;MO KORRI Plaintiffs response to defendant Camas county's 
post hearing memo relating to eantlet of interest 
Robert J Eigee 
allegation 
4/212008 DE:OP BOBS:£:: Decision On Conflict Of Intrests Issue For Robert J Elgee 
Purposes Of A Preliminary Injunction \ g 4 
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District Court - Camas County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin, eta!. vs. Ed Smith, eta!. 
User. KORRI 
George Martin, Martin Custom Homes, LI. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
Date Code 
5/13/2008 MOIS 
ORD=t 
CMIN 
SUB(=' 
511412008 SUBI=l 
AFS[;~ 
5/1912008 EXLT 
WlTr,1 
5/20/2008 CMI'" 
WlT.'l 
NO~N 
EXLT 
CH:T 
APPL 
NOTe 
ROBR 
5121/2008 CMIN 
STII:) 
7/312008 HR:3C 
7/25/2008 HRSC 
8/8/2008 MOAM 
PETN 
e 
User Judge 
KORRI Motion To Dismiss Robert J Eigee 
BOBBIE Order Granting Camas County's Motion To Robert J Eigee 
Shorten Time 
BOBBIE Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
BOBBIE Subpoena issued X3 Robert J Eigee 
BOBBIE Subpoena Returned X3 Robert J Elgee 
BOBBIE Affidavit Of Service X3 Robert J Eigee 
KORRI Exhibit List, defendants· Robert J Eigee 
KORRI Witness List. defendants Robert J Elgee 
KORRI Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing Robert J Elgee 
date: 5/20/20081lme: 9:00 am Audio tape 
number: 20080520 
BOBBIE Witness List Robert J Eigee 
BOBBIE Notice Of Service Robert J Eigee 
BOBBIE Exhibit List Robert J Elgee 
KORRI Hearing result for Court Trial held on 05/20/2008 Robert J Elgee 
09:00AM: Court Trial Started Set for 4 days in 
Camas County 
BOBBIE Plaintiff's Application For Temporary Restraing Robert J Eigee 
Order, Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory 
Relief 
KORRI Notice of service of plaintiffs suppl response to Robert J Eigee 
interrogatories propounded by def camas county 
KORRI Request To Obtain Approval To Broadcast And Robert J Eigee 
Or Photograph A Court Proceeding 
KORRI Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing 
date: 5121/2008 Time: 8:28 am Court reporter; 
Robert J Eigee 
Susan Isreal Audio tape number. 20080521 . 
KORRI Stipulation as to facts and admission of Robert J Eigee 
documentary eVidence 
KORR! Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Robert J Eigee 
08/19/200801:00 PM) 
BOBBIE Hearing SchedUled (Status 08/11/2008 11 :00 Robert J Eigee 
AM) By Phone 
BOBBIE Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To Amend Petition By Robert J Eigee 
Adding Two Additional Causes of Action: 
1) Declatory & Injunctive Relief Against 
Resolutions 114 & 115 and Ordinances #157 & 
158 
2) Damages For Violations of State & Federal 
Law 
BOBBIE Second Amended Petition For Breach of Robert J Eigee 
Contract. Tortious Interference with contract, For 
Declaratory relief, Damages For Violation Of 
-ID 
Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights 17 
and Equal Protection Of Law 
~1/~02~~:O~ rAX ~087642J49 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000024 Current Judge: Robert J Eigee 
George Martin. eta\. vs. Ed Smith. eta\. 
l4J 009 
User KORRI 
George Martin. Martin Custom Homes. L.t. C. vs. Ed Smith, Camas County Board of Commissioners 
Date Code User Judge 
8/8/2008 APPL. BOBBIE Plaintiffs Verified Application For Temporary Robert J Elgee 
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injuction And 
Declaratory Relief 
8/1112008 HRHO BOBBIE Hearing result for Status held on 08/11/2008 Robert J Eigee 
11:00 AM: Hearing Held By Phone 
CON~i BOBBIE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Elgee 
0811912008 01 :00 PM: Continued 
HRS~~ BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Robert J Eigee 
08/20/2008 01 :00 PM) 
HRSG BOBBIE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/20/2008 09:00 Robert J Elgee 
AM) 
BOBBIE Notice Of Hearing Robert J Eigee 
SMIS BOBBIE Summons Issued X4 Robert J Eigee 
8/13/2008 CMr\~ KORRI Court Minutes Robert J Eigee 
8/14/2008 SMHT BOBBIE Summons Returned X4 Robert J Eigee 
AFSI~ BOBSIE Affidavit Of Service X4 Robert J Eigee 
8/20/2008 CMIN KORRI Court Minutes Hearing type: Court Trial Hearing Robert J Eigee 
date: 8/20/2008 Time: 9:00 am Court reporter: 
Maureen Audio tape number: 20080820 
BREF KORRI Plaitiffs Trial Brief Robert J Elgee 
HRHD KORRI Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Robert J Eigee 
08120/2008 01 :00 PM: Hearing Held 
8/27/2008 RE::::P KORRI Response to plaintiffs petition for leave to amend Robert J Eigee 
complaint 
9/1212008 REI:JL BOBBIE Plaintiffs Reply To Response To Motion For Robert J Eigee 
leave To Amend Petition By Adding Two 
Additional Causes Of Action 
9/15/2008 MEMO BOBBIE Plaintifs Post-Trial Memorandum Robert J Eigee 
9/2912008 BREF KORRI Def Camas County, etal Post Trial Brief Robert J Eigee 
10/8/2008 OF~.IJR BOBBIE Order On Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Robert J Eigee 
Amended Complaint 
10/15/2008 ANGW KORRI Amended Answer Robert J Eigee 
Ll 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Bt;;:;IfNE COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN, 
Plaintiff, 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, 
vs. 
ED SMITH, 
Defendant 
and 
{~ AS COUNTY IDAHO 
.. - - " I3Y; d through the duly elected 
Bo~r f Commissioners in 
Their,o cial and individual capacities, 
KEN BAXTROM, 
BILL DAVIS, and 
RON CHAPMAN 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
LMAS 
~ 
) Case No.: CV-2007-24 
) 
) 
) ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED 
) COMPLAINT 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The procedural history and present posture of this case is particularly 
important with regard to this motion. In his original complaint, Martin 
brought causes of action against Camas County seeking judgment declaring 
that certain zoning ordinances passed by Camas County in 2006/2007 were 
Order on Plaintiffs Molion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- I 
invalid and violated existing law. Combined with the original declaratory 
judgment are claims by which Martin seeks civil damages against Ed Smith 
individually, and the Camas County commissioners in their official 
capacities. 
The court has heard the declaratory judgment action over the 
200612007 amendments in toto. In the process of getting to trial on this first 
declaratory judgment action, the court has issued 2 injunctions, one 
detennining that the Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to 
keep a trancribable verbatim record, and the other determining that conflicts 
of interest existed. Evidence obtained during hearings over these preliminary 
injunction issues were combined with trial evidence pursuant to IRCP 
65(a)(2). 
Trial was held on this first declaratory judgment issue in Camas 
County on August 20, 2008. Post trial briefs are currently being submitted, 
and the court will take the matter under advisement immediately. By 
agreement of counsel, all claims for money damages against all defendants 
, 
have been reserved for a subsequent trial at a later time, and those issues 
have not yet been set for trial. 
On August 8,2008, shortly before trial, Martin filed a Motionfor 
Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two Additional Causes of Action. This 
motion was submitted on briefing submitted post-trial. This motion seeks to 
add new claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, as a part of the existing 
case, as to new ordinances passed by Camas County in 2008. It also seeks 
to add new civil damages claims against Camas County, and the Board of 
Commissioners in their individual capacities, for violations of Section 1983 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to fIle Amended Complaint 2 
of the Civil Rights Act, alleging both due process and equal protection 
violations. As noted, the existing pending civil damage claims against these 
same defendants have been split off from the declaratory judgment claims by 
agreement of counsel, and have not yet been set for trial. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
One of the pending issues is whether the court should allow plaintiff 
to amend his complaint, post-trial, on the declaratory judgment issues, to 
incorporate new matters that have occurred since the original filing. 
Although not specifically addressed by the parties, (because both parties 
have taken an "all or nothing approach" to the proposed pleading 
amendment) a separate issue is whether the court should allow a partial 
amendment to the complaint as to the civil damage issues that are still 
pending for trial. Another issue, addressed but unclear, is whether the court 
can bifurcate the declaratory judgment issues, that have already been tried, 
from the pending civil damages issues for purposes of an appeal, so that the 
parties can get a resolution of the declaratory judgment issues at the 
Supreme COUli, without having to wait for trial on civil damage issues that 
have little in common factually or legally with the declaratory judgment to 
be rendered. 
The starting point for this analysis is IRCP 15. The court recognizes 
under Rule 15(a) that in the ordinary case, if a trial is not pending, or there is 
no prejudice, leave to amend should be freely given. The court also 
recognizes this is a discretionary decision. Jones v. Watson 98 Idaho 606, 
570 P.2d 284 (1977), Hines v. Hines 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20 (1997). 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Fiie Amended Complaint -- :; 
PiaintiffMal1in argues under Rule 15(d) that the amendment here 
should be allowed as his new pleading involves occurrences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be amended. That 
much is true. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the evidence 
necessary to address these new claims is entirely different from the original 
cause of action, that the trial on the original cause of action has already been 
held (at least as to the declaratory judgment issues), and thus any 
amendment will open up new avenues of discovery and delay, citing Black 
Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc, v. Idaho First National Bank 119 Idaho 171, 
804 P.2d 900 (1991), and Hinkle v. Winey 126 Idaho 993,895 P.2d 594 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
The court finds that the new allegations, at least as to the declaratory 
judgment causes of action, are based on events that have happened since the 
filing of the original complaint, but they will involve new evidence, new 
discovery, and application of new legal theory or principles. To elaborate, 
plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint, as to the relief seeking 
declaratory judgment, that Camas County failed to properly enact 
ordinances, and conduct administrative hearings involving zoning 
amendments passed in 2008. Although it is true that plaintiffs original 
complaint alleged some of the same general sort of legal defects as to 
ordinances and hearings conducted in 2006 and 2007, the defects alleged in 
the proposed amended complaint are not founded on the same facts as the 
prior complaint- indeed, they are founded on allegations as to what Camas 
County did or did not do in passing the 2008 amendments. The cOUI1 can 
tell, simply from the attachments submitted with the Verified Application for 
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Temporary Restraining Order, and the allegations of the new complaint, that 
Camas County utilized a different, more thorough process in 2008 than it did 
with the 2006, 2007 amendments. Whether this process (in 2008) was 
adequate will not involve an examination of the same questions raised in the 
attack on the 2006, 2007 ordinance amendments. It may involve some of the 
same or similar questions, but it is apparent that it will involve, at a 
minimum, new discovery based on new facts and events, and the application 
of some difIerent legal principles. This is not as straightforward as Camas 
County simply putting a new coat of paint over old defects. Moreover, the 
declaratory judgment issues raised by the initial complaint have already been 
tried, and briefed, and those matters are due to be taken under advisement 
forthwith by the court. Finally, akin to the situation in Hinkle v. Winey, 
supra, there is no showing of any prejudice to Martin ifhe is required to 
resolve these new declaratory judgment claims in a separate action. This is 
where they would be best resolved. As will be more fully addressed below, 
there is simply no good reason to tie these new declaratory judgment claims 
in with the old ones. I 
The motion for leave to file an amended complaint with regard to new 
claims for declaratory judgment is DENIED. 
The next issue is whether the new civil claims set forth by Martin in 
his proposed amended complaint (violation of due process and equal 
I Although in his proposed amended complaint Martin makes an altemative claim for a Petition for Judicial 
Review, his pleading does not seem to address the judicial review factors. Whether it does or does not is of 
no moment, however, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently determined an action for Judicial Review 
could not be combined with a civil action. Euclid Avenue Trl/Sf v. City of Boise Supreme Court Opinion No. 
107, Docket No. 33974, filed Sept 23, 2008. Accordingly, this court need not address where that 
particular allegation falls under this motion. 
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protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983) should be treated differently 
than his claims for declaratory relief. As noted, these claims are directed at 
the members of the Camas County Board of Commissioners personally and 
individually. Also as noted, Martin has existing civil damage claims against 
Ed Smith and Camas County seeking money damages, which claims are not 
currently set for trial and remain pending. These civil rights claims allege 
violations of Martin's rights from both the 2006/2007 amendments to the 
county zoning, and the 2008 amendments as well. As such, if the coul1 did 
not allow the amended complaint as to the alleged violations occurring in 
2006/2007, Martin would probably lose the right to bring them. That is, 
insofar as alleged violations are alleged to have occurred in 2006/2007, they 
either needed to be brought along with the original claims made in this case, 
or they would likely be barred. See Duthie v.Lewiston Gun Club 104 Idaho 
751,663 P.2d 287, (1983) (Res judicata principles operate to prohibit 
subsequent claims as to not only that which was litigated, but also to every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.) 
A second reason to treat these allegations differently from the new 
declaratory judgment claims is these involve questions of money damages, 
are triable to a jury (jury trial is requested in the proposed amended 
complaint), and there is no reason to require or allow two separate suits for 
money damages between the same parties on the same facts. 
The third reason to treat these claims differently is that there is no 
viable claim of prejudice that can be made by the defendants. No trial date 
has been set on the civil damage claims. Rule 15 (a) requires leave to amend 
be freely given when justice so requires, and the court determines, for the 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 6 
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reasons set forth above, at least with regard to the civil damages claims, that 
justice requires leave be granted to amend the pleadings to allow the civil 
rights claims to be pled and proved along with the other civil damage claims 
now pending. See Sinclair A1ktg., Inc. v. Slepert 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d 
385. The motion to amend with regard to the new civil damage claims is 
GRANTED. 
Finally, Camas County has raised in its briefing the necessity or 
advisability of having the court issue a Rule 54(b) certificate as to the 
declaratory judgment issues resolved or to be resolved by the trial held in 
August 2008. Camas County has already tried to appeal those issues once, 
and the court has addressed this issue previously on the record with the 
parties. As this issue implicates the procedure and posture of this case (the 
court is in the process of rendering judgment on the declaratory judgment 
claims, there may be a new declaratory judgment action filed, and a civil 
trial for damages is still pending) this issue needs attention from both the 
court and the parties. The court will make no rulings on this issue at this 
point, but wants the parties to carefully consider their positions here. 
From the court's perspective, it makes perfect sense to certify the 
issues resolved by the declaratory judgment trial for appeal pursuant to Rule 
54(b). They are unconnected legally from the civil damage claims, as they 
involve entirely different questions of law. The declaratory judgment trial, 
(and preliminary injunctions) revolved primarily around the failure to keep a 
transcribable verbatim record, whether county officials are exempt from 
conflict of interest statutes if their activity is "legislative" as opposed to 
"quasi-judicial", and such things as whether a written recommendation was 
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sent or received from the P&Z Commission to the Board before zoning was 
changed. The civil damage claims will involve a jury trial, at least in part, 
and will not occur for some period of time. Of equal significance, any 
decision rendered by an appellate court in Idaho as to whether some of the 
conduct of county officials (e.g.- the effect of alleged conflicts of interest) is 
exempt from some provisions oflaw because it falls under the umbrella of 
"legislative activity", or whether certain civil claims are viable under the 
circumstances alleged can only help here. If guidance on the declaratory 
action already tried comes before the civil trial on damages, it can only help-
not only the parties involved in this litigation but throughout Idaho. The 
legal issues raised by the declaratory judgment are important questions that 
need resolution-the sooner the better. If guidance is not forthcoming before 
the civil trial, the parties are no worse off. If this court certifies those 
declaratory judgment issues for appeal, and they are not appealed, they 
become the law of the case, and the only issues that could be appealed later 
would be those raised by the civil trial. In short, there are many good reasons 
to certify a forthcoming judgment on the declaratory judgment issues, and 
scant few to wait for the results of a relatively unconnected civil trial. 
Finally, any issues as to claims or entitlement as to attorney fees should 
probably be reviewed, resolved, and determined at this juncture rather than 
after a civil trial, and a separate analysis conducted on the civil issues when 
they are resolved. Any claims for attorney's fees against the county at this 
point, and attorney's fees under civil damage claims that might be made 
later, will likely involve completely different analyses under completely 
di fferent statutes and standards, and the same is true under the appeal 
Order on Piail1tiff~tion for Leave to File Amended Complaint -- 8 
process. Combining those issues will only make them more complex and 
harder to resolve in the future. 
Having made those observations, the comi is concerned about the 
application of Rule 54(b )(2) to this case. As the court has indicated, the court 
would be reluctant to stay the civil trial until after an appeal of the 
declaratory judgment issues, which would seem to be the result mandated 
by Rule 54(b)(2). . The court believes the best course of action is if the 
parties stipulate that the declaratory judgment issues already tried will be 
certified for appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b), that any discovery conducted in 
the declaratory judgment action need not be repeated for purposes of the 
pending civil action, that the issues on the civil damage claims involve a 
"separate action" under the meaning or Rule 54(b )(2), the civil action for 
damages will not be stayed pending appeal of the declaratory judgment 
issues, that the court may determine prevailing parties, attorney's fees, and 
costs upon the declaratory judgment action upon entry of a judgment in this 
case, and that there will be a separate and independent review of the 
attorney's fee issue in the civil action once it is resolved. How you wish to 
treat attorney's fees incurred to date that may relate solely to the civil action 
is up to you. The court is not ordering any of this at this time; it is only 
making suggestions as to what the most expedient and efficient method of 
handling the case may be. 
Although the head note under Rule 54(b )(2) says the exact opposite, 
the procedure allowing an appeal with a Rule 54 (b) certificate, with a 
bifurcated separate issue- a separate third party claim, was allowed in 
Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen 107 Idaho 541, 691 P.2d 787 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File 
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(App.1984). What is unclear is whether this particular provision of 54(b )(2) 
was in effect at that time, or came after the decision. I f the panies fail to 
stipulate, the court does not know yet what action would be appropriate, but 
a stipulation of some sort would eliminate uncertainty and avoid expensive 
legal maneuvering on these procedural issues. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED THIS ~ day of October, 2008. 
District Judge 
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Case No_ CV-07-24 
SECOND AMENDED 
PETITION FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, TORTIOUS INTER-
FERENCE WITH CONTRACT, FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF, DAMAGES 
FOR VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL & 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
AND EQUAL PROTECtiON OF LAW 
JURy TRIAL DEMANDED 
lZSLZZ9S0Z L9:91 899Z/L9/8Q 
I , 
CO~S NOW, Plaintiff George Martin, personally and on behalf of Martin 
I 
Custom HOfnes, L.L.C. as a member, and in SUppOlt ofhi5 Petition for Breach of Contract 
and Inlenti~nallmerferem;~ WiUl Contract against Defendant Ed Smith personally, and 
his PetitioJ for Declaratory Judgment against Camas County, by and through its duly 
elected Bo I d of Commissioners, does state following: 
FACTS COMMON TO ALL COUNTS 
& 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
1. George Martin (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintifi" jointly with Martin 
q..:itstom Hqmes, L.L.C.) is a resident of and owner of real property silual~d in the COWlty 
j 
of Camas, [tate of Idaho. ~ 2. MIIl1.in Custom Homes. L.L.C (hereinafter referred to os "Plaintiff" jointly 
7with Geole Mat.tin) is an Idaho Limited Liability Company in good standing. 
3. Defendant Ed Smlth (hereinafter referred to as '~Defendant Smith") is a 
resident 0 Camas County, State ofIdaho. 
4. Defendant Ed Smi~ is Jicen~ed hy the State of Idaho as a Real Estate 
Broker dOirg bIL<in",,-, lIS Town and Country Realtors. and whose business address is 514 
Soldier Ror' Fairfield Idaho 83327. 
S. All acts and activities alleged to have occurred in this Complaint occurred 
within COIty of Camas, State of Idaho. 
6. Damages claimed by Plaintiff are within the jurisdictional amount 
required t be heard in the District Court for the State of Idaho, County of Camas. 
I 
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7. The 5th District Court for Ule State of Idaho, County of Camas, has 
jurisdictionlover thi~ Iuatter pursuant to Idaho Code, Seq,tiops 67-5270,67-5273,67-5278 
I . . 
and section I 1-705. 
I 
I [REP ORE, this lWnorabl. CQurt having jurisdiction Plaintiff prays thi< court 
hear and dllemline the controversies presented herein. 
COUNT! 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
8. I Un or about September 8, 2004 Plaintiff e:nte:rc::c.l int.o au agl-ecmcnt with 
Defendant ISmith, in Camas County, for which good and valuable consideration was 
eXCbang4 whereby Defendant was to act as Plaintiff's "Exclusive Buyer's Broker," 
(hc:rreillafter referred to as the 4'Agcncy Agreement") for purposes of purchase of vacant 
I 
land in Cafas County Idaho. 
9. Defendant Smith, by entry into said agreement, owed Plaintiff certain 
duties and rbligations, including bnt not limited to the following; 
3. 1j'0 perfonn the terms of the written agreement 
E9/BE 39\1d 
b. To exercise reasonable skill and care 
c. 0 promote the best interests of the Plaintiff in good faith, honesty and fair 
d ing including, but not limited to . 
(i) Disclosing to the Plaintiff all adverse material facts actually known 
or which reasonably should have been known by the defendant; 
(ii) Seeking a property for purchase at a price and under tenns and 
conditions acceptable to the buyer and assisting in the negotiation 
therefore 
d. fI'0 immediately. upon receiving any offer to purchase signed and dated by 
Plaintiff, provide a copy of the ofter to purchase to the buyer as a receipt 
e. To make certain that all otters to purchase real property or any interest therein 
ar9 in writing and contain all terms and conditions of the real estate transaction as 
dirfeted by the pl~tiff ~ Ci· 
I 0'+ 
AU \1SV-IW I S<:l3HdOl.S HlH8 lZ:5n:Z:980Z: 
! 
I 
f. 4y and all fiduciary duties. 
10. On or about September 8, 2004 property for purchase was located, then 
I 
owned by Ron and Deborah Pauls, Husband and Wife, (hereinafter, "Sellers"), which 
said proper is situated in Camas County, Idaho, and fully d,,"'rihed in the "Legal 
Descriptio! ' attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
11. Terms for an offer were defined by Plaintiff and submitted in writing to 
Defendant fmith. 
I 12.1 Defendant Smith thereafter failed to perfonn the terms of the written 
I 
agreement; to exercise reasonable skill and care; to promote the best interest of Plaintiff 
in good fair honesty and fair dealing; failed to notify Plaintiff of all adverse facts known 
or which r1asonablY should have been known by Defendant Smith; failed to make certain 
the offer t, purchase real property contained all the terms and conditions as directed by 
Plaintiff. I . 
I 
13.
1 
PlaintiF as a direcl <u,d proximate result of Defendant Smith's breach of 
agency coptract, su ered monetary damages in an amount exceeding Ten Thousand 
I 
I 
Dollars ($ 0,000). 
14. Defen ant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basis in law 
causing P intiff to ircur attorney fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-120 
and 12-ll 
J 'j Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from 
reasonabltj standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for its likely 
I ~ 
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I 
i 
I 
consequenis. Defendant Smith acted with an eXtremely harmful state of mind whether 
his conduct/was malicious or grossly ndgligent. 
I 
I 
I 
WiRFORE, Plaintiff prays this court enter judgment against Defendant Smith 
in an amort in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary damages, for 
punitive drages and for attorney's fees. 
COUNT II 
I TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
16. j Upon further negotiations Seller and Plaintiff entered into a c.ontract. to 
purchase rt property (hereinafter the "Real Estate Contract") subject to a ""ries of terms 
and conditirns including a "contingent on rezone and replat" clause. 
17. Defendant Smith knowing of the contract between Plaintiff and Seller, and 
the SPecifir. terms and conditions thereof, set about a course of action tha! further 
breached is own contractual duties to Plaintiff and intentionally interfered with the 
contract fOr purchase of real property with Seller by taldng all efforts possible to prevent 
the real prjPerty in question from being rezoned in a manner satistactory to Plaintiff and 
otherwise' tentionally obstructing closure on the Real Estate Contract. 
18. Defendant Smith actively enticed Sellers to breach the Real Estate 
Contract ,erebY directly causing Sellers to declare the Real Estate Contract null and void 
thereby br aching said Real Estate Contract. 
19. In addition to the above specifically described intentional interference 
with conlfdct by enticing Sellers to breaoh the contract to purchase 
I \ Q 
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i 
1 
i 
Defendant jmith continued his malicious and illegal conduct under this cuwlla"d in his 
ostensibly Qtticial capacity, as plead in Count fir below, by acting as Chair ofthc body 
ostensibly ~cting as Camas County Plannin~ Md Zoning Commission that apparently 
recommen~ed amemlmcuts to the Comprehensive Plan Dud Zoning Ordinance. 
20. Plaintif( seeking to mitigate his damages and take advantage of the 
residual viue of his contractual rights, (i.e. diminished potential development rights and 
or resale vfue in the real property) waived all conditions, tenus and contingencies and 
closed on ie real property in question on or about September 26, 2005. 
21.1 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Smith's intentional 
1 
interferenCf with the Real Estate Contract with Sellers that led to a breach of said 
I 
contract Plaintiff suffered monetary damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000)·1 
1 
22. Detendant Smith acted in a manner without a reasonable basi::; in law 
causing Pl{lintiff to incur anomey fees recoverable under Idaho Code Sections 12-120 
I 
and 12-12 I. 
23. Defendant Smith acted in a manner that was an extreme deviation from 
reasonable standards of conduct, and with an understanding or disregard for its likely 
consequenrs. Defendant Smith acted with an extremely harmful state of mind whether 
his conduc was malicious or grossly negligent. 
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I 
iRFOKE, P~aintiff prays this court rotcr judgment against Defendant Smith 
in an amotplt in ~Xl:CSS of Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 for monetary damages, for 
punitive ~ag"" and for attorney's fees. 
I . 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
COUNT III 
I 
I 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
! OR IN THE AL TERNERA TIVE 
! 
I 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Facnku Allegations Common to All Legal Theories 
I 
24. During t~e period and within lh~ lime frame addressed by this Petition, 
I 
Camas corty, by and tbough its duly elected Board ofCommissioncrs, and through the 
memb~s uJr a body ostellsibly acting as, but not lawfully organized, Planning and Zoning 
commissir undertook to exercise the mandatory powers authorized Title 61 Ch"l'ter 
65, commr1Y referred to as the Local Land Use Planning Act,. by amending the Camas 
County Ctpreheusive Plan, the Land U.e Map and Zoning Ordinance. text and Zoning 
Map, and Idid thereby uniformly and systematically up-zone real property owned by 
various mjmbers. relations and clients of members of the Board and Commission, and 
downzone eal property owned by Plaintiff. 
25. The dates of approval or recommendation of the various aspects of the 
comprehTive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, by the 
unlawfulli organized Planning and Zoning Commission, are difiicult if not impossible to 
discern be~ause no proper record was created or maintained. 
I 
I 
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26. The Camas County Hoard of Commissioners did adopt an amended 
Zoning Or~inance No. 153, on April 18, 2007, but failed to altach a copy of the 
ordinance, fext or map. Curiously, Zoning Onlinallcc; Map No. 150, was adopted by the 
i 
I 
Board Pci0l to the text, on March 29,2007, which did not include legal description of the 
various zors, Also on March 29, 2007 the Board passed a resolution adopted a 
Comprche~sive Land Use Map, but failed again to provide legal description of the areas 
I 
contemPlatd for future land uses. No written record of recommendation from the 
unlawfully ifonned Planning and Zoning Commission was created. 
I 
I 
Conflict of Interest 
27. Defendant Smith, during the period addressed in this Petition, acted as an 
appointed fovemment official serving on a body that purported to be a duly empowered 
Camas CO'Jffity Planning and Zoning Commission. 
28. Detendant Smith owns, and frequently buys and sells, numerous parcels of 
I 
real properb situated within Camas County, Idaho. 
29. Defendant Smith is actively engaged in the purchase and sale of real 
property siited in Camas County both for his own account and as a broker agent for the 
purpose OJ generating income through commission. During the period addressed by this 
Petition, i1 believed Defendant Smith has purchased, sold or been associated with the 
purchase Tsale as a broker agent nwnerous parcels of real property. 
30. Defendant Smith and other members of the Planning and Zoning 
CommissiCim and Roard of County Commissioners had an economic interest in the jN ~ 
ES/S£ 39\;1d All \;1SWv~ I SCl3HdOlS I ClH:) 1Z5LlZ:980Z: 
outcome of] this legislative and quasi-judicial activity under Idaho Code Section 67-6506 
and theref1re suffered a fatal conflict of interest requiring n:eusa! in tbeir capacity as a 
member(s) I of the body purporting to btl the C~Ul1as COWlty Plruming and Zoning 
CommissiJ limi lhe Board of COWlty Commissioners. 
Planning and Zoning Commission Lacked Jurisdiction 
31. During the period addressed by this Petition the Cama~ County Planning 
and ZOnini. Commi~.ion did not legally exist andlor was operating without authority in 
th::.t no Orrinance was duly passed by the Board of County Commissioners creating a 
I 
Planning apd Zoning Commission and no organizational papers or bylaws had been 
adopted asjrequired by Idaho Section 67-6504. Therefore, any and all acts dependant on 
a valid 4ended Comprehensive Plan, including an amended zoning ordinance are 
without Ie Ia{ authority. 
Fatal Procedural Infirmities ruue Process Violations) 
32. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County Jmmissioners failed to follow the notice and hearing procedures required by 
Idaho Cod in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning Ordinance. 
33. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County C mmissioners failed to keep a transcribable verbatim record of proceedings as 
required b Idaho Code in amending the Comprehensive Plan, 
£9/9£ 39'1d Al.I '1SlA/lA/ I SCl3HdOlS I ClH8 TZ6LZ:Z:980Z: 
34. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Boaru of 
County Co missioners failed to keep a transcribabl~ verbatim record of proceedings as 
required by Idaho Code in amending the Zoning Ordinance. 
35. The Camas County Plaruting and Zoning Commission and Board of County 
commiSSiorers fuiled to comply with the substantive dictates of the Local Land Use 
Planning APt. 
I 
i 
I 
36. The Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and Board of 
County C9mmissioners failed. in amending the Comprehensive Plan and the Zoning 
Ordinance.1 to fe findings of fact and conclusions of law or other documentation or 
record of rromrendations as required by LC. 67-6508(b) thereby rendering impossible 
a meaningful r~view whether the substantive requirements and mandatory Planning 
duties undt Idaho Code were adhered to. 
I 
37.1 The Camas County Board of Commissioners, as governing board, fail~u to 
remand 1d re-notice public hearing after material chang"" were made to the 
Comprehe ive Plan and Zoning Ordinance. 
Additional Fatal Procedural Infirmities 
MA Y 25 2006 AMENDMENT TO COMPREHENSIVE PLAN RESOLUnON 9 
38. On or about May 25, 2006 Defendant Camas County adopted Resolution 
#96 - Ne, Comprehensive Plan with revised Land Use Map, changing the permitted 
future lan, use of the ~Ubject property from R-7 to Low Density Residential - was not 
Allt1SWv·IIS;:!3Hd01SI;:!H:J TZ6a:Z9SGZ 
I 
supported b~ proper notice pursuant to LC. Section 67-6509. Therefure, Resolution 96 is 
I 
lawfully defcient and should be stricken as void and held for naught. 
39. I More specifically the notice published failed to contain a summary of any 
kind or m+er. including any sort of legal dcscription or map of the areas to be affected, 
the land us~ and/or use designations; nor did Defendant Camas County provide a notice 
to 0 er m 10. servmg e Juns lction lor use as a pu lC servIce announcement, nor was th r" . th' . d" .c hi" 
notice of Ttent to adopt the amended plan sent to all political subdivisions providing 
services wifhin the planning jurisdiction. including school districts. 
40_ Moreover. Defendant Camas County failed to provide proper mailed or 
I 
lawfully a~orized alternative notice such as site posting. 
I 
I 41./ Furthennore, Defendant Camas County altered the proposed land use map 
on the day pf the hearing and thereafter failed to properly notice a subsequent hearing. 
I 42./ Additionally, Defendant Camas County failed, in relation to the planning 
duties req,ired by I.e, Section 67-6508, to include "all land" and provide a map, 
including e entire county, indicating suitable projected land uses for the jurisdiction. 
43. Moreover. Defendant Camas County has not complied with 67-6509(c) 
requiring 1 copy of the plan to accompany each adopting resolution and to be kept on file 
with the county clerk and said the portion of said Plan that is the land use is to this day 
not aVail1le at the office of the County Clerk. 
APRIL [8 2007 AMENDED ZONING ORDINANCE I ORDINANCES 150 & 153 
44. On or about March 29, 2007, and April 18, 2007 Defendant Camas 
County a10pted Ordinances #150 & #153- Amended Zoning Ordinance and Map 
providing Itar amended zoning districts and bolUldaries thereby, rezoning the subject 
i 
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I 
I 
property - ~ublication for which failed to comply with the requirements of I.e. 31-715 
I 
and/or 31-'115A. Therefore, Ocdillanees 150 and 153 are lawfully deficient and should be 
sLrickeu as I oid and held for naught. 
45. More specificnlly, said publications did not an accurately and completely 
summarize the ordinance nor did the publications provide a statement that the full text of 
the ordinarres were available at a given location or time where a copy of ~ame could be 
obtained. I 
I 
46.1 Additionally, said publications faile~ because the ordinances deal with 
I 
real proPT requiring legal description, to publish in full those sections containing the 
legal ,ption or map thereof with sufficient detail to clearly define the area with 
which the rdinance is concerned. 
47.1 Moreover, Ordinance 150 adopting an Amended Zoning Map. was 
adopted Mr 29,2007 some twenty (20) days prior to adoption of Ordinance 153, the 
Amended foning Ordinance text upon which the Map is supposedly based indicating a 
unlawful at decision to adopt was made prior to hearing. 
WIIEREFORE, Plaintiff prays this court to enter its Judgment declaring null 
and void 11 activities and ostensibly official actions under I.LUP A taken by the Cama. 
County PI . S and Zoning Commission and the Board of Commis.sioner" on and after 
September 8, 2004. to restrain Defendant from processing land use applications under the 
ostensibly adopted amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance and to enter 
judgment ir an amount reasonably required for Plaintiffs attorney fees. 
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COUNT IV. 
f ~ J I'J r' ' 
i DECLARATORY RELIEF 
I 
MAY ~2~ 2008 COMPREHENSIVE PLAN & ZONING ORDINANCE 
I AMENDMENTS 
48. On or about May 12, 2008, by Resolutions 114 and 115 illegally adopted a 
new Amenfd Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map. On that same date, by Ordinance 
Nos. 157 r 159 the Camas County Board of Commissioners illegally adopted a new 
amended Zjning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map. 
I 
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS IN ADOPTING NEW AMENDED ORDINANCES IS IN 
I 
I 
VIOLATlbN OF THE COURT'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AND THE CAMAS 
I 
i 49'1 
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE 
This Court, in its order of December 28, 2007, enjoined and prohibited 
Defendant rm proceeding under the Zoning Ordinance amended in MMch of 2007 and the 
related zO,ing Map if the Zoning Map purportedly affected any sort of change in existing 
zoning. Injthis Court's Order of March 10, 2008 the Court state~ on page three (3) ''until 
such time rs a final Order is entered the County cannot treat the March 2007 Zoning 
Amendmjts as void ... " 
50./ This Comt stated, "In the Comt's view the applicable zoning in Camas 
County goreming land use applications cannot change week to week. as the case at hand 
progresses At such time as a final order is entered the question of which County Zoning 
Ordinance iPlies will have been settled, and not befOre." 
51'1_ The only means to amend the Zoning Ordinance is the procedure provided 
for in the /Zoning Ordinance, Article X V ll, and in full compliance with LLUP A. The 
Defendantt actions in amending the Zoning Ordinance, again a1t~riJlg the zoning 
AIHISl-'lvH S~3HdO.LS I ~H:J LG:91 8GGZ/LG/88 
designation in areas purportedly atIected by zoning (;hang,c by the 2007 amendments, arc in 
violation oflthe Court's Order and/or Defendant's Zoning Ordinance. 
1 
PROCESS OF ADOPTING NEW AMENDED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN & ZONING 
I ORDINANCE IN VIOLATION OF LLUPA 
i 
52.1 The new amended Comprehensive Plan and Zoning Ordinance T ,and Use 
Map and zJning Map are substantially identical t.o that approved in May 2006. March and 
April2007,jwith several minor exceptions. 
53. i The draft date of the new amended Camas County Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning Orbance is March 10, 2008 before any meeting had been held, indicating 
unnoticed td illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners 
54./ The draft date of the new amended Camas C01.ll1ty Comprehensive Plan and 
Zoning orrnance Land Use Map and Zoning Map is March 142008 before any meeting 
had been hrld, indicating wmoticed and illegal meetings of the Board of Commissioners and 
I 
Planning ,d Zoning Commission. 
55./ Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Planning and Zoning 
COmmissir were drafted and signed outside of any notice public meeting and not reviewed 
in public the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
56. Regarding the Zoning Map recommended for approval, the Findings of Fact 
and ConCI/iOns of Law are signed by the Planning and Zoning Commission Chair, outside 
. of any la11 meeting of the Planning and Zoning Commission, even though Mr. Ralph had 
recused . self from participating in the Public Hearing wherein said Map was considered. 
£9/117 39'i1d A.11 'i1Sv.j\tHS~3Hd01SI~HJ TZ:5LlZ:980Z: 
57. Ibe new Amended Comprehensive Plan is an incomplete document, in that 
maps and ~les referenced in the Table of Contents arc not contained within the approved 
! 
document. i 
i 
58. The new Amended Comprehensive Plan approved by the Board of 
Commi.si0rets is not the same document that wa< made available to the public prior to 
Public Hers' 
59. The new Amended Zoning Ordinance and new Amended Comprehensive 
Plan were crnsidered concurrently indicating a pr~determined outcome, illegal meetings of 
I 
the P1anninrl and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners. 
60. Among the additional procedural errors associated with the new process are; 
£g/Zt> 39\;1d 
I 
I 
i 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
a Legal Notice of Public Hearing deficiencies in violation of I.e. Sections 
67 -6509 & 67-6511 because no summary of the proposed amendments, 
that would reasonably apprise an individual of the nature or location of 
the proposed land use zoning changes, was included in said Legal 
Notice; 
b. nor was said notice provided to all political subdivisions providing 
services within the planning jurisdiction, specifically City of Fairfiel<L 
and West Magic Fire District; 
c. deficiencies under LC. Section 67-6511 and Camas County No. 142 in 
providing additional or alternative notice in the case of zoning district 
boundary change in that notice was not posted as required at the Camas 
County Courthouse or Fairfield City Hall; 
AH\;1Sv·UAjIS~ElHdO.LSIC:lH:) 
I 
i 
i 
I 
I 
I 
i 
d. deficiencies in lhc recommendations made by the Planning and Zoning 
Commission to the Doard of County Commissioner regarding the new 
amended Comprehensive Plan, Zoning Ordinance and related Land Use 
Map and Zoning Designation Map in violation ofT.C. ~ections 67-6507. 
67-6509 (a) & (b), 67 .. 6511 (b), and in the findings issued by the Board 
of C.ommissioners; 
e. publication deficiencies under LC. Section 31-715A due to failure to 
publish the entire text, including legal description of the rezoned land. 
or alternatively a summary that actually describes the amendments 
made; and 
f. failure to remedy the stench of pre-existing conflicts of interest as 
found by this court. 
61. r Idaho Code Sections 67-6502 provides the twelve (12) purposes for the 
Local Lan~ Use Planning Act, including; (a) To protect property rights while making 
accOmmOd~tions for other necessary types of development such as low-cost housing and 
mobile hote parks. (b) To ensure that adequate public facilities and services are provided 
to the P1le at reasonable cost, (c) To ensure that the economy of the state and localities 
is protecti (d) To ensure that the important envirorunental features of the state and 
localities ye protected. (e) To encourage the protection of prime agricultural, forestry. 
and minini lands for production offood, fibre, and minerals, (t) To encourage urban and 
urban-tyl development within incorporated cities. (g) To avoid undue concentration of 
Populati01 and overcrowding of land, (h) To ensure that the development on land is 
commensrate with the physical characteristics of the land, (i) To protect life and 
I ') 
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I 
property iniareas subject to natural hazards and disasters, (j) To protect fish, wildlife, and 
recreation Jesources, (k) To avoid undue water and au: pollution, (1) To allow local school 
I 
districts to/ partidpate in the community planning and development process so as to 
address PUjllic school needs and impacts on an ongoing basis. 
62. The legislature to ensure the purposes of the Act are met. provided for 
mandatory ruties, process, procedure and required criteria to he considered in I.C. Sections 
I 
67-6507. 6V-650R, 67-6528. 67-6535 and 67-6537. For example, I.C. Section 67-6528 
i 
states in re~vant part. •• .. .In adoption and implementation of the plan and ordinances, the 
I 
governing poard or commission shall take into account the plans and needs of the State of 
Idaho and! all agencies, boards, departments, institutions, and local special purpose 
I 
I 
i 
districts ... 'r No such accounting of said plans or needs was had in this case or appears in 
I 
the record 9f same. 
63. Likewise, I.e. Section 67-651 I (a) provides in relevant part, " ... Requests 
for an amt1ndment to the zoning ordinance shall be submitted to the zoning or planning 
and ZOnin~ commission which shal1 evaluate the request to determine the extent and 
nature of tp,e amendment requested. Particular consideration shall be given to the effects 
of any prorsed zone change upon the delivery of services by any political subdivision 
providing fbliC services, including school districts, within the planning jurisdiction ... " 
No such ruation of the extent and nature of the amendment has here occurred, or 
appears in e record of same. 
64. Similarly. I.C. Section 67-6511 (b) allows a Planning and Zoning 
commiSSir to make a recommendation to amend a Zoning Ordinance only "After 
considering the comprehensive plan and other evidence gathered through the public 
I 
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I 
I 
hearing pr~cess ... " No such considerdtioll was made or appears anywhere in the record 
of this nt:w!process. 
I 
i 
65.1 Idaho Code Section 67-6537 (4), states "When considering amending. 
repealing o~ adopting a comprehensive plan, the local governing board shall consider the 
I 
effect the ~roposed amendment, repeal or adoption of the comprehensive plan would 
have on thf source, quantity and quality of ground water in the area." Nothing in the 
record herejof indicates that any such consideration of ground water issues was had by the 
Camas co~ty Board of Commissioners. 
66.: Finally, the legislature, to be certain the purposes ofLLUPA were adhered 
I 
I 
to, adopt, 67-6535, requiring approvals of land use ordinances affecting a change in 
I 
I 
zoning diSfct boundary, like that which has occurred here, to base the decision upon 
standards if writing. In full the statute provides, 
£9/9P 391;:;1d 
(a) The approval or ueuial of any application provided for in this 
chapter shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth 
in Ithe comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate 
ordrance or regulation of the city or county. 
) (b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this 
charter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that 
e~lains the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant 
co~tested facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision 
bas~ on the applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan. relevant 
ordFance and statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and 
facru information contained in the record. 
f(~) It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to this 
cll,ter should he founded upon sound reason and practical application of 
recpgnized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the 
~ta~e are directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate 
thel adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical 
considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the 
I 
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I 
i 
es~tiaiS of reasoned decision-making. Only those whose challenge to • 
dec~ion demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not 
the mere possibility dIe-roof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a 
dec~ion. Every fmal decision rendered concerning a site-specific land use 
r~4.~est shall provide or be accompanied by notice to the applicant 
reger-ding the applicant's right to request a regulatory taking analysis 
pur~uant to section 67-8003, Idaho Code. 
None of jiS oocurred in the initial or new amendment process. Therefore. the new 
amended Cpmprehensive Plan,. Zoning Ordinance and related Land Use Map and Zoning 
DeSigMti0r Map. are void on the face of the record before the Court. 
WIfREFORE, Plaintiff prays this Court enter its Order declaring Resolutions 
114 and 11~, new Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map and Ordinance Nos. 
I . 
i 
157 and 15f' new amended Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Designation Map adopted on or 
about May 112,2008 null and void without force or effect, and to award Plaintiffbis auomey 
I 
fees and co~ herein. 
i 
I 
I COUNTY. 
VIOL~TION OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE RIGHTS 
Clf.S. Canst 14th Amend. Via 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Id. Canst. Sec. 13) 
67.j Plaintiff possesse<L and possesses a property right based on ownership of 
and contr+tual interests in. certain real property located in Camas County, State of 
Idaho, and/development rights thereto. 
68. Plaintiff, pursuant to his ownership of and contractual rights in said real 
property, fartiCiPated in and was part of the Camas County process of amending the 
Camas corty Comprehensive Plan, the Land Use Map and Zoning Ordinance, text and 
Zoning ~' in both 2006-2007 and again in 2008, wherein the Defendant did thereby 
uniformly and systematically up-zone real property owned by various members, relations 
E9/91;> 39t'd A 1.1 t'SWVU S~3Hd01Sn:lH:) t66Lz:l9806 
and clients of members of the Board and Commission, and downzone real property 
I 
I 
owned by praintiff. 
69. Plaintift: pursuant to his ownership of and contractual right.~ in said 
real proper' filed for a rezone of the real property in question on which rezone 
application !was recommended for approval by the then existing Camas County Planning 
I 
and Zonin~ Commission, htlt which was later withdrawn by Plaintiff due to threats and 
i 
I 
coercion frtm the individual defendants hereto. 
70.1 Plaintiff: pursuant to his ownership of and contractual rights in said 
real propemr, again filed an application for rezone of the real property in question in 
I 
April 2007/which said application Defendant has refused to act upon. 
I 
71. i Plaintiff is and was entitled to fair consideration of the rezone 
applicatio~ and the rezone process as described above, upon the facts in the record 
I 
before th1 Camas County Board of Commissioners and Planning and Zoning 
Commissiio, and objective criteria in the applicable Ordinances and Statutes. 
72./ Due process requires that only fair and unbiased decision-makers may 
I hear and p icipate in the decision making process for the rezone application and rezone 
process. 
73. The motive for the Defendants denial and/or refusal to consider 
Plaintiff's rezone applications, and unequal treatment of Plaintiff in the rezone process, 
was in whole or part predicated on animus toward Plaintiff and was a spiteful effort to 
retaliate arl ainst Plaintiff for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate governmental 
objective. 
I 
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74. , The actions taken by lhe Defendants singled out Pinintifffor particular 
i 
I 
decision-m~ng not related to legitimate public goals. 
75. ! The actions taken by the County were arbitrary, capricious, irrational 
I 
. t d bl . . or tam e r Improper motive. 
76. The actions taken by the Defendants deprived Plaintiff of his rights to 
procedural rod substantive due proce~s of law :in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Unitdd States Constitution and Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, giving rise to a 
I 
I 
cause 0 act~on under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
77. Plaintiff sustained damages as a proximate result of the conduct of the 
Defendants~ the exact amount of which damages is not presently known but which 
I 
I 
exceeds thl' jurisdictional amount of this Court. 
78. As a result of Defendants violation of Plaintiffs rights to procedural 
I 
and substruttive due process of law, Plaintiff has incurred costs hereof and attorney fees. 
I 
WI-fEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants Camas County, and 
I 
the individually named Defendants in an amount reasonably calculated to satisfy the 
I 
damages sJffered by Plaintiff as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct of the 
! 
defendants
r
i plus attorney fees and costs incurred herein. _, v~ 
I COUNT VI. til 
I EQUAL PROTECTION OF LA W (U'l' Const., 14th Amend Via 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; Id. Const, Section 2) 
79. As a result of the animu~ toward Plaintiff, the Defendant has treated the 
Plaintiff dierently than similarly ,ituated landowners seeking to develop property within 
Camas Corry. 
£S/8P 39'i1d 
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80. In addition to the other factual averments made herein Defendants have 
adopted a shies uf moratorium directed at prohibiting the development or rezone of the 
I 
i 
Plaintif.rs 10perty, while not affecting similarly situated properties. 
81. I The different treatment by the County deprived the Plaintiff of the equal 
I 
protection ?f the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment tot eh United States 
Constituti0Jjt and Section 2 of the T dabo Constitution,. giving rise to a cause of action 
under 42 ujs.c. Section 1983. 
i 
82. r Plaintiff has sustained damages as a proximate result of the conduct of the 
i 
Defendantsl the exact amount of which damages is not presently known but which 
I 
exceeds thl jurisdictional amount of this Court. 
Wf:lEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants Camas County, and 
I 
I 
the indivi~Ually named Defendants in an amount reasonably calculated to satisfy the 
i 
damages s~ffered by Plaintiff as a result of the illegal and unconstitutional conduct of the 
defendants) plus attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
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I 
State ofId*o 
I 
CO\IDty of qamas 
i 
) 
) 
) 
VERIFICATION 
I G10RGE MARTIN, the Petitioner herein. declare WIder oath that the above is 
true to the qest of my knowl edge. 
I 
I 
Dated this I -r 
I 
I 
! 
ES/0Si 39\1d 
day of August, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I of"'-
The wrdersigncu hereby certifies that on the:;- day of August, 2008. a copy 
I 1 . of PLAINlrIFF'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION was served upon COllnse Via 
facsimile 1d addressed to Phillip 1. CollBer, AttOrney for Oefendant Ed Smith, 250 
South Fifth/Street, Ste. 700, P.O. Box 7420, Roise Idaho 83707-7426. facsimile number 
208 344 58fo, and Stephanie 1. Ronney. Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. 
I 
Bannock Sl Ste 520, Boise. Idaho 83702, facsimile number 208 331 1202. 
, 4 i 
I 
i ~~~--~--------------------
I 
I 
r 
I 
I 
i 
I 
TZEiLU9S0Z 
Paul J. Fitzer, ISB 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise, 1D 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Llr) 
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Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DAVIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS CAMAS 
COUNTY, THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS 
OF THE CAMAS COUNTY BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND ED 
SMITH IN HIS CAPACITY AS A 
MEMBER OF THE CAMAS COUNTY 
PLANNING AND ZONING 
COMMISSION 
In its Order on Plaintiff s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served on the 
County Defendants on October 8, 2008, this Court denied in part and granted in part the 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Petition. Plaintiff included as an attachment to said 
motion, his proposed amended pleading. To date, the Plaintiff has not served County Defendants 
with the amended pleading reflecting the Court's Order. Erring on the side of caution, County 
AMENDED ANS~ER -- I 
~e a+-
\ 
Defendants hereby submit its response to Plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended Petition for 
Breach of Contract, Tortious Interference with Contract, For Declarative Relief, Damages for 
Violation of Procedural & Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of the Law. In 
so doing, Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through its duly elected 
board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron Chapman (the Individual 
Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of the Camas County Planning and 
Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants), by and through their attorneys of record, 
Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke, Chartered, hereby submit this Second Amended Answer in 
conformance with the Court's Order. 
L 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITION 
The County Defendants admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
Facts Common to all Counts & Jurisdictional Statement 
1. County Defendants lack information sufficient to admit or deny Plaintiffs 
Paragraph 1, 2, and 4, and therefore deny. 
2. County Defendants admit paragraph 3. 
3. With regard to Paragraph 5, County Defendants admits insofar as the legislative 
actions of the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission and/or Camas County Board of 
County Commissioners in enacting the County's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and 
map occurred in Camas County but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
AMENDED AN~R -- 2 
4. County Defendants deny Paragraphs 6 and 7. 
COUNT I - BREACH OF CONTRACT 
5. As Count 1 does not pertain to nor is it relevant to the County Defendants, County 
Defendants are not required to answer. However, to the extent that any such claim can be 
asserted against County Defendants, Paragraphs 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 are denied in 
their entirety. 
COUNT II - TORTIOUS INTERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
6. County Defendants lack infonnation sufficient to admit or deny Paragraph 16, 17, 
18, 20, and 21 and therefore deny same. 
7. County Defendants deny paragraph 19, 20, 22, and 23. 
COUNT III - Petition for Declarative Judgment 
8. Count III has already proceeded to trial before the Court and is awaiting the 
Court's final order and IRCP 54(b) certification of final judgment. Therefore, Defendant is not 
required to submit an additional amended answer as to Count III. To the extent that any such 
allegations remain, (due to the pending nature of the Court's Order and 54(b) certification), 
County Defendants deny each and every allegation alleged by Plaintiff unless specifically 
admitted herein including but not limited to, all allegations pertaining to Count III (Paragraphs 
24-47) . 
COUNT IV - Declarative Relief May 12, 2008 Comprehensive Plan & Zoning Ordinance 
Amendments 
9. In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, served 
upon County Defendants on October 8, 2008, the Court specifically denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition as it pertains to this Count. Therefore, the matter is stricken from the 
amended pleading and County Defendants are not required to answer this Count. To the extent 
that any such allegation pertains to a triable issues, County Defendants deny each and every 
allegation not specifically admitted herein including any and all allegations alleged in Count IV 
(Paragraphs 48-66). 
COUNT V - Violation of Procedural and Substantive Due Rights [sic1 
10. With regard to Paragraph 67, Defendant admits that Plaintiff does own property 
within the County, but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
11. With regard to Paragraph 68, Defendant admits that Plaintiff was a part of the 
comprehensive planning process utilized in the amendment of the comprehensive plan and 
zoning ordinance and map as Plaintiff attended and/or testified at every public hearing, meeting, 
informational session, and workshop, but denies the remainder of the paragraph. 
12. County Defendants deny paragraphs 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 78. 
AMENDED AN~ER -- 4 
13. With regard to Paragraph 71, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual allegation, 
but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the extent a 
response is required, deny. 
14. With regard to Paragraph 72, Plaintiff does not appear to assert a factual 
allegation, but rather assets a legal conclusion and therefore no response is required. To the 
extent a response is required, deny. 
COUNT VI - Equal Protection of Law 
15. County Defendants deny paragraph 79, 80, 81, and 82. 
16. [Prayer] Deny and affirmatively allege that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Petition is 
wholly devoid of any merit whatsoever and that the County Defendants are entitled to costs and 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C § 12-117 because this action has been brought without a reasonable 
basis in fact and law. 
II. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
First Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in their favor and 
against the County Defendants. 
Second Affirmative Defense 
Plai ntiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
Third Affirmative Defense 
AMENDED ANSW;:;:R -- 5 
0+ 
Plaintiffs' claims are barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel. 
Fourth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of their own actions 
or omlsSlOns. 
Fifth Affirmative Defense 
Any injuries suffered by Plaintiffs are a direct and proximate result of the acts or 
omissions of others for whom the County Defendants are not liable. 
Sixth Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of Title 6, Chapter 9, Tort Claims 
against Government Entities. 
Seventh Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants have immunity pursuant to I.C §§ 6-904(1), 6-904(3), and 6-
904B(3). 
Eighth Affirmative Defense 
County Defendants are not liable for punitive damages pursuant to I.C § 6-918. 
Ninth Affirmative Defense 
The Plaintiffs have not suffered actual harm or a violation of a fundamental right as 
required by I.C § 67-6535. 
Tenth Affirmative Defense 
The Plaintiffs' alleged claims are properly before the District Court of the United States 
as said claims have original jurisdiction over such federal questions of law and therefore such 
civil action should be removed to the United States District Court. 
III. 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, the answering County Defendants request that the Plaintiffs take nothing by 
their Petition and each cause of action pleaded therein; that the County Defendants be awarded 
their reasonable costs and attorney fees under I.e. §§ 12-117, 12-120,12-121, and 6-918A; and 
that the Court provide the County Defendants any further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day of October, 2008. 
XTON & TURCKE, CHID. 
itzer 
eys for County Defendants 
AMENDED ANSW . 
VERlFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Camas ) 
Ken Backstrom, being duly sworn, states as follows: 
That he is the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioner for the County of Camas, 
representing the County Defendants in the above-entitled matter; that, as such, he has read the 
foregoing document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct to 
the best of his knowledge; 
FURTHER, your Affiant sai~ not. 
La~-
," 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ,.5 day of October, 2008. 
------....\ c ______ ~A.......c-"'-::"=~_~ C/:~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~OR IDAHO 
Residing at: ~,( -b--e l d , ~ 
My Commission Expires: ::>-G -';;"'0 I (\ 
TRACY D. GILL 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
AMENDED ANSW?R -- 8 
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*** 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer was this IStb day 
of October, 2008 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN. 
Plaintitl: 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM HOMES. LLC, 
vs. 
ED SMITH. 
Defendant 
and 
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO. 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official capacities. 
KEN BACKSTROM. 
BILL DAVIS. and 
RON CHAPMAN 
Defendants. 
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On May 4.2007. the plaintiff filed a petition alleging Breach of Contract. a claim 
for Tortious Interference with Contract. and. in Count III. a Petition for Declaratory 
Judgment or in the Alternative Petition for Judicial Review. This last claim has proceeded 
primarily as a petition for declaratory judgment rather than as a claim for judicial review. 
An amended petition was filed on or about December 13.2007. 
Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law. and Order 
Plaintiff George rvlartin applied for and was denied a temporary restraining order 
and later a preliminary injunction on the issue ofv,:hether Camas County had a duly 
constituted planning and zoning commission. The decision denying that relief was filed 
on or about August 9,2007. 
Thereafter, Martin applied for and was granted a preliminary injunction on the 
issue of whether Camas County was required to or did maintain a .. transcribable verbatim 
record" of certain proceedings as required by Idaho Code § 67-6536. That decision vvas 
entered and filed on December 28, 2007. 
Martin again applied for a preliminary injunction on the issue of whether certain 
Camas County Commissioners, or others, had prohibited conf1icts of interest. This comi 
entered a written decision on that issue along with a second injunction on April 2, 2008. 
In that decision, the court also re-examined the question of whether at least some of the 
proceedings before the Camas Board of Commissioners were quasi-judicial in nature. and 
thus required that a verbatim record be maintained. 
Pursuant to IRCP Rule 65(a)(2), and by virtue of stipulations between the parties. 
the eourt ordered the hearings on the applications for preliminary injunctions 
consolidated with the trial. The evidence from them has become part of the trial record 
and thus did not need to be repeated at trial. 
Trial was held before the court sitting in Camas County vvithout a jury on August 
20.2008. The plaintiff has been represented throughout by Christopher Simms, Ketchum. 
Idaho. Camas County has been represented throughout by the firm of Moore. Smith. 
Buxton, & Turcke. Chartered, of Boise, Idaho. Phillip Collaer. of Anderson, Julian. & 
Hull. of Boise, was excused from attending the trial. Following trial. the parties submitted 
~ 
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briefs. the last coming on September 26. 2008. At that time. the court took this matter 
under advisement. 
INTERIM DECISIONS FROM THE IDAHO APPELLATE COtTRTS 
While this case has been pending. the Idaho Supreme Court has entered a few 
decisions in the area of land use planning; their affect on this case is unclear. Among 
them are GiitnerDail}', LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630.181 P,3d 1238 (2008): 
Highlands Dewlopmenl Corporation \', City oj'Boise, 145 Idaho 958. 188 P,3d 900 
(2008): and Euchd Avenue Trust v, City ojBoise, 146 Idaho 306. 193 P.3d 853 (2008), 
The Giltner Dairy and Highlands Development cases raise issues such as "vhether judicial 
review of certain zoning decisions is available to aggrieved paliies. \vhile Euclid Avenlle 
clarifies that a petition for judicial review. being an appellate proceeding. may not be 
combined with other claims for relief 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Overview 
1,) The court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, Venue is 
proper. 
2,) This court reiterates and re-adopts its decision filed December 28.2007 
regarding Camas County's failure to keep and maintain an adequate transcribable 
verbatim record. and its decision filed April 2. 2008 on the issue of whether certain 
conflicts of interest existed, 
3,) This court will be the first to recognize that while the distinction between 
"legislative" and "quasi-Judicial" activity has not always been clear, some of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent decisions-notably Highland\' Dewlopmeflf Corporation \' Citl' 
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oj/3oise-cast doubt on whether and under what conditions a court may re\iew quasi-
judicial zoning decisions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA"). See 
Highlands Development Corporation v. ('ity oj'Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 962-70. 188 P.3d 
900. 904-12 (2008) (Jones. J. dissenting). This court also recognizes the distinction the 
Idaho Supreme Court clearly made in Euclid A \'enue Trust that judicial review of 
administrative activity should proceed as an appeal while. as different procedural rules 
apply. the appellate and civil processes should not be allowed to proceed together. This 
case was well underway before Euclid Avenue Trust was decided, 
Although the court has paid significant attention to the issue of whether Camas 
County's process of holding public hearings and maintaining a proper record was 
legislative activity as opposed to quasi-judicial, most of that examination has focused on 
determining what record the county was required to maintain. and not in determining 
whether this case involves an appeal of arguably legislative activity. Admittedly. in its 
decision on the "transcribable verbatim record" issue. the court paid a good deal of 
attention to whether there could be an appeal from those administrative decisions. In its 
next opinion, which concerned the conflicts of interest issue, this court clarified its earlier 
decision by pointing out that at some time during the 2007 rezoning process. Camas 
County clearly engaged in "quasi-judicial" activity when it held noticed public hearings 
for the purpose of passing amendments to its Comprehensive Plan. and also when it 
rezoned large pOliions of the county. if not all of it, during the March 2007 meetings. 
The court's determination that a transcribable verbatim record was required turns 
on its findings that the County engaged in deliberations leading lip to the quasi-judicial 
puhlic hearings at Hhich the ('omprehensive Plan and new zoning were adopted. and that 
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the ('ountJ' did so without making any record olthose deliherations. I Moreover. at the 
time the court was reviewing the verbatim record issue. all of the e\'idence had not yet 
heen presented. and there \vere at least two open questions. One question im'olwd 
determining 11'hen the Board of Commissioners actually received a written 
recommendation from the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission C'P&Z'"). so 
that deliherations hy the Board olCol1lmissioners might hare thereafter ensued in 
violation ol§ 6"'-6536. The second question concerned \\"hat the written recommendation 
from P&Z might have contained. 
The ans\ver to those questions is that no one from Camas County can provide that 
information. In other words. no one knows exactly what the Board of Commissioners 
received from the P&Z. and no one can tell when it was received. Thus. no one can tell 
precisely when the Board commenced "deliberating toward a decision after compilation 
of the record." It is evident from the court's prior findings that the Board of 
Commissioners was certainly having discussions "offthe record" after it received P&Z's 
recommendations, but before the public hearings commenced. 
In this regard, the court wishes to clarify its view that Idaho Code ~ 67-6536 
mandates a record Of([l1Y deliberations once P&Z's recommendations have been 
received, and that such deliberations are not confined or limited to discussions among the 
Board of Commissioners once they have heard all the public testimony. Othenvise. the 
Board gets to deliberak all they \vant after P&Z's recommendations have arrived, but 
prior to the public hearings. and with no record maintained as to what \vas discussed. 
The Board then gets to come to whatever conclusions they desire. If that happens. the 
! "When a statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect of a zoning law upon propert: rights 
the action uf the legislative body becomes quasi-judicial in character." .lerome Cmmtl' \' Hoi/OliO.\'. 1 18 
Idaho 681. 799 P2d 969 ( 1 ')90). 
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public hearings become a sham. Without a record, the public has no assurance this is not 
exactly what has happened. The "record" here-P&Z's recommendations-was 
obviollsly received and discussed by the Board in some fashion for quite some time 
hef(xe any public hearings commenced. 
The court also views Idaho Code § 67-6356 as requiring a verbatim record if a 
hoard engages in a quasi-judicial proceeding, and deliberates with an objective of 
reaching a decision. regardless olwhelher an appeal is ultimately availahle to some 
party. 
4.) Camas County has argued long and hard in this case that its actions were 
legislative. not quasi-judicial, and thus are exempt from judicial review. While counties' 
legislative actions are subject to collateral actions such as declaratory judgments. they 
cannot be attacked by judicial review. Burt v. City of1daho Falls 105 Idaho 65. 665 P.2d 
1075 (1983); Cooper v. Ada County Commissioners, 101 Idaho 407.614 P.2d 947 (1980). 
A trial and several evidentiary hearings were held on three preliminary injunction issues. 
Here, the plaintiff clearly indicated at the commencement of trial he was proceeding on 
the declaratory judgment aspects of this case. and did so by going forward with trial and 
by presenting evidence and testimony. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth 
ahove. the court will review the facts and law and enter a decision as a declaratory 
judgment. and not as a judicial review proceeding. Thus, while the court agrees that large 
portions of the County's challenged activities may be legislative, certainly not all of the 
County's activities are. More importantly. however. is that simply because the County's 
actions may haw been legislative in nature, and thus perhaps exempt from a judicial 
reviev, proceeding. this fact does not mean those actions are exempt from lavv. 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law, and Order Following 
In order to accept Camas County's position. one must accept the proposition that 
if a county acts on a broad enough scale and rezones enough property. it acts in a purely 
legislati\e capacity. Thus. if it acts in a legislative capacity. it is essentially immune from 
the legal requirements of LLUPA or any number of other statutory requirements. and 
need not keep verbatim records of meetings or avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally. 
under the county's position. its actions are not reviewable. 
Camas County also suggests in its briefing that. in view of the recent decisions of 
the Idaho Supreme Court. comprehensive plans. land use maps, zoning ordinances and 
zoning maps rezoning property are no longer subject to the statutory revie\v procedures 
of LLUPA. Time will tell. 
B. New Findings and conclusions. 
5.) The plaintiff still has civil causes of action pending against Camas County 
based on whether the County acted appropriately in effecting the questioned rezones. The 
issues in this case are not moot. and the plaintiff mayor may not be entitled to attorney" s 
fees. Actions are not mooted by an amendment or replacement if the controversy is not 
removed or the amendment or replacement does not otherwise resolve the parties' claims. 
Idaho Schools/or Eelual Educational Opportunity v. Idaho State Board ojEducation 128 
Idaho 276. 912 P.2d 644 (1995). 
Two related principles bear on the mootness issue. The first is the public interest 
doctrine. E\'en if a case is determined to be moot. if the issue presented is one of 
substantial public interest. the issue may need to be addressed for future direction and 
guidance. Johnson \'. Bonner COllnty S'chool District No. 82, 126 Idaho 490. 492. 887 
P.2d 35.37 (1994); Idaho Schoolslhr Equal Edllcational Opportunity r. Idaho S'tale 
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Boord oj Educalion 128 Idaho 276. 912 P.2d 644 (1995). The second principle is that. 
en:n if a case could technically be deemed moot. it can fall \vithin the exception of 
"capable of repetition yet evading re\'iew:' As the Court noted in Idaho Schools/or 
Equal E'duco/ iOllal Opportllni/J', the county could pass nev,' ordinances e\'ery year. 
making any prior determinations arguably moot. 128 Idaho 26. 912 P,2d 644. As the 
Court there stated. ·'Then. as in this case, each time a declaratory judgment action is filed 
claiming the method of school funding is not 'thorough' under that year's standards. the 
district court could dismiss the case as moot claiming those standards had been 
sunsetted:·ld. at 284. 912 P.2d at 65l. Thus. "a situation arises \vherein the case is 
repetitive or continuing. but is incapable of being resolved." ld 
The court notes that this situation has already presented itself here. On the heels 
of this presently pending case, the plaintiff has already sought and been denied leave to 
file an amended complaint alleging that the new ordinance passed in 2008-the one 
Camas County claims renders this case moot-suffers from the same defects as the ones 
being presently ruled upon. (See Plaintitf's l'v1otionfc)r Leave to Amend Petition hJ' 
Adding TJ.l'O Additional Causes of Action, filed on or after August 7. 2008 herein. and 
Plain/itT's Applicationfor Temporary Res/raining Order, Preliminary Injunction, ([nd 
Dec/aratory Relic/filed herein on or after August 7. 2008.). In these new pleadings that 
the plaintiff sought to be made a continuing part of this case. the plaintitf has attacked the 
very 2008 ordinances that the defendant claims have mooted the present case, and for 
many of the very same reasons. The plaintiff should be entitled to a determination of the 
issues in this first case, as they directly impact the allegations in the second. 
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6.) Camas County claims that the plaintiff lacks standing. It is undisputed that the 
plaintifl holds record interest in several parcels of real estate situated throughout various 
portions of Camas County. (See attached Stipulation.). Pursuant to that stipulation. at 
least some of the plaintiff s property was rezoned, apparently down zoned from AT to 
A5. (See Paragraph 15 of Stipulation.). In addition. the plaintiff may be affected ifhis 
neighbors are allowed to develop adjoining property in a rural area. S'ee Emns 1'. Telon 
('ollnly. 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003): ('owan v. Fremont ('olinly, 143 Idaho 501, 148 
P.3d 1247 (2006). The plaintiflhas also claimed that the county \\ill allmv dewlopment 
on several parcels near his. and that by allowing nearby properties to be upzoned 
(including parcels belonging to commissioners that have been upzoned in violation of 
conflicts of interest statutes). the county has acted with an evil motive and in a manner 
that deprives the plaintifl of both of due process and equal protection. Those civil 
damages claims. though tiled in this action. have yet to be resolved. For the above 
reasons. the court concludes that the plaintiff has standing. 
7.) In making amendments to the Comprehensive Plan in March. 2007. Camas 
County used very little new information. The general consensus of the Board of 
Commissioners was that old information was still valid. The Board felt the zoning 
ordinances needed to be amended because of gro\V1h in Camas County. At least one 
Board member admits that the Board permitted new density in ne\\" arcas 0 f the county 
without knowing the impact of new zoning and without obtaining any new studies. In the 
same breath. that same board member also admits that the Board did not analyze hm\" 
new development would affect roads or transportation. 
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8.) A large-scale rezone of the county was effected in March. 2007. The county 
claims that the original recommendation from the P&Z Board \vas for a large rezone and 
that the County Board then gave public notice and re-zoned the entire county on or after 
March 14.2007. This has not been the subject of testimony or argument, though it may 
be ascertainable by lengthy and protracted review of the evidence. However, the court is 
not resolving this issue. The March 2007 rezone involved a contemporaneous amendment 
to the Comprehensive Plan and did etlect a rezone, at least by estimates, of 10.000 to 
20.000 acres, if not the whole county. 
9.) There is an area of Camas County known as the "recharge" area, which is the 
area within the southern half-mile or so of the base of the Smoky Dome peaks. Prior to 
the March 2007 rezone this was zoned '"Agricultural": after the rezone it has some 
residential zoning. In some of this area. the county had a land use map that designated 
this area as "Agricultural Transitional." or "Ag Tran." The parties seem to agree that 
obtaining an actual rezone to Ag Tran required an application to P&l. and approval by 
the Board. The Board. however, felt that because of the map, they had no way to deny 
any applications for a rezone from "Ag" to Ag Tran. The Board apparently rezoned this 
area in March. 2007 without any recommendation from P&Z. Large portions of the 
recharge area have also been rezoned from Ag to "ResidentiaL" and to zoning allowing 
one house per five acres. No studies were apparently done to determine the effects of the 
rezone on water in the recharge area. 
10.) In approximately 2006. the Board of Commissioners. or some of its 
memhers. approached the Camas P&Z Commission and asked them to come up with a 
nel,\ zoning map for Camas County. This may have been the Board' s response to its 0\\11 
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opinion that they could not prohihit rezone applications from Ag to Ag Tran in those 
areas of the county designated Ag Tran hy the existing map. The inference the court 
draws is that this request hy the Board or some of its memhers '-vas oral and is not in the 
record. If it is. the court has not heen directed to it. 
1 1.) There is no written record of any recommendations in this regard that 
the Camas P&Z Commission ever completed and sent to the Board. That is. there is 
no record that P&Z ever prepared and sent to the Camas County Board of Commissioners 
any written recommendation for a rezone or an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan 
that the Board could either accept or reject. 
12.) At least initially. P&Z was not attempting to rewrite the Comprehensive Plan. 
hut only attempting to comply with the Board's request for a zoning map. Partway 
through the process. P&Z determined it had to change the Comprehensive Plan and map 
in order to get to the zoning map. P&Z chose not to gather new data because its members 
felt not much had changed. P&Z did not consider the whole of the county in making 
whatever recommendations it did make, and in fact, did not make any recommendations 
as to changes in the Comprehensive Plan. According to the testimony, this failure to 
consider the whole of the county was "rectified in 2007," apparently by the Board. The 
court has not been directed to the record to confirm that any of that action was attributed 
to the P&Z Commission. 
13.) According to the testimony from P&Z members there is no \\Titten 
recommendation from the P&Z to the Board. as noted above. What ,-vas sent to the Board 
\\as a compromise consisting of a single big "proposed land use rnap." together with 
additional maps submitted by each P&Z commissioner that contained what each would 
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like to see. \Vhat is important is that whatever map(s) was sent to the Board, if such 
a map hy ilsellcould constitute a written recommendation pursuant to Idaho Code ~ 67-
6509, is not now before the court. Trial Exhibit 0 is not it. There is not, therefore, any 
record maintained by Camas Count}· as required by Idaho Code § 67-6509(a) of the 
"hearings, findings made, and actions t~lken b)" the commission." These maps went 
to the Board sometime in ::?006, although it is impossible to say \vhen. At least one P&Z 
commissioner testified that at the time he raised the issue that the law required the P&Z 
commission to send a written recommendation to the Board to accompany the 
documents, but that it never happened. 
14.) This failure to identify a written recommendation from P&Z to the 
Board precedes and precipitates a number of other legal difficulties. Because there is 
no written recommendation that can be identified from the P&Z to the Board, it is 
impossible to tell vvhen the Board received whatever it is they did receive, and therefore 
impossible to tell when the Board commenced its "deliberations." It is obvious from the 
court's prior findings made after the second injunction hearings-the transcribable 
verbatim record issue-that the Board discussed these recommendations he/hre they ('1'er 
got to public hearing or were even noticed/or public hearings. The minutes are clear that 
on November 28, 2006, in a meeting at which no record was kept. the "Board continued 
discussing the proposed new Zoning Ordinance." (Defendants Exhibits. Pg. 318.). The 
same thing occurred on December 11,2006, vvhen the Board re\'iewed the Subdivision 
Ordinance and proposed changes. and the Board "discussed the Camas County Zoning 
Ordinance" and "The Board discussed the City Area ofImpact." Other unrecorded 
meetings at which "the P&Z map" and the "proposed Zoning and Land Csc Map" and the 
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proposed ordinances were discussed by the Board occurred on December 26.2007. 
January 8. 2007. and February 20. 2007. (See Pgs 13 and 14 of the Decision on 
Req1lirements o/'u Transcribable Verbatim Record und Other Reconh)hr Purposes o/'a 
Preliminary Injunction filed herein December 28.2007.). Because there is no record of 
what was discussed. it is impossible for the county to deny that these are "deliberations 
tov;ard a decision after compilation of the record."" 
In addition. because it is not possible to identify precisely 'what recommendations 
the Board received. it is virtually impossible for the county to give proper legal notice as 
to what would transpire at upcoming public meetings. I.e. § 67-6509 states. "If the 
governing board will conduct a subsequent public hearing. notice of the planning and 
zoning commission recommendation shall be included in the notice of public hearing 
provided by the governing board." Without a written recommendation from P&Z. this 
requirement became almost impossible for the county to comply with. The County 
attempts to get around these requirements by suggesting the proposed maps were on 
display somewhere so that the public could go look at them in order to comment at public 
hearings. However. unless the public has other maps available to illustrate what changes 
are proposed. such a map would mean little. It is the written recommendation that the 
public needs. and that the lav.: requires. in order to know what is proposed. 
Finally. vvithout a written recommendation from P&Z that can now be identified. 
it is difficult for the county to argue that they complied with I.e. § 67-6509 by giving 
notice ot: ami adopting. a proposed plan. If there was not a \vTitten proposed plan. what 
did the Board adopt? Presumably. the Board adopted a map that cannot now be 10C({led 
:Vloreover. it is impossible to tell whether any changes or how many changes \vere made 
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to the proposed "map" after its receipt. \vhich \vould require additional hearings pursuant 
to the same statute. There were at least some changes because the county claims it made 
amendments on approximately March 14.2007 to include the whole county. It is also 
evident from the minutes of the December 1 L 2006 meeting that Commissioner Ken 
Baxtrom was directed to "meet with the attorney to make the recommended revisions and 
forward on to the Planning and Zoning Commission." Were those changes the subject of 
additional hearings as required? Without knowing what recommendations originally went 
up to the Board. it is impossible to know whether the final result was the subject of 
proper hearings or not. 
15.) The plaintiff and Camas County entered into a written stipUlation filed herein 
on May 21. 2008 entitled "Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary 
Evidence." A true and correct copy of that stipulation consisting of 6 pages is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. and the court adopts all of that 
stipulation into these findings of fact. Alleged deficiencies in publication of legal notices 
are set forth in the stipulation at paragraphs 8. 9.10.11. 12. and 13. When these 
deficiencies are combined with the failure of the county to identify a written 
recommendation from the P&Z Commission, the effect is exponential. 
16.) The Camas County Comprehensive Plan was amended during the same 
March 2007 hearings that the county was rezoned. There is no formal written 
recommendation from the Camas P&Z to the Board to amend or adopt amendments to 
the Comprehensive Plan. (See Stipulation. Paragraphs 5 and 6.). This would appear to 
violate Idaho Code ~ 67-6509. When asked at trial by the plaintitrs counsel where in the 
record it appcared that the county considered the Comprehensive Plan and other evidence 
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before adopting the amendments to the zoning code. Commissioner Backstrom gave an 
answer suggesting that process occurred in his head. and if there had been discussions 
about that issue vvith his fellov\' commissioners it had occurred ora the years from time 
to time. 
However, as the court advised counsel. the court would not listen to the tapes in 
order to ascertain events. The tapes are in evidence. This answer. however. suggests that 
the county may not have properly considered the Comprehensive Plan in making 
amendments to the zoning ordinance, or may not have considered the Comprehensive 
Plan and the zoning amendments in the proper order. Idaho Code § 67-6511 (c) provides 
that ',[allier the plan has been amended. the zoning ordinance may then be considered 
for amendment pursuant to section 67 -6511 (b). Idaho Code." I.e. § 76-6511 (Emphasis 
added). See also Price v. Payette County Bd. Of'Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583 
(1998). The court makes no factual finding in this regard one way or the other, except to 
the extent stipulated by the parties. 
17.) This issue is magnified. however, by the failure of the county to "generate 
any independent formal written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or 
153 other than the Ordinance itself." (See Stipulation, Paragraph 7.). An amendment to 
a zoning ordinance must be in accordance with the adopted plan. Love v. Board 0/( 'oullty 
Commissioners. 105 Idaho 558. 671 P.2d471 (1983). Although the court recognizes the 
county's assertion that the very nev, decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court hav'e modified 
50 years of case law, this court is not so sure. As matters novv stand. it appears that cases 
like Price v. Payette COllnty Board o/Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426. 958 P.2d 583 
( 19981: Lore \', Board of' COllf1ly Commissiollers, 105 Idaho 558. 671 P .2d4 71 (1983): 
I 
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and CO\!'(m r. Fremont COllnty, 143 Idaho 501. 148 P,3d 1247 (2006). are still good law, 
This cOllrt recogni::es that some oj"those decisions im'olrejudicial rnie1l' ol::onil1g 
decisiol1s. The court also recognizes that the action of the county in rezoning large 
portions of the county may be entire~}' legislative activity, See Burt \', Idaho Falls, 105 
Idaho 65. 665 P,2d 1075 (1983), Hov.:ever. neither of those issues is the focus here, 
Rather. the focus here is to determine.fi)r pUl]JOses oldeclaratoryjudgment, 
whether Camas County complied with applicable law in enacting new zoning ordinances 
in March of 2007, To this court. it appears that zoning decisions such as the one before 
the court are quasi-judicial agency functions, in which the public is given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, and where evidence and testimony are taken, As such. it still 
appears that "The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (LA,P,A,) governs the review of 
local zoning decisions." Price r. Payette County Board oj"Commissioners, 130 Idaho. 
426.958 P.3d 583 (1998) Therefore. this court believes that: 1.) because this is an action 
for declaratory relief. and 2.) because the county is engaged in a quasi-judicial function 
\vhen exercising its authority here. it matters not whether the county was acting on a 
request from a particular landowner for a change in zoning or whether the Board was 
considering a request or recommendation from its own P&Z Commission to amend 
zoning. The/act is the cOllnty has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise oj"a qu([si-
judicial/imction and therej'ore due process considerations apply. Thus, the cOllnty must 
muke \tTittenjindings oj/act and conclu.siolls ollwr. The Price case and numerous Idaho 
decisions say as much. Whether the county is acting on a particular application or on its 
own recommendation from its P&Z affects whether a party might be able to seek 
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judicial review, but it does not affect the requiremellts imposed by statutes (Iml case law 
(IS to whether the county mllst make written findings (lnd conclusions. 
The county suggests that the recent decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court in 
llighlunds Development Corp. v. Boise and Gillner Daily v. Jerome ('ollnty change this 
result. In addressing whether findings of fact or conclusions of law are required. the 
county states that "[a]s the Supreme Court has made patently clear in Giltner and 
Highlands, there must be an application or permit to invoke the quasi-judicial review 
provisions ofLLUPA." (Defendant's Trial Briet pg. 12.). In other words. the county's 
position is that as long as no one is able to seek judicial review of a county zoning 
decision. even though the county Board has taken evidence and testimony in the exercise 
of a quasi-judicial function. the Board does not need to identify the evidence or testimony 
on which it relies in rezoning 10.000 to 20.000 acres. or an entire county. 
This court does not believe Giltner and Highlands Development stand for so 
broad a proposition. If it was the Idaho Supreme COU11's intent to overrule significant 
case law on point they would have more explicitly done so. Instead. it appears to this 
court that both Giltner and Highlands tum on much narrower grounds-i.e .. the right to 
judicial review. Each case says as much. In Giltner Dairy the issue is directly stated as: 
""Did Giltner Dairy have a right to tile a petitionjhrjlldicial review of an amendment to 
the comprehensive plan map"? GiltnerDaif)" LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630. 632. 
181 P.3d 1238. 1240 (2008) (Emphasis added). In Highlands Del'elopmel1l, the Supreme 
Court again phrased the issue as. ""Did the District Court Err in Dismissing the Petition 
fhr Judicial Review?" Highlands' De1'elopment COil) \'. Boise. 145 Idaho 958. 960. 188 
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PJd 900, 902 (2008) (Emphasis added). In each case the Supreme Court determined that 
the allegedly aggrieved party had no right tojudicia/ review. 
There is. unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be interpreted to 
mean that IDAPA does not apply at all to zoning decisions. If that were so. then the 
Supreme Court. \vithout saying so. has overruled a number of Idaho cases and done away 
with any requirements that zoning bodies keep records or identify the basis of their 
decisions. Such a decision would eliminate even declaratory relief actions such as this 
one. The Supreme Court stated in Highlands' that they did not intend to eliminate other 
causes of action. It is this court's belief that the language quoted in Giltner Dairy about 
the applicability of IDAPA to the issue before the Supreme Court was not intended to 
eliminate a county's responsibility to make findings of fact in quasi-judicial zoning 
matters. It was instead intended to clarify that the APA conferred 110 separate right to 
an appeal of coullty zoning activity by way of judicial review. That is \vhat (iiltna DaiJT 
was about. No more and no less. The case starts with that discussion and never varies 
from it. There, the Court stated: 
In its brieting. Giltner Dairy contends it is entitled tojudicial 
review under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act .... The 
language of the lAP A indicates that it is intended to govern the 
judicial review of decisions made by state administrative agencies, 
and not local governing bodies. During oral argument, Giltner 
Dairy admitted that the right to ohlainjlldicial review in this case 
must come/i'om a stalute other than the IAPA. During oral 
argument. Giltner Dairy relied upon Idaho Code 67-6521 jor Cl 
right to appeal. .. 
(;il!nerDaitv. 145 Idaho 630, 632, 181 P.3d 1238. 1240 (emphasis added). 
In GilTner Dairy. the Idaho Supreme Court clarified only that (iiltner Dairy was 
not an aggrieved party for purposes of appeal by \vay of judicial revievv. Highluncl, did 
not change this result. but in fact reinforced it. 
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On the other hand, there is a wealth of Idaho case 1m\' on the question of whether 
zoning bodies must enter \vritten findings and conclusions of law on zoning decisions. 
,"lee e.g. E'wns v. Teron COllnty, 139 Idaho 71. 73 P.3d 84 (2003). \Vhether Giltner D(/i'~\' 
and Highlands' are intended to overturn all aspects of cases such as Emns 1'. Tl!ton 
<- 'ollnly. Price \'. Payette County, and Comer v. County ojTwin Falls is anyone's guess. 
Until the Supreme Court has explicitly said that this has happened, this court believes its 
obligation is to follow existing law. 
The following language is taken from COvl'Cln v. Board oj'Com 'rs oj'Fremont 
('ollnty decided less than 2 years ago: 
For effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning 
boards, there must be .. ,adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Conclusory statements are not sufficient; instead, what is needed for 
adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the 
decisionmaking body believes, after hearing and considering all the 
evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which its decision is 
based. (Citation omitted), However, a board of commissioners may adopt 
a planning and zoning commissions' findings and conclusions because 
I.e. § 67-6535 requires only that findings and conclusions be made. 
143 Idaho 501. 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Because I.e. §§ 67-6535(a) and (b) refer to "applications," the county suggests it 
is exempt from requirements to enter findings and conclusions imposed by existing case 
law. Historically, land use and zoning decisions have been appealable pursuant to 
LL UP A and the APA, and findings of fact and conclusions of lay\' have been required in 
order to facilitate these appeals. Whether the Supreme Court has intended to do away 
with requirements that counties enter findings of fact and conclusions of law following 
quasi-judicial zoning hearings in cases that do not involve specitic "applicants" remains 
to be seen. Until that happens. this court believes they are stilL and should be, required. 
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If they are only required in cases where there is a nan-owly qualified right to 
judicial review. a county \vould be free to engage in "legislative activity" and rezone an 
entire county without stating any standards and without indicating in any fashion what 
e\idence. if any. has been accepted and/or relied upon from public hearings. This would 
also empower counties to rezone without reciting \vhether the zoning amendments in any 
\vay contlmll to or have even been compared with a comprehensive plan. In that event. 
the right to bring an action for declaratory relief in order to determine whether the county 
has functioned according to 1m\' is worth little. Working back further into the whole 
hearing process-without a requirement that there be a record and findings of fact and 
conclusions of lav\'-there would seem to be little benefit to having hearings or giving 
notice. 
This court believes these issues have already been addressed. though the same 
sticky question sometime arises as to whether the zoning board is addressing a particular 
rezone application. This court does not believe that should be the determinative factor. 
From the case law. it appears that a county that engaged in purely legislative activity has 
always been exemptjromjudicial review. However, in Jerome County v. Holloway. the 
Idaho Supreme Court states flatly that ""[w]hen the statute requires notice and hearing as 
to the possible effect of a zoning law upon property rights the action olthe legislu/i\'e 
ho(zv hecomes qu(/si~jlldicial in character .... ,. 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 ( 1990) 
(emphasis added). The Cowan court likewise addressed this issue in the passage quoted 
above. In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Chamhers \', Kootenai ('OUJ1IJ' 
Hoard ojCol11missioners that once there is a quasi-judicial decision. procedural 
sateguards must be tl)l1owed: 
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This Court. in ",effing a standard o{dlle process fiJr ({u([si-iudicial 
proceedings, held that: (a) a board of commissioners' failure to provide 
notice of its second meeting regarding an application (after the public 
hearing) where statT views were expressed: (b) the absence of a 
transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings: and (c) the{clilure 10 
make specijicfindings of/act and conclusions lIpon ll'hich a dec;sion \\'LIS 
hased did /lot comport ll'ith notions o(procedural due process, In 
addition. the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, which is inferred 
from the right to notice and specific findings of fact. is an element of due 
process. 
125 Idaho 115. 867 P .2d 989 (1994 ) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is this court's conclusion that the question of whether a county 
board must produce written findings and conclusions when changing county 
zoning laws is not connected to whether there is an identified "applicant." or 
whether most of the activity to a given point is legislative activity. or eyen 
whether an appeal pursuant to a judicial review proceeding is possible. Instead. 
once proceedings reach the quasi-judicial stage-which. it did here because the 
county engaged in hearings and took evidence and testimony pursuant to statutory 
notice and hearing requirements-due process. if nothing else. requires the county 
to make specific findings of fact and conclusions upon which a decision is based. 
18.) There is no written record of what the Board did in amending the 
Comprehensive Plan in March. 2007. There is nothing in writing to confirm that 
the Board did or did not consider amendments to the Comprehensive Plan before 
amending zoning throughout the county. There is nothing in writing to contlrm 
what evidence or findings or data or criteria or rationale. if any. the county relied 
upon in amending the Comprehensive Plan. There does not appear to be any 
record of when or ifor hov,' any P&Z commission's recommendations regarding 
changes to the Comprehensive Plan actually came into the hands of the Board. 
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19.) The legal notice of public hearings published on April 19.2006. bef()re the 
Camas County Board of Commissioners public hearing held initially on May 17.2006 
and continued until May 22. 2006. at \vhich time an Amended Comprehensive Plan and 
Land Use Map \vere adopted as Resolution #96. failed to contain the Planning and 
Zoning Commission recommendation. I.e. § section 67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the 
P&Z commission' s recommendation in the notice provided by the governing board if the 
board will conduct another public hearing. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit C6.). 
20.) The governing board made material changes to the Comprehensive Plan 
Land Use Map under consideration at meetings held May 3. 2006. May 10.2006. May 
12.2006. May 17,2006. and May 22, 2006. Yet further notice and hearing were not 
provided. This would violate I.e. § 67-6509(b). (,)'ee Plaintiffs Exhibits H2, B4. B5. B6. 
and B7.). 
21.) Legal notices of public hearing before the P&Z Commission and before the 
Board to consider recommendation or adoption of Resolution 96, and Ordinances 150 
and 153. did not contain a summary of proposed amendments. I.e. § 67-6509(a) requires 
publication of a "summary of the plan to be discussed". (See Plaintiffs Exhibits e. C L 
C4. C6. C7. and C8.). 
22.) The legal notice of public hearing published February 2 L 2007. before the 
Board's public hearing held March 14.2007. at \vhich the Board adopted Ordinance 150. 
Amended Zoning Designation Map. failed to include the P&Z recommendation. I.e. § 
67-6509(a) requires inclusion of the P&Z" commission's recommendation in the notice 
prO\ided by the governing board. (See Exhibit C8.). 
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23.) Resolution #96, the Amended Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map 
adopted on !vlay 22, 2006 included only the southern half of Camas County. I.e. ~ 67-
6508 requires that .. [t]he plan shall include all land vvithin the jurisdiction of the 
governing board." (5,'ee Plaintiffs Exhibit G, and Finding #13 above.). It would appear the 
Board adopted Resolution #103, to include all of the land within the county. Pursuant to 
I.e. §§ 67-6507, 6508, and 6509, it is the duty of the P&Z commission to conduct the 
process to prepare and update the Comprehensive Plan, to hold public hearings on it prior 
to amending the plan, to send out public notice of the hearings, and to make 
recommendations to the Board. The court cannot see where that process was ever 
undel1aken by the P&Z Commission and recommended to the Board with regard to the 
northern half of the county. 
The Board can, under § 67-6509(b), make material changes to the P&Z 
recommendations and give notice and amend the plan. Purportedly the public hearing to 
amend the plan occurred on March 14,2007. However, all of the agenda notices, the 
legal notices, and the minutes, refer to amendments to the Comprehensive Plan Map. (See 
Plaintiff s Exhibit B31 (minutes of meeting); Exhibit C8 (legal notice for the March 14 
meeting); and Exhibit F, pg. 25, (agenda for the meeting).). 
24.) At least part of the importance of adequate legal notices to the public is so 
members of the public can make an informed determination of what will be discussed and 
decide whether they wish to attend a particular public meeting. If legal notice is 
inadequate. there are members of the public that would not attend. simply because they 
had no knO\vledge that particular topics would be discussed. In that event. it is not 
possible to measure or know what evidence or testimony from the public is missed: all 
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that can be measured or known is the eyidence or testimony from those who attelllkd. 
With that in mind it is no answer to those who allege that legal notices of public hearings 
were inadequate, to counter that "you attended that meeting" and therefore "you were 
heard." and therefore "never mind that notice to the rest of the world was improper. or 
never given." While that mayor may not be the rule in evaluating due process 
considerationsfhrilldicial review plilposes (""You were not aggrieved by a lack of notice 
because you [often as a party] were able to attend and present your el'idenliary case."). 
that is not the rule that should be follovved if public legal notice is inadequate in the 
context of enacting ordinances such as these. Statutory notice requirements are conditions 
precedent to the enactment of valid ordinances and may not be dispensed with. 
25.) This case was tried on August 20. 2008. On August 8. 2008. plaintiff filed a 
MOlionfor Leave to Amend Petilion hy Adding Two New Callses oj'Acliol1. The court by 
vvritten order denied this motion as to new allegations seeking declaratory judgment 
relief The court allovved plaintitTto amend his complaint in this action to add claims 
against the individual members of the Board, and to add claims for alleged due process 
and equal protection violations. In that same order the court addressed, but did not rule 
upon. the advisability of attaching a Rule 54(b) certificate to this decision. Following 
entry of that order. and the filing of plaintiff s amended complaint, defendants removed 
the remainder of this action to federal court (presumably all the civil damage claims that 
had remainded pending). by yirtue of a Notice of Removal filed November 10. 2008. 
Therefore, after the entry 0 f this decision, there is and v\i II be nothing further pending in 
this action. EYen if the entire pending case has not been remoyed to federal court. or in 
the e\'Cnt federal jurisdiction is lost and some or all civil damage claims are once again 
r~~ 
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pending in district court in Camas County. a Rule 54(b) Certiticate is proper in this case. 
Any and all other pending claims are bifurcated for separate triaL and involve separate 
issues. See 5-,'nake River Equipment ('0. v. ('hristensen 107 Idaho 541. 691 P .2d 787 
(App. 1984) For the foregoing reasons. and the reasons set forth in its order allov\ing the 
filing of the amended complaint. this court will attach a Rule 54( b) certificate to this 
decision. and it \vill become a tinal order subject to appeal. 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER 
In summary. in addition to any conclusions that appear above. with regard to the 
ordinances in question. the court concludes: 
1.) The Board of Commissioners of Camas County failed to keep a transcribable 
verbatim record of deliberations they engaged in, leading up to quasi-judicial public 
hearings. after they received recommendations from P&Z and had compiled at least part 
of the record. 
2.) In recommending and passing Ordinances #153 and #150 at least one P&Z 
commissioner and one county commissioner acted with a conflict of interest as set forth 
in this court's Decision on Conflicts alInterests Issue tiled April 2, 2008. The court can 
tind no exception in the law for members of these bodies if they are acting in a 
legislative. as opposed to a quasi-judicial capacity. 
3.) The P&Z Commission failed to keep and maintain adequate records ufthe 
hearings. findings made. and actions taken by the commission. and failed to send a 
\\Titten recommendation to the Board as required by lavv. The map or maps that were sent 
as recommendations cannot not be identified. and no one can identify when any 
recommendations with regard to changing the Comp Plan or zoning \vere received. 
1 
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Because of these failures, and the failure to keep verbatim records of meetings. it 
is impossible to tell when the Board commenced deliberations to\vard a decision. or what 
changes or hmv many changes were made to the zoning or comp plan amendments by the 
Board. Consequently. it is not possible to tell if requirements for additional public 
hearings were met. 
.f.) The Board failed to make any written record of its decision. No findings of 
fact or conclusions of law were entered on a decision that purportedly effected a rezone 
of at least portions of the entire county. These are required after the Board has made a 
quasi-judicial decision. 
5.) The Comprehensive Plan includes far more than a Comp Plan Map. In 
amending the Comprehensive Plan, the county has failed to follow proper legal 
procedures and to provide proper legal notice. In amending zoning in Camas County. the 
county has failed to follow proper legal procedures and provide proper legal notice. 
6.) This is a civil judicial proceeding between a county and a person as defined in 
Idaho Code 12-117. That same section provides the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds the party against whom judgment is entered 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. For the reasons set forth herein. the court 
concludes Camas County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. and plaintiff 
may make application for an a\vard of attorney's fees. 
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ORDER 
THE COURT HEREBY DECLARES. ADJUDGES. AND DECREES: 
1.) The amendments to the Comp Plan adopted May 25. 2006 and March 19. 
2007 as Resolution 96 are null and void. 
2.) The amendments to the Camas County Zoning Ordinance. adopted April 18. 
1007. as Ordinance #153. and the Zoning Designation Map adopted March 29. 2007 as 
Ordinance # 150 are aIL and each of them. null and void. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 2nd day of December. 2008. 
Robert .Irtt) zr 
District Judge 
RULE 54(B) CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order is it hereby 
CERTIFIED. in accordance with Rule 54(b) I.R.C.P .. that the court has determined that 
there is no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which 
execution may issue and an appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate 
Rules. 
DATED this 2. day of December. 2008. 
District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thej..-dday of DECEMBER, 2008, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, document by depositing a copy 
there of in the United States mail, postage prepaid by first class mail to the following: 
Christopher P. Simms 
US Bank Bldg., Suite 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Phillip 1. Collaer 
250 S Fifth St., Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7246 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Paul Fitzer 
950 W Bannock St., Ste 520 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Korri Blodgett, Deputy Clerk 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIM:MS 
Attomey at Law 
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191 S;~m Valley Road 
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Fax: 208 (;22 7129 
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IN 11HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIm STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIm COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE 'MARTIN, 
Plain~ 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES, :".L.C., 
Plcintiff, 
v. 
Defendant, 
and 
CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their (,meial capacity, 
KEN BACKTROM. 
BILL DAVIS, and 
RON CHAPMAN, 
Df.lfendants. 
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STIPULATION AS TO FACTS 
AND ADMISSION OF DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE 
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CAMAS CAMAS COUNTY 
... J MAY 
COttles now the parties hereto, through counsel, and hereby stipulate to the 
followL11g f~ts for purposes of submission of the legal issues herein; 
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
1. The parties stipulate to the admission into evidence of Plaintiff's Exhibits A -
A29, B- B36~ C - CII, D, ~ F, 0.·03, II-HI2, 11-14, J, ~ L, M, N-N7, 0, P &; 
Q, all as included in Plaintifrs Trial Exhibit Bindel. 
2. The parties stipulate to the admission into evidence of Defendant's Exhibits 
A 1 through AlB, Bl~7, C68 -224, D226-226, E227-238, F239.286, 0287-
332, H333, 1336-343, J344-420, K421-423. U24-425, M426-428, N429-497, 
0498, P499-500, Q501-570, RS71-854 and S855-870. all as included in the 
Defendant's Trial Exhibit Binder pages 1-870. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
3. The parties stipulate that the Defendant's Exhibits admitted into evidence, as 
referenced in paragraph 2 above, comprise the entire administrative record in 
possession of Camas County. 
~003 
flV7", Co'~ 
The Planning and Zoning Commission nor the Board of Commissioners " -t-h< 
I!rl'.-.cr +1'I"c... +h~.4- ~o,J'" ,"~ ~ 
4. 
aenerated or considered new studies or new data tin adoption. of the 
Comprehensive Plans of 2006 or 2007. The studies and data within the 1997 
Com.prehensive Plan was the data and infonnation considered by the Planning 
and Zoning Commission and Board of Commissioners in adopting the Plan. 
:5. Although no independent formal written recommendation from the Plannhtg 
and Zoni.ng Commission to the Board of County Commissioners to adopt the 
Comprehensive Plan and Land Use Map, in 2006 or 2007, Defendant submits 
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':hat maps, notes and other materials in the record submitted complies with any 
legal requirements. 
6. No independent formal written recommendation from the Planning and 
Zoning Commission to the Board of County Commissioners to adopt the 
amended Zoning Ordinance or Zoning Designation Map exist. Defendant 
submits that a draft Ordinance and draft Map were transmitted to the Board of 
CoImnissioners and satisfy any legal requirements. 
7, The Board of County Commissioners did not generate any independent formal 
written record of decision of adoption of Ordinance 150 or 153t other than the 
Ordinance itself. 
8. Legal Notice of Public Hearing, pursuant to Camas County Ordinance 142 
was posted at all designated locations except the City of Fairfleld City Hall. 
Notice was posted insid~ not outside the Camas County Courthouse. 
9. No written verification exists regarding Legal Notice of Public Hearing, 
PW'SU8Ilt to IC 67-6509, to political subdivisions providing services within the 
plannjng area, as to Planning and Zoning Commission meetings or hearings. 
1. O. At the Board of County Commissioner level Legal Notice of Public Hearing, 
pursuant to IC 67-6509, was purportedly mailed to all political subdivisions 
providing services within the planning ar~ except West Magic Fire 
Protection District and the City of Fairfield No written verification of notice 
;, \ t~t exists. 
I ,.'J D.II, 0.1 14 "-
11. ,\ Legal descriptions of the various zoning designations on the 2006-2007 
Comprehensive PlBIlt Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance and Zoning 
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::>esignation Map were not considered in adoption of same nor published with 
rhe Ordinances. 
12, Publication of Zoning Ordinance 153 adopted April 18,2007 did not include 
any legal descriptions or map. The publication directed the reader to fmd the 
full text of the ordinance at the Planning and Zoning Office during regular 
office hours. 
D. Publication of the Zoning Designation Map Ordinance No 150 adopted March 
29, 2007 did not include any legal descriptions or map. 
1 LI. Plaintiff owns in fee simple the folJowine parcels of real property in Camas 
County as of May 20. 2008: a) 40+ acre parcel 770 E 240 N., b) 29 acre parcel 
west of Soldier Road and South of Baseline Ro~ c) lots 3 and 4 Blk. 5 
Homestead Subdivision,. within an existing approved and platted subdivision 
of one acre lots. 
] :5. The above parcels of real property, in order were located within the named 
zoning district prior to and after the rezone process of 2006·2007 a) 
agricu1tura11 agricultural, b) agriculturalJRl c) ATlAS 
1. 6. Plaintiff had a fee simple ownership interest in two (2) 80 acre parcels, in 
section 4, that were sold to third parties while retaining a contractual fiscal 
interest in the development, marketing. and building potential thereon. The 
north parcel, was zoned AT before and after the 2006·2007 rezone process. 
~If t.-'''' 
The southern parcel was rezoned from AG to R1 as a result of the 2006-2007 
zoning amendment process. 
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1 7. Plaintiff holds a first right of refusal as to a 67 acre parrel in Section 4 that 
(.,.~ ~.sf 
was rezoned from AG to R1 as' a resuh of the 2006-2007 zoning amendment 
process. 
1 ~;. The parcels generally described in the two preceding paragraphs. numbered 
16 and 17. were included in the R-7 land use designation in the 
Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map existing prior to the 2006·2007 
Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-t land use designation in the post 
2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map amendments. 
19. The 29 acre parcel described in paragraph 14 subparagraph b. was included in 
the R .. 7 land use designation in the Comprehensive Plan Land Use Map 
existing prior to the 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Amendments and R-I 
land use designation in the post 2006-2007 Comprehensive Plan Land Use 
Map amendments. 
::.0. The two tape series labled March 26, 2007 also includes an audio recording of 
the March 27, 2007 deliberative proceedings at Board of Commissions 
meeting of those same dates. 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
AITOREY FOR PLAINTIFF 
PAUL FITZER 
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MOORE, SMITH, BUXTON & TURKE, ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
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CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum. ID 83340 
Tel: 208622 7878 
Fax: 208622 7921 
ISB#7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN. ) 
) 
Plaintiff: ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, L.L.c.. ) 
) Case No. CV-07-24 
Plaintiff. ) 
) 
v. ) 
) COST MEMORANDUM 
ED SMITH. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
and ) 
) 
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO. ) 
By and through the duly elected ) 
Board of Commissioners in ) 
their official capacities. ) 
) 
) 
KEN BAXTROM. ) 
BILL DAVIS. and ) 
RON CHAPMAN. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
PLAINTIFFS' COST MEMORANDUM 
COMES NOW PETITIONER. through his attorney of record and files this. 
his COST MEMORANDUM. claiming as costs the items stated and totaled herein belo\v. 
and further states that to the best of counsel's kno\\ledge and belief the items are correct 
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with law. 
Filing Fee 
Attorney Fees 
Paralegal Costs 
TOTAL 
88.00 
79,171.50 
961.00 
$80,220.50 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
A TTOREY F R PLAINTIFF 
/", //// 
Christopher P. Simms 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this /1 day of Pi: C. 2008. I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PlaintitT s Reply to Response to Motion for 
Leave to Amend Petition by delivering same, to Phillip J. Collaer. Attorney for 
Defendant Ed Smith. 250 South Fifth Street. Ste. 700. P.O. Box 7426. Boise Idaho 
83707-7426, and Paul Fitzer. Attorney for Camas County Defendants 950 W. Bannock 
St.. Ste 520. Boise. Idaho 83702. 
Christopher Simms 
PLAI0JTIFFS' COST MEMORAl\;DUM 
ATTORNEY FEE AFFIDAVIT AND CERTIFIC ATE OF AUTHENTICITY 
L the undersigned Christopher P. Simms, Attorney at Law, ISB #7473, am the attorney of 
Record of George Martin regarding his claims against Camas County, and I familiar with and 
m\are of prevailing charges for legal services, that agreed to be charged Mr. Martin for services 
rendered in the instant matter. and the actual time expended in said representation, all of which 
are reflected on the attached records and further I am the Official Custodian of Records for the 
Simms Law Firm, related to all reports, records, or data compilations, and specifically as to the 
Attorney Fee Summary attached hereto, a data compilation, the basis and method of computation 
of which were computer entries of professional time expended on the Martin v. Camas County 
matter, excluding any time expended related to co-Defendant Ed Smith, which said entries each 
relate to acts and events, made at or near the time by myself, or the legal assistant working under 
my supervision having direct knO\vledge of the act or event, and compi led into its present form 
from said data entries by use of simple arithmetic by adding the individual time entries from each 
calendar month. I make this \/Hitten declaration under oath subject to the penalty of perjury. I 
certify that the documents attached hereto are authentic exact dupl icates of records systematically 
kept of regularly conducted business activity. 
LA W & CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the I j .i!::. day Of'~U=1M..6~.:....2008. 
~JSc~J 
NO' AR Y PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
-~-----~'~----~--~-+--~ 
Donna J Simms 
Notary Public 
State of Idaho 
CH 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
2086227878 
cpslaw@gmail.com 
TO 
R $ SIMMS 
STATEMENT NO. 
DATE December 19, 2008 
CLIENT GEORGE MARTIN 
FEE $150 Hourly 
MATTER Martin v. Smith, et at 
Summary of Legal Hours 
HOURS DATE & DESCRIPTION RATE 
Attorney Billable Hours 
51.29 Nova: Dec-06 $150.00 
13.25 Jan-07 $150.00 
2.92 Feb-07 $150.00 
4.36 Mar-07 $150.00 
-
12.51 Apr-07 $150.00 
21.66 May-07 $150.00 
7.00 Jun-07 $150.00 
32.99 Jul-07 $150.00 
23.99 Aug-07 $150.00 
44.64 Sep-07 $150.00 
47.48 Oct-07 $150.00 
27.74 Nov-07 $150.00 
-
2.84 Dec-07 $150.00 
--~-----, -
21.32 Jan-OS $150.00 
15.07 Feb-OS $150.00 
37.84 Mar-OS $150.00 
18.99 Apr-OS $150.00 
82.75 May-08 $150.00 
3.50 Jun-08 $150.00 
-~~ 
14.00 Jul-OS $150.00 
41.67 Aug-08 $150.00 
,--.-~ 
527.81 
SUBTOTAL 
AMOUNT DUEL 
Make check payable to CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR BUSINESS! 
o L.j 
AMOUNT 
$7,693.50 
$1,987.50 
$438.00 
$654.00 
$1,876.50 
$3,249.00 
$1,050.00 
$4,948.50 
$3,598.50 
$6,696.00 
$7,122.00 
$4,161.00 
$426.00 
$3,198.00 
$2,260.50 
$5,676.00 
$2,848.50 
$12,412.50 
$525.00 
$2,100.00 
$6,250.50 
$79,171.50 
$79,171.50 
CHRIST HER s 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
2086227878 
cpslaw@gmail.com 
TO 
Al"TORN 
Summary of Paralegal Hours 
HOURS DATE & DESCRIPTION 
Paralegal Billable Hours 
0.40 Aug-07 
9.16 Apr-OS 
5.66 May-OS 
0.50 Jul-OS 
3.50 Aug-OS 
19.22 
STATEMENT NO. 
DATE December 19, 2008 
CLIENT GEORGE MARTIN 
FEE $150.00 Hourly 
MATTER Martin v. Smith, et al 
RATE 
$50.00 
$50.00 
$50.00 
$50.00 
$50.00 
SUBTOTAL I 
AMOUNT 
$20.00 
$458.00 
$283.00 
$25.00 
$175.00 
$961.00 
AMOUNTDUE~ 
Make check payable to CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR BUSINESSI 
Paul J. Fitzer, ISB 5675 
:Y100RE SMITH BuXTON & TLRCKE. CHTD. 
950 \V. Bannock St., Suite 520 
Boise. ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/331/1202 
Attorneys for Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES. LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO. by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
OBJECTION TO ATTORNEY 
FEES UNDER RULE 54(e)(6) 
OF THE IDAHO RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
COMES NOW Defendants Camas County, Idaho (the "County"), by and through 
its duly elected board of county commissioners, Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and Ron 
Chapman (the Individual Commissioners) and Ed Smith, in his capacity as a member of 
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission (collectively, County Defendants). 
by and through their attorneys of record. Moore Smith Buxton & Turcke. Chartered. and 
objects by rv10tion under Rule 54(e)(6) to the Motion for Attorney Fees by Plaintiffs in 
the above entitled action for and on the following grounds and reasons as set forth herein. 
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1. Removal - ,Jurisdiction is properly before the United States District Court 
This Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint to include federal 
U.S.c. Section 1983 civil claims. Defendant timely removed the cause of action to the 
United States District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1 :08 CV-
00470-CWD on or about November 5, 2008. Subsequent to this removal. on or about 
December 2, 2008, this Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. and Order 
Following Trial. Plaintiff filed its Notice of Hearing for attorney fees on or about 
December 9, 2008 and its Cost Memorandum on or about December 22.2008. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. 1441(c) all state law claims are removed to federal court 
upon a notice of removal which includes all state law claims as well. While the federal 
court has the discretion to remand, it has sixty days upon which to do so. The United 
States District Court has not done so. The provision further provides: 
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the 
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or 
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case 
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, 
in its discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 
Thus, the discretion remains with the federal court to determine whether it will 
preside over all of the claims or remand the state law claims back to the state court. At 
this juncture. this Court lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees. 
2. Plaintiff's Request is Untimely pursuant to (RCP 54 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5) a court may award attorney fees only \',-hen 
a memorandum of costs is served upon adverse parties no later than fourteen days after 
entry of judgment. The Plaintitf failed to do so. On or about December 2. 2008. this 
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Court issued its Findings of Fact Conclusions of Layv, and Order Following Trial. 
PlaintitT did not file its Cost Memorandum with the Camas County Courthouse until 
December 22, 2008 at 2:40 p.m. The rule is quite clear: "[flailure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of the 
right of costs:' LR.C.P. 54(d)(5). Plaintiffs motion is untimely and he has therefore 
waived any right to attorney fees. 
3. Plaintiff's Request does not provide sufficient specificity to support an award 
for reasonable attorney fees. 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) a court may award only reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party. Additionally, a memorandum of costs is required to be served upon 
adverse parties itemizing each claimed expense. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) (Emphasis Added). 
Why would the rule require that attorney fees be itemized to each claimed expense? Why 
limit attorney fees to only those that are found to be "reasonable"? Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(6), due process requires that the non-prevailing party must have an opportunity to 
object to the allowance of attorney fees either in its entirety. or to a certain portions 
thereof that may be unreasonable, duplicative, or for some other basis. 
Plaintiffs Cost Memorandum, in addition to being untimely, additionally does not 
provide any information. The memorandum of costs merely includes the dollar amount 
and the month said fees were allegedly accrued. but otherwise fails to include v .. hat the 
accrued costs pertained to. Distinctly absent is an itemized accounting of each claimed 
expense. If the non-prevailing party has the right to contest all or part of the requested 
mvard, how is he, of the Court for the matter, able to determine the reasonableness of the 
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request? There might be a duplication of services. Some of the fees may pe11ain to case 
CV -08-40 or the United States District Court action. Because Plaintiff has procedurally 
and substantively failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 54. he has waived any claim to attorney 
fees. 
.... Plaintiff has failed to assert that Defendant acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 a court may award attorney fees to the 
prevailing party only where the court finds that the non-prevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. This case involves multiple claims and multiple 
defenses; some of which are cases of first impression. Attorney fees are not appropriate 
unless all defenses and claims were asserted frivolously or without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. Turbo W Corpac, Inc. 119 Idaho 626, 809 P.2d 487 (1991). Where some of 
the claims or issues are subject to argument, attorney fees are inappropriate. Indeed, the 
novelty of the issues presented in this cause of action were the subject to three Idaho 
Supreme Court decisions in 2008 alone. 
In its Order, this Court asserted thirty-one different findings of facts. conclusions 
of law. Throughout its Order. the Court asserts conclusions that it believes are well-
grounded in law, but acknowledges other conclusions that are subject to argument and 
future direction by our supreme court. Being subject or open to argument or differing 
perspectives means that there is a reasonable basis in law to make such argument. 
For example. in considering the three 2008 Idaho Supreme Court decisions. the 
Court espouses that "Time will tell" whether LLUPA's judicial revic\v provisions are 
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applicable in a declarative judgment action where a party seeks to enJOIn a 
comprehensive plan. land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map ... governmental 
activity historically viewed as legislative in nature. 
This Court clarifies a possible interpretation of the Giltner and Highlands 
decisions which purportedly hold that a land use map and annexation rezone are not 
subject to the judicial review provisions of LLUP A. Perhaps this Court is correct and all 
cities and counties will hereinafter be required to keep transcribable verbatim records and 
issue written findings of fact, conclusions of law for all public informational sessions, 
meetings, and hearings in which legislative comprehensive planning and zoning are 
discussed. At this juncture, no cities or counties adhere to such an interpretation to 
LLUPA's requirements and, if this court IS correct, then nearly all cities and counties in 
the state will need to readopt said ordinances and resolutions. 
The key word here, however, is ·'interpretation". LLUP A, in general, is far from 
providing perfectly clear guidance and where, as here, we have a number of statutory 
provisions which mayor may not be applicable to certain government activities, there is a 
reasonable basis in law to litigate these issues and attorney fees are unwarranted. This 
Court provided: ·'[t]here is, unfortunately, language in Giltner Dairy that could be 
interpreted to mean that IDAPA does not apply at all to zoning decisions." If there is 
such equivocal language in these cases to lead to such differing interpretations, then it is 
inappropriate to award attorney fees against one pat1y declaring that that party had no 
reasonable basis in la\v or fact to argue the point of law. 
It is certainly open to argument whether Plaintiff is an "affected party" sufficient 
to invoke LUJPA's judical review provisions in the County's adoption of its 
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comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance. It is even open to argument whether Plaintiff 
is an affected party with regard to the County's adoption of a county-wide zoning map. 
Perhaps the Court is correct and everyone in the county is an atlected party in a quasi-
judicial adoption of a zoning map. There has never been such a finding pertaining to a 
county-wide zoning map. comprehensive plan. and zoning ordinance. nor has a county 
official ever been deemed to have a conflict of interest by virtue of its ownership of 
property in the county. These are cases of first impression which potentially contradict 
the Supreme Court's latest guidance. 
This Court has found that the judicial review provisions of LLUPA are applicable 
outside of a petition for judicial review but in a declarative judgment action seeking to 
enjoin a county comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance because the County itself is 
deemed to have submitted an application or permit to satisfy LLUP A's plain textual 
limitations. This conclusion is an alternate interpretation of the applicability and nature 
of LLUPA's judicial review provisions to legislative activity in a declarative judgment 
action. It is a case of first impression in Idaho and. is certainly subject to argument as our 
own supreme court seems to have limited the judicial review provisions to five and only 
five types of permits by affected persons. 
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5. Additional Arguments in which the County had a reasonable basis in Fact 
and Law 
The Defendant respectfully asserts that it proceeded \vith a reasonable basis in 
fact and law in the the following additional arguments: 
a. Plaintiffs Cause of Action 
At the outset of the case. Plaintiff sought both a petition for judicial review and a 
declarative judgment action. Given the subsequent actions by our Idaho Supreme Court. 
the County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiff seeking 
injunctive relief under both such cause of actions. It: as the Court declares. the County 
was acting in a quasi-judicial matter, a prospective plaintiff must exhaust administrative 
remedies by filing a timely petition for judicial review. Plaintiff failed to do so. 
Additionally, a petition for judicial review is limited to the record. Here, Plaintiff was 
allowed to present evidence. Thereafter, to award attorney fees would essentially punish 
the parties for failing to settle the case. 
b. Judicial Review Standards Applicable in a Declarative Judgment Action 
While the cause of action allegedly proceeded only as a declarative judgment 
action. the Plaintiff nonetheless sought to invoke LLUPA's judicial review provisions in 
a declarative judgment action. The County had a reasonable basis to contest this attempt 
to invoke the judicial appellate provisions outside the context of a petition for judicial 
reView. The legal standards differ. the procedures differ. and Plaintiff failed to timely 
bring a petition and is therefore barred from invoking its protections. LLUPA 's judicial 
revie\v provisions are inapplicable in a declarative judgment action. 
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c. Actual Notice 
Plaintiff alleged numerous due process violations pertaining to alleged legal 
notice defects by the county. The County had a reasonable basis in 1m\! to argue that 
Plaintiff cannot assert alleged legal notice defects as a basis to permanently enjoin the 
County's Comprehensive Plan, Land Use Map, Zoning Ordinance, and Zoning Map 
where the Plaintiff had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard at each 
and every public hearing and did so. The Plaintiff cannot bring an action for the benefit 
of the general public. 
d. Standing / Actual Harm 
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiffs 
sought after injunction based upon the fact that Plaintiff had not sufTered actual harm 
sufficient to have standing to bring said action in the first instance and thereafter 
necessitating the injunction of the county's comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, and 
zoning map due to said ham1. All of his properties either remained the same or were 
upzoned other than one one acre lot in a legally vested subdivision permitting RI 
densities. Along with being a vested use, the property has been rezoned to Rl. 
e. Due Process / Nexus 
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to challenge whether Plaintiff 
was denied due process of law. Outside of the legal notice issue, it is unclear whether he 
had a substantial right impaired or had suffered actual harm by l'irfllc oj' an alleged 
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procedural or substantive error. Any argument that he has been downzoned is limited to 
the zoning map. What is the relationship between Plaintiffs alleged harm and a 
comprehensive plan? a land use map? or a zoning ordinance'? 
f. Transcribable Record 
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from PlaintitTs 
challenge that Idaho Code §67-6536 requires Camas County keep and maintain an 
adequate transcribable verbatim record during all public workshops, informational 
sessions, and public meetings pertaining to the adoption of a comprehensive plan, zoning 
ordinance, and zoning map. It is a case of first impression that all public meetings 
leading up to a public hearing must also be recorded in addition to the public hearing as 
well. 
g. Conflict of Interest 
The County had a reasonable basis in law and fact to defend itself from Plaintiffs 
assertion that it has the requisite standing to enjoin the County's comprehensive plan, 
zoning ordinance, and even a county-wide zoning map based upon a perceived 
government official's conflict of interest by virtue of ownership of property in the county. 
While the Court can find no exception in law for legislative as opposed to quasi-judicial 
activity. the fact remains that it is the quasi-judicial nature of such activity that enables a 
particular plaintiff' to challenge such a contlict. which is absent here. Additionally, no 
court has ever deemed a county official to have a conflict of interest in the adoption of a 
comprehensive plan. land use map. or zoning ordinance. Where would the conflict 
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attach? Even for a county-wide zoning map. the County has a reasonable basis to argue 
that a county official is not conflicted from conflicted from passing a county-wide map 
by virtue of ownership of property within the county absent some other nexus connecting 
a true conflict. 
h. IDAPA 
Given the possible interpretation of our Supreme Court's recent decisions, the 
County acts with a reasonable basis in law in defending itself from Plaintiffs attack that 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAP A") applies to the enactment of a county-
wide comprehensive plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map. which is 
arguably legislative in nature and not subject to LLUPA's judicial review provisions or 
IDAPA. 
1. Planning and Zoning Recommendation 
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from 
Plaintiffs assertion that, pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6509, the county board cannot 
conduct a public hearing without first receiving a written recommendation from the 
planning commission, other than the legislation itself. 
,. Written Findings of Fact. Conclusions of Law 
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from 
Plaintiff s assertion that the County's Comprehensive Plan. Land Use Map. Zoning 
Ordinance, and Zoning Map are quasi-judicial in nature and thus its failure to adopt 
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written findings of fact, conclusions of law pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6535 and §67-
6509 enables the Plaintiff to seek their permanent injunction. The County has a 
reasonable basis to argue that such legislative activity is not an application or permit 
under LLUPA nor does 67-6509's requirement that a "record of the hearings, findings 
made, and actions taken ... be maintained" mandate that such record, other than written 
evidence submitted, be in writing versus an audio recording. 
k. Material Changes requiring remand to Planning and Zoning Commission 
The County acts with a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from 
Plaintiffs assertion that it has the requisite standing to enjoin not only the land use map, 
but the comprehensive plan as a whole in asserting that the planning commission only 
amended the bottom half of the land use map, which was later "rectified in 200T' by the 
Board of County Commissioners in amending the entire land use map without first 
remanding it back to the planning commission. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any 
harm by virtue of this perceived defect as his property is not located in the northern 
portion of the county which is mostly uninhabited. Further while Idaho Code §67-6509 
requires a subsequent hearing where material changes are made by the county board, 
there is no requirement to remand back to the planning commission. 
1. In Accordance with the Comprehensive Plan 
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from Plaintiffs 
assertion that he has standing to enjoin the County's zoning ordinance and zoning map 
based upon his assertion that the County did not consider a written recommendation nor 
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generate written findings in determining that the zoning ordinance and map were adopted 
in accordance with the comprehensive plan. 
m. LLUPA Planning Duties 
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to defend itself from Plaintiff s 
assertion that he has standing to enjoin the County's legislation on the basis that the 
County did not conduct any subsequent studies, generate new maps, etc. in amending its 
comprehensive plan pursuant to Idaho Code §67-6508. The County may reasonably 
decide an existing comprehensive plan' s findings, maps. and other information are still 
valid without having to revise each planning component anew every time the 
comprehensive plan is amended; It is the plan itself that must contain each component; 
that the Plaintiff and even the Court could not substitute its acumen/judgment for that of 
the elected officials. 
n. Mootness 
The County had a reasonable basis in fact and law to maintain its position that the 
enactment of new legislation that purportedly corrects certain alleged procedural errors 
renders the decision whether to enjoin its predecessor moot. 
DA TED this 29th day of December 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Attorney Fees \vas this l '1 day of December. 2008 served upon the following 
individuals and in the corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum. 10 83340 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S. Suite 110 
Hailey. 10 83333 
Via United States mail 
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Paull. Fitzer, ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock S1., Suite 520 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
HFi 
CLEf 
Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
FILED 1 /-12-- ZOo 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES,LLC, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY, IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN 
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS, 
P.O. BOX 3123, KETCHUM, ID 83340, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 1 I 
I INAL 
1. The above named appellants, Ed Smith and Camas County, Idaho, by and through the 
duly elected Board of Commissioners in their official capacity Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and 
Ron Chapman, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the final judgment certified pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(b) entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order Following Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 3rd day of December, 
2008, Honorable Judge Robert 1. Elgee presiding. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to 
Rule II(a)(l), LA.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 
(a) Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling 
that it had jurisdiction over this matter where the case was properly removed to the United States 
District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1:08 CV-00470-CWD. Subsequent 
to this removal, the District Court issued its ruling in this matter. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the case was still a justiciable case 
or controversy and not rendered moot by Camas County's enaction of subsequent legislation 
repealing the challenged legislation. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 2 
(c) Declaratory Judgment Action: Whether the District Court erred in permanently 
enjoining the County's legislation in a declaratory judgment action where Respondent wholly 
failed to carry its burden and the evidence could not support a court's finding that: 
1. Standing / Harm: Respondent suffered a distinct palpable injury differentiating 
him from the citizenry at large; and 
11. Nexus: The injury suffered was by virtue of, or has a fairly traceable connection 
between, the claimed injury and the challenged conduct; 
111. Challenged Conduct: The County committed a procedural! substantive error or 
the challenged legislative activity is confiscatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
capricious in nature as applied to the Respondent. 
(d) Whether the District Court erred in holding that the enactment of a comprehensive 
plan, land use map, zoning ordinance, and zoning map are quasi-judicial rather than legislative in 
nature; 
(e) Whether the District Court applied the wrong standard of review, ruling that the 
County's legislative activity was governed by, and Respondent had standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action under, LLUPA'sjudicial review provisions including I.e. §67-6521, 
I.e. §67-6535, I.e. §67-6536, and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201 et 
seq.: 
(0 Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on finding that 
Respondent was entitled to and was denied due process of law for defective notice where the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 3 
evidence is uncontradicted that Respondent had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard, and did, in fact, attend, testify, and present evidence at each and every public hearing. 
(g) Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on a finding 
that while Respondent's actual notice might be a defense against challenges by affected persons 
in a judicial review context, the County is held to an even higher due process standard where 
legislative activity is applicable to the general public as a whole. 
(h) Whether the District Court erred in finding that LLUPA's judicial reView 
provisions are applicable in this case in the absence of evidence demonstrating that, pursuant to 
Idaho Code §67-6521, Respondent had an interest in real property adversely affected by the 
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development. 
(i) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6536 was applicable to the 
governmental activity in this matter, and, if applicable, that the County did not comply with the 
statutory requirements. 
(j) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.C. §67-6535 was applicable to the 
governmental activity in this matter requiring a written decision in amending the zoning 
ordinance, zoning map, comprehensive plan, and land use map, beyond the legislation 
themselves; 
(k) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with 
I.C. §67-6509; 
(I) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with 
I.e. §67-6508; 
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(m) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with 
I.C. §67-6511; 
(n) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County violated I.C. §67-6506; 
(0) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-117. 
(p) Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.e. 
§ 12-117. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule 
25, I.A.R. supplemented by the following: 
(a) June 27,2007, hearing 
(b) July 19,2007, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County) 
(c) September 25,2007, hearing 
(d) October 23,2007, telephonic hearing 
(e) November 13, 2007, hearing 
(e) December 11,2007, hearing 
(1) January 29,2008, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County) 
(g) February 26, 2008, hearing 
(h) March 7,2008, hearing 
(i) May 5, 2008, telephonic status conference (occurred in Blaine County) 
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(j) May 20-21, 2008, hearing 
(k) August 11, 2008, telephonic status conference (held in Blaine County) 
(I) August 20, 2008, hearing 
6. Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R., be included in the clerk's record. Appellant also requests the following documents be 
included in the clerk's record: 
(a) 06/20/2007 Answer of Defendants Camas County, The Individual Members of 
the Camas County Board of County Commissioners, Ed Smith in his Capacity as a Member of 
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(b) 07/06/2007 Memorandum 
(c) 07/1312007 - Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records 
(d) 07116/2007 - Motion to Strike and Objection to Plaintiff's Verified Application 
for a TRO and Pre-Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Record * * * Note: This 
document is erroneously entitled as described, but it is in substance a Reply Post-Hearing 
Memorandum filed by Defendants* * * 
(e) 07119/2007 - Objection to Plaintiff's Verified Application for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records 
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(t) 07/1912007 - Affidavit of Dwight Butler In Support of Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Verified Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to 
Destruction of Public Records 
(g) 07/27/2007 - Order Denying Plaintiffs' July 13,2007 Verified Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public 
Records 
(h) 08113/2007 - Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction 
(i) 10109/2007 - Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting the County Defendants 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction 
(j) 10/22/2007 - Motion to Strike Affidavit of George Martin In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing) 
(k) 10/22/2007 - Memorandum Supporting Motion to Strike Affidavit of George 
Martin in Support of Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing) 
(f) 1211 112007 - Order Granting Leave to Amend Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
(m) 12/13/2007 - Amended Petition for Breach of Contract 
(n) 12/28/2007 - Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record" 
and Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction 
(0) 0 1/22/2008 - Plaintiffs Motion to Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt 
of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
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(p) 01/23/2008 - Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Hold Camas 
County Defendants In Contempt of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
(q) 01/23/2008 - Affidavit of Stephanie 1. Bonney In Support of Defendants' 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt for Alleged Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
(r) 0311112008 - Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order Expanding 
Preliminary Injunction 
(s) 03112/2008 - Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction (Conflict of Interest Allegation) 
(t) 04/02/2008 - Decision On Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a 
Preliminary Injunction 
(u) 0511312008 - Motion to Dismiss 
(v) 05/19/2008 - Exhibit List, Defendants 
(w) 05/20/2008 - Exhibit List 
(x) 05/20/2008 - Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief 
(y) 05/2112008 - Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence 
(z) 08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two 
Additional Causes of Action: 1) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against Resolutions 114 and 
115 and Ordinances # 157 and 158; 2) Damages for Violations of State and Federal Law 
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(a a) 08/08/2008 - Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, Tortious 
Interference With Contract, For Declaratory Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural and 
Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law 
(bb) 08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief 
(cc) 08/27/2008 - Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Amend Complaint 
(dd) 09/29/2008 - Defendants Camas County, et al Post Trial Brief 
(ee) 10108/2008 - Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
(ft) 10/15/2008 - Amended Answer 
(gg) 12/22/2008 - Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
(ft) 12/2912008 - Objection to Attorney Fees 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including charts, graphs, 
maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether hearing or trial, 
be included as exhibits to the record. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Rollie Bennett 
Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
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(b) The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofIdaho acting in his official capacity, 
and Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for 
any services rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official 
capacity is a party. 
(c) The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section 67-
2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state 
officer in the performance of his official duties. 
(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
I.A.R. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 day of January, 2009. 
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD. 
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* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was this 
4- day of January, 2009 served upon the following individuals and in the corresponding 
manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey, ID 83333 
Via United States mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM ) 
HOMES, LLC. ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 
V. ) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, by ) 
And through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their official capacity, ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPMAN, ) 
) 
Defendants-Appellants. ) 
Court No. Cv-07-24 
CLERK'S CERTIFICA TE OF 
OF APPEAL 
Appeal from: Fifth Judicial District, Camas County. Honorable Robert Elgee presiding. 
Case number from court: CV 07-24 
Order or judgment appealed from: December 3,2008 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order Following Trial 
Attorney for appellant: Paul J. Fitzer 
Attorney for Respondent: Christopher P. Simms 
Appealed by: Defendants 
Appealed against: Plaintiffs 
Notice of Appeal filed: January 12, 2009 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: 
Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: 
Appellate fee paid: None-Exempt 
Respondent's Request for additional clerk' s record tiled: 
Respondent's Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? Yes 
!'lame Reporter: Susan Israel, 20] 2nd Ave S, Ste 106, Hailey, Id 83333 
Maureen Newton. Box 368, Rupert. ID. 83350 
A L-
Request for additional reporter's transcript: Yes 
Dated: January 14.2009 
F.R. BENNETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ~ CI<iX:,VT: 
Deputy Clerk 
L-
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMiv1S 
Attorney at Law 
US Bank Bldg .. Ste 209 
191 Sun Valley Road 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum. ID 83340 
Tel: 208622 7878 
Fax: 208 622 7921 
ISB# 7473 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAMAS 
GEORGE MARTIN. 
Plaintiff. 
and 
MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES. L.L.c.. 
Plaintiff. 
v. 
ED SMITH. 
Defendant. 
and 
CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO. 
By and through the duly elected 
Board of Commissioners in 
their official and individual 
capacity. 
KEN BACKTROM. 
BILL DAVIS. and 
RON CHAPMAN. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST 
TO SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
I.A.R. 19 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff. through counseL and files this, his REQUEST to 
SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL. and in support thereof states as 
fo11o\vs: 
I. Defendants-Appellants. Camas County by and through the Board of 
Commissioners. by counsel. filed a Notice of Appeal herein on or about January 12, 
2009. 
2. Said Notice of Hearing failed to designate any of the legal memorandum tiled by 
PlaintitT during the course of the proceedings and thereby fails to join the issues herein 
presented. 
3. Idaho Appellate Rule 19 provides for a Respondent to request additional materials 
to supplement the Clerks Record identified by Appellant, and does therefore request the 
following documents 
a. 6.13 .07 Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Camas County's Objection to 
Plaintiffs Application for TRO, Preliminary Injunction & Rule 11 
Sanctions 
b. 7.16.09 Plaintiffs Response to Post-Hearing Memorandum Supporting 
County Defendant' s Objection to Plaintiff s Application for TRO & 
Preliminary Injunction 
c. 10.16.07 Plaintiffs Reply to Camas County Defendant's Post-Hearing 
Memorandum 
d. 3.18.08 Plaintiffs Response to Defendant Camas County's Post-Hearing 
Memorandum Relating to Conflict of Interest Allegation 
e. 8.20.08 Plaintiffs Trial Brief 
re') 
PLAINTIFF'S Rl:::QUEST TO S( ;PPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON i\PPEAL 2 
f. 9.15.08 Plaintiffs Post-Trial Memorandum 
g. 12.3.08 Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS 
FOR PLAINTIFF 
Christopher P. Simms Dated 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFIY that on this l.:y day of ) 1I;v1' 2009, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO 
SUPPLEMENT CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL by delivering same, via US Mail 
to Phillip 1. Collaer. Attorney for Defendant Ed Smith, 250 South Fifth Street, Ste. 
700, P.O. Box 7426, Boise Idaho 83707-7426, facsimile number 208 344 5800, and 
Moore, Smith Buxton & Turke, Paul Fitzer. Attorneys for Camas County Defendants 
950 W. Bannock SL Ste 520. Boise, Idaho 83702. facsimile number 208 331 1202, 
and the Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District. Camas County, Rollie Bennett. PO 
Box 430, Fairfield. Idaho 83327. 
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Paul J. Fitzer. ISB No. 5675 
MOORE SvlITH BUXTON & TURCKE. CHTD. 
950 W. Bannock St.. Suite 520 
Boise. ID 83702 
Tel: 208/33111800 
Fax: 208/33111202 
Attorneysfor Defendants Camas County and the Individual Commissioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CAMAS COUNTY 
GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN CUSTOM 
HOMES, LLC 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ED SMITH and CAMAS COUNTY. IDAHO, by ) 
and through the duly elected Board of ) 
Commissioners in their ot1icial capacity. ) 
KEN BACKSTROM, BILL DA VIS, and RON ) 
CHAPt\lAN, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-07-24 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT(S), GEORGE MARTIN and MARTIN 
CUSTOM HOMES, LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY. CHRISTOPHER P. SIMMS. 
P.O. BOX 3123. KETCHUM. ID 83340. AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN Tl fAT: 
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1. The above named appellants, Ed Smith and Camas County, Idaho. by and through the 
duly elected Board of Commissioners in their otlicial capacity Ken Backstrom, Bill Davis, and 
Ron Chapman. appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the tinal judgment celiified pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b) entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law. and Order Following Trial entered in the above-entitled action on the 3rd day of December. 
2008. Honorable Judge Robert 1. Elgee presiding. 
2. The Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and 
order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to 
Rule 11 (a)(1), I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant now intends to assert 
in the appeal is as follows: 
(a) Whether the District Court, before the Honorable Robert Elgee, erred in ruling 
that it had jurisdiction over this matter where the case was properly removed to the United States 
District Court before the Honorable Candy Dale in Case No. 1 :08 CV -004 70-CWD. Subsequent 
to this removal. the District Comi issued its ruling in this matter. 
(b) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the case was still a justiciable case 
or controversy and not rendered moot by Camas County's enaction of subsequent legislation 
repealing the challenged legislation. 
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(c) Declaratorv Judgment Action: Whether the District Court eITed in permanently 
enjoining the County's legislation in a declaratory judgment action vvhere Respondent wholly 
failed to caITY its burden and the evidence could not support a court's finding that: 
I. Standing / Harm: Respondent suffered a distinct palpable injury differentiating 
him from the citizenry at large; and 
11. Nexus: The injury suffered was by virtue of, or has a fairly traceable connection 
between. the claimed injury and the challenged conduct; 
Ill. Challenged Conduct: The County committed a procedural! substantive eITor or 
the challenged legislative activity IS confiscatory. arbitrary. unreasonable, or 
capricious in nature as applied to the Respondent. 
(d) Whether the District Court erred in holding that the enactment of a comprehensive 
plan. land use map. zoning ordinance, and zoning map are quasi-judicial rather than legislative in 
nature; 
(e) Whether the District Court applied the wrong standard of review, ruling that the 
County's legislative activity was governed by, and Respondent had standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action under. LLUPA's judicial review provisions including I.e. §67-6521, 
I.C §67-6535. I.e. §67-6536. and the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, I.C. §67-5201 et 
seq. : 
(t) Whether the District Court eITed in basing a permanent injunction on finding that 
Respondent \vas entitled to and was denied due process of law f()r defective notice where the 
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evidence is uncontradicted that Respondent had actual notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. and did. in fact. attend, testify, and present evidence at each and every public hearing. 
(g) Whether the District Court erred in basing a permanent injunction on a finding 
that while Respondent's actual notice might be a defense against challenges by affected persons 
in a judicial review context, the County is held to an even higher due process standard where 
legislative activity is applicable to the general public as a whole. 
(h) Whether the District Court erred in finding that LLUPA's judicial reVIew 
provisions are applicable in this case in the absence of evidence demonstrating that, pursuant to 
Idaho Code §67-6521, Respondent had an interest in real property adversely affected by the 
issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development. 
(i) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.e. §67-6536 was applicable to the 
governmental activity in this matter, and. if applicable. that the County did not comply with the 
statutory requirements. 
(j) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that I.e. §67-6535 was applicable to the 
governmental activity in this matter requiring a written decision in amending the zoning 
ordinance. zoning map, comprehensive plan, and land use map, beyond the legislation 
themselves: 
(k) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply \vith 
I.C. §67-6509: 
(I) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply with 
I.e. §67-6508: 
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(m) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County failed to comply vvith 
I.e. §67-6511: 
(n) Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the County violated I.e. §67-6506: 
(0) Whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent is 
entitled to an avv-ard of attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-117. 
(p) Whether Appellant is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C. 
§12-117. 
4. No order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested. The appellant requests the preparation of the 
following portions of the reporter's transcript: the reporter's standard transcript pursuant to Rule 
25, I.A.R. supplemented by the following: 
(a) June 27, 2007, hearing 
(b) July 19,2007, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County) 
(c) September 25, 2007, hearing 
(d) October 23,2007, telephonic hearing 
(e) November 13.2007. hearing 
(e) December 11. 2007, hearing 
(1) January 29, 2008, telephonic hearing (held in Blaine County) 
(g) February 26, 2008, hearing 
(h) March 7, 2008, hearing 
(i) May 5. 2008. telephonic status conference (occurred in Blaine County) 
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U) May 20-21, 2008, hearing 
(k) August 11,2008, telephonic status conference (held in Blaine County) 
(I) August 20, 2008, hearing 
6. Appellant requests that those documents which are automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R., be included in the clerk' s record. Appellant also requests the following documents be 
included in the clerk's record: 
(a) 06/20/2007 - Answer of Defendants Camas County, The Individual Members of 
the Camas County Board of County Commissioners, Ed Smith in his Capacity as a Member of 
the Camas County Planning and Zoning Commission 
(b) 07/06/2007 - Memorandum 
(c) 07113 /2007 - Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order and 
Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records 
(d) 07116/2007 - Motion to Strike and Objection to Plaintiffs Verified Application 
for a TRO and Pre-Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Record * * * Note: This 
document is erroneously entitled as described, but it is in substance a Reply Post-Hearing 
Memorandum filed by Defendants* * * 
(e) 07119/2007 - Objection to Plaintiffs Verified Application for a Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public Records 
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(1) 07119/2007 - Affidavit of Dwight Butler In Support of Defendants' Objection to 
Plaintiffs' Verified Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to 
Destruction of Public Records 
(g) 07/27/2007 - Order Denying PlaintiiIs' July 13,2007 Verified Application for 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Relating to Destruction of Public 
Records 
(h) 08/13/2007 - Decision on Status of Camas County Planning and Zoning 
Commission for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction 
(i) 10109/2007 Post Hearing Memorandum Supporting the County Defendants 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction 
U) 10/2212007 - Motion to Strike Affidavit of George Martin In Support of 
Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing) 
(k) 10/22/2007 - Memorandum Supporting Motion to Strike Affidavit of George 
Martin in Support of Plaintiffs' Post Hearing Memorandum (Second Evidentiary Hearing) 
(I) 1211112007 - Order Granting Leave to Amend Petition for Declaratory Judgment 
(m) 12/13/2007 Amended Petition for Breach of Contract 
(n) 12/28/2007 - Decision on Requirements of a "Transcribable Verbatim Record" 
and Other Records for Purposes of a Preliminary Injunction 
(0) 01122/2008 - Plaintiffs ~1otion to Hold Camas County Defendants In Contempt 
of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
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(p) 01123/2008 - Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Hold Camas 
County Defendants In Contempt of Court for Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
(q) 01123/2008 Affidavit of Stephanie 1. Bonney In Support of Defendants' 
Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion for Contempt for Alleged Violation of Preliminary Injunction 
(r) 0311112008 - Order Following Contempt Hearing and Order Expanding 
Preliminary Injunction 
(s) 03112/2008 - Post-Hearing Memorandum Objecting to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction (Conflict of Interest Allegation) 
(t) 04/02/2008 - Decision On Conflict of Interests Issue for Purposes of a 
Preliminary Injunction 
(u) 05/13/2008 - Motion to Dismiss 
(v) 05/19/2008 - Exhibit List. Defendants 
(w) 05/20/2008 - Exhibit List 
(x) 0512012008 - Plaintiffs' Application for Temporary Restraining Order. 
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief 
(y) 05/2112008 - Stipulation as to Facts and Admission of Documentary Evidence 
(z) 08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Petition by Adding Two 
Additional Causes of Action: 1) Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Against Resolutions 114 and 
115 and Ordinances #157 and 158: 2) Damages for Violations of State and Federal Law 
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(aa) 08/08/2008 Second Amended Petition for Breach of Contract, Tortious 
Interference With Contract, For Declaratory Relief, Damages for Violation of Procedural and 
Substantive Due Process Rights and Equal Protection of Law 
(bb) 08/08/2008 - Plaintiffs' Verified Application for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief 
(cc) 08/27/2008 - Response to Plaintiffs' Petition for Leave to Amend Complaint 
(dd) 0912912008 - Defendants Camas County, et al Post Trial Brief 
(ee) 10108/2008 - Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint 
(ff) 10/15/2008 - Amended Answer 
(gg) 12122/2008 Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
(ff) 12/2912008 - Objection to Attorney Fees 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 31, Appellant requests that all tapes, exhibits, including charts, graphs, 
maps, or other documents, offered and admitted during the proceedings, whether hearing or trial, 
be included as exhibits to the record. 
7. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Rollie Bennett 
Clerk of the Court, Fifth Judicial District, Camas County 
P.O. Box 130 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
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Susan Israel 
Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District, Camas County 
P.O. Box 430 
Fairfield, Idaho 83327 
Maureen Newton 
Court Reporter 
Fifth Judicial District. Minidoka County 
P.O. Box 368 
Rupert, Idaho 83350 
(b) The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for preparation of the 
clerk's record because Appellant is an officer of the State ofIdaho acting in his official capacity, 
and Section 31-3212(2), Idaho Code, provides that county officers shall not charge any fee for 
any services rendered in any action or proceeding in which any state officer in his official 
capacity is a party. 
(c) The Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because Section 67-
2301, Idaho Code, provides that no filing fee shall be charged for services rendered to any state 
officer in the performance of his official duties. 
(d) Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, 
I.A.R. 
Respectfully submitted this 11-day of January, 2009. 
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MOORE SMITH Bux N & TURCKE, CHTD. 
Paul 1. F 
Attorneys 
* * * 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tme and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Notice of Appeal 
\vas this J!f-- day of January, 2009 served upon the follow"ing individuals and in the 
corresponding manner: 
Christopher P. Simms 
P.O. Box 3123 
Ketchum, ID 83340 
Via United States mail 
Phillip J. Collaer 
ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise. ID 83707 
Via United States mail 
Hon. Robert Elgee 
Blaine County Courthouse (resident chambers) 
202 S. Second Ave. S, Suite 110 
Hailey. ID 83333 
Via United States mail 
Paul J. 
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